


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

Reading Material



THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
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C O N T E N T S

1. Robert B.Denhardt
Public Administration Theory:
The State of the Discipline
2. Peter F.Drucker
The Deadly Sins in Public Administration
3. Gerald E.Calden
What Really is Public Maladministration
4. Mohit Bhattacharya
Crisis of Public Administration as a
Discipline in India
5. Charles T.Goodsell
Emerging Issues in Public Administration
6. James L.Perry and Kenneth L.Karemer
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Issues and Patterns.
7. S.R.Maheshwari
Accountability in Public Administration:
Towards a Conceptual Framework
8. R.S.Ganapathy
On Methodologies for Policy Analysis
9. United Nations
Enhancing Capabilities for Administrative
Reforms in Developing Countries
10. Government of India
Administrative Reforms Since 1947.



3

Public Administration Theory: The State of the Discipline

ROBERT B. DENHARDT

Generally speaking, public administration is concerned with managing change in pursuit of publicly defined societal values. In the definition of the field are implied serious theoretical issues. What is the role of the public administrator in shaping and executing public policy? How might public organizations best be designed and managed? What are the proper roles and responsibilities of the public manager? In an effort to answer such questions, students and practitioners of public administration over the years have developed a variety of theoretical approaches. Yet all have been bound together in their attempt to conceptualize and to understand the management of public programs.

While having common interests, theorists have ranged widely in their approaches to developing theories of public organizations. Even the briefest listing of efforts in public administration theory would have to include work by public administrationists in empirical theory, normative theory, ethical theory, public-choice theory, phenomenology, critical theory, psychoanalytic theory, and so on. In addition, one might wish to include theories related to public administration growing out of political science, management, sociology, anthropology, and a host of other disciplines. Public administration theory is contributed to by social scientists engaged in specific research projects and seeking to contribute to theory, but also by a small group of scholars who identify themselves as public administration theorists.

In my view, public administration theory draws its greatest strength and its most serious limitation from this diversity. On the one hand, public administration theorists are required to understand a broad range of perspectives relevant to their theory-building task. There is a tremendous richness and complexity built into public administration theory. On the other hand, the diversity of public administration often means that the field lacks a sense of identity. Many even question whether it is possible to speak of building a coherent and integrated public administration theory.

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Under these circumstances, a review and assessment of public administration theory is timely.

Recent periodical literature and a large number of recent books in the field have been examined in preparing this chapter. Specifically, the major public administration journals from 1980 to 1985 have been reviewed, and articles that contributed most directly to public administration theory have been identified. An impressive accumulation of material on such diverse topics as democratic responsibility, democratic governance, the politics of bureaucracy, ethical concerns, citizenship, organizational dynamics, and political economy has resulted. The diversity and richness of public administration theory were both surprising and encouraging. Next, a listing of books published in the 1980s that seemed to be self-consciously theoretical in their presentation was developed. Again, the collection of material was impressive, though diverse in content and approach.

In reading the recent articles in public administration theory, one is struck by the diversity of topics being considered by public administration theorists; in reading recently published books, one gets more of a sense of trends in the field. For this reason, the diversity of topics in public administration theory is illustrated using the collection of journal articles as a base, then shifts that are occurring in our approach to public administration theory are explored using recently published books as a base. Following this review, several developments that set an agenda of topics needing further exploration by public administration theories are discussed.

The Content of Public Administration Theory: The Articles

The current periodical literature in public administration theory illustrates a vast range of topics including the role of the public bureaucracy in the governance process, the ethics of public service, citizenship and civic education, alternative epistemologies, organizational dynamics, interorganizational policy implementation, and political economy and public choice. Although it is not possible here to review all the current work in public administration theory, representative work in each of the topical areas is examined.

The Role of the Public Bureaucracy in the Governance Process

Recent public administration theorists have continued to explore many familiar issues, such as the relationship between politics and administration or between bureaucracy and democracy. Indeed, Grosenick (1984) draws from the American Society for Public Administration's Centennial Agendas project to identify eleven topical areas currently being examined through research in democratic governance. These include such concerns as basic political values, responsibility and accountability, and

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checks and balances—all topics long considered the core of the study and practice of public administration.

One noteworthy treatment of these issues is provided by Thompson (1983), who explores various ways in which the public bureaucracy can be reconciled with a democratic political system. Among these approaches, he identifies the hierarchical model of administrative responsibility, reliance on the professionalism of the civil service to achieve responsiveness, a pluralist model of citizen involvement, and the participatory model. Thompson argues that the participatory model provides the best starting point for reconciling bureaucracy and democracy, but that it needs to be supplemented by the best features of the other models.

David Rosenbloom (1983) treats the same general issue in a different fashion, suggesting three approaches to public administration theory: the "managerial," the "political," and the "legal." Each approach corresponds to a particular branch of government and each carries a distinctive set of values. Rosenbloom argues that in the modern administrative state, these three sets of values have permeated the administrative agencies of government, placing administrators in the unenviable position of having to balance the various interests represented by the three approaches. One illustration of these difficulties is provided in Lerner and Wanat's (1983) discussion of the fuzziness of legislative mandates and the ways in which bureaucrats seek to minimize the problems arising from mismatched intentions and understandings.

Hart and Scott (1982) offer the view that American public administration has been taken over by the values of American business management, values they consider inappropriate to the conduct of public affairs. In contrast, they assert that the field of public administration must recover from its dependence on business values and develop both a philosophy and an approach to education for the public service that will emphasize the inherent uniqueness and strength of the field. The conduct of public affairs, they argue, should be guided by the natural-law values of our constitutional foundation. Hart (1984) carries the argument further by applying the philosophical principles underlying the American system to an analysis of virtue among citizens and honor among bureaucrats. Seen in this light, "public administration is not a kind of technology but a form of moral endeavor" (p. 116), one requiring what Frederickson and Hart (1985) term a "patriotism of benevolence."

In addition to these general philosophical statements concerning the role of public organizations in a democratic society, several theorists have taken a historical approach to the field, seeking to understand more clearly some of the traditional values associated with the public organizations. O'Toole (1984), for example, examines the reform tradition in public administration, arguing that administrative thinkers over the past hundred years have remained remarkably true to the tradition from which the field evolved. He suggests, however, that certain problems are so deeply rooted in our political culture that a field primarily concerned with reform will have great difficulty in addressing them. Similarly, whether the image or presen-

tation of the field to the larger political culture can be altered is the topic addressed by Killingsworth (1982), who argues for a new style of presentation.

Finally, we should note several articles that attempt to conceptualize more precisely notions of responsiveness (Saltzstein 1985) or efficiency (Goodin and Wilenski 1984), or to develop empirical tests of the correspondence between bureaucratic action and public demands (Gaertner, Gaertner, and Devine 1983; McEachern and Al-Arayed 1984; Romzek and Hendricks 1982).

Related to these discussions of the role of public organizations are a number of articles stimulated by recent attacks on the public service by politicians and others. Drucker's (1980) discussion of the deadly sins of public administration suggests several errors agencies make in implementing programs that undermine their success. More positively, Kaufman's (1981) discussion of the fear of bureaucracy suggests that whatever the validity of recent attacks on the public bureaucracy, the fear itself deserves some explanation. Kaufman conjectures that the fear may be stimulated by a need on the part of the public to assign specific blame for problems that may be far more systemic than they appear. He suggests that we should look for deeper explanations rather than scapegoats. This same sentiment is echoed by Triston (1980) and Adams (1984), both of whom acknowledge certain weaknesses in public organizations but underscore their positive contributions to society.

From this brief review, it is clear that the traditional concerns of public administration theory continue to occupy the attention of major theorists in the 1980s. Notable in its philosophical tone, this material suggests a field continuing to search for an adequate expression of its role in democratic governance. While such a search is informed by historical developments in the field, it recognizes that the changing demands placed on public organizations in modern society require a redefinition of such notions as *responsiveness*. The image of the public administrator of the future is still being formed, but not in the minds of contemporary theorists; the new administrator is likely to be one active in the policy process, highly sensitive to notions of the public interest, and always mindful of the moral and political context of administrative action.

The Ethics of Public Service

If there is one striking shift in the priorities of public administration theorists in the 1980s, it is surely the extensive attention now being given to ethical concerns. Although we might speculate on the reasons for this new attention (Watergate certainly being a prime candidate), there is no question that theorists have assigned great emphasis to ethical concerns. The ethics of public service is discussed more fully in chapter 5 of this book, but we should at least indicate here the range of materials now being developed by public administration theorists.

The territory is well laid out by Willbern (1984), who identifies six kinds of morality for public officials: (1) basic honesty and conformity to law, (2) conflicts of

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interest, (3) service orientation and procedural fairness, (4) the ethic of democratic responsibility, (5) the ethic of public policy determination, and (6) the ethic of compromise and social integration. This list is elaborated on by Brady (1981), Lilla (1981), and Thompson (1985), each of whom considers the range of ethical studies and the way this study should be approached. Especially important is Thompson's demonstration that two major arguments against the possibility of developing ethical administration are not compelling.

Specific discussions of the relationship between law and public administration include Foster's (1981) argument in behalf of an "intermediate legalism"—law as if people mattered—that would complement and foster moral behavior in public agencies. Similarly, Rohr (1985) presages his recent book on ethics in the administrative state by comparing the political theory of the Constitution with the constitutional theory of Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900).

The question of individual responsibility in public organizations has been discussed even more frequently. Representative articles include those by Brady (1983), Scott (1982), and Thompson (1980). Stewart (1985) illustrates the flavor of these discussions well in her assessment of ethic and the profession of public administration.

A special condition affecting the ethical behavior of officials is the influence of professional values, values that may clash with the ethics of public service. Bell (1985), for example, studies the interplay between professional values and organizational purposes in housing policy, while Yarwood (1986) concludes more generally that "science and the professions must share the blame for any ethical problems caused by formal organizations" (p. 483).

Finally, several authors have considered the dissemination of ethical standards throughout the profession, with Chandler (1983) providing an analysis of arguments both in favor of and in opposition to a Code of Ethics for the American Society for Public Administration, and with Koritansky (1982), Mayer and Harmon (1982), and Schorr (1983) considering the teaching of ethics in professional programs in public administration. Mayer and Harmon (1982) summarize this work well in their comment: "The role of the administrator is to mediate, not merely to judge or to solve problems. . . . Performing this essential role requires that the administrator be responsible in each of three senses: professionally, politically, and personally. Moral education for public administrators requires an understanding of each and an understanding of their relationship" (p. 222).

Citizenship and Civic Education

One important area combining studies of the governance process with studies of administrative ethics has been citizenship and civic education. Fredrickson's (1982) article on the "recovery of civicism" sets the tone for these discussions by arguing that, in de-emphasizing the public aspect of public administration, we have lost sight of

the importance of democratic values as they affect the work of individual administrators. A similar conclusion, though one arrived at through different means, is reached by McSwain (1985), who argues that we do not now have an adequate grounding for a fully developed notion of citizenship and that the liberalist legacy of the Constitution has undermined notions of community and the public interest with rational individualism. Under such circumstances, she argues, the administrator is left with little guidance in making responsible decisions concerning public values.

In addition to these independent works, a special symposium on citizenship in the *Public Administration Review* included several important theoretical articles (including the article by Hart discussed earlier). In contrast to other theorists interested in ethics who take a more legalistic approach, Cooper (1984) argues that the ethical obligations of the public administrator are derived from the fact that administrators are citizens, "professional citizens," or "citizen-administrators." Among the administrator's obligations, argues McGregor (1984), is that of educating the citizenry, something that Gawthrop (1984a) finds difficult in a time in which the meaning of citizenship has become devoid of significance. Finally, Rohr (1985) discusses limitations on the administrator's political activity as instructive with respect to the language of citizenship.

Alternative Epistemologies

The questioning of traditional positivist approaches to research in public administration that characterized much of the theory work during the 1970s continued in the early 1980s; however, more recent work is not merely critical of earlier approaches but also seeks to outline alternative perspectives. (Many of these are discussed in Morgan 1983, especially the entries by Forester and White, and McSwain.) Among these, several theorists approached their topic from perspectives growing out of phenomenology and literary criticism. Ostrom (1980) expressed the flavor of these new approaches: "I have gradually come to conclude that the study of public administration should not be treated as strictly natural phenomena. The methods of the natural sciences are not fully appropriate to the study of public administration. Instead, we need to look upon administrative tasks and administrative arrangements as works of art or as artifacts" (p. 309).

Sederberg (1984) suggests that we examine the metaphors underlying various research traditions. In contrast to the more traditional machine, organic, and dramatic metaphors, he offers an explanatory metaphor, one he claims is more sensitive to the subjective nature of organizations. Since all organizations are based on the experience of individual actors involved in explaining their actions and their participation, clarifying the structure of knowledge acquisition might well provide clues to the understanding of organizational structures and behavior. Killingsworth (1984), in contrast, employs Speech-Act philosophy as a framework for investigating idle talk in administrative organizations, noting both the ideological and fictional

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nature of what occurs in organized life. Finally, Fischer (1983) seeks a way of integrating empirical and normative judgments through a logic of questions that might aid in understanding decision making, while Jung (1982) provides a detailed application of phenomenology to public affairs.

Other theorists have focused on critical social theory as a source of inspiration for their studies. Denhardt (1981a, 1981b), for example, has outlined a critical theory of public organization, based on the work of the Frankfurt School of social philosophy. In such an approach, self-reflection and self-critique on the part of the administrator become central to organizational transformations. Similarly, Forester (1981) has applied Habermas's theory of communicative competence to the work of planners and administrators, emphasizing the administrator's contribution to enhanced public discourse in a society characterized by systematically distorted patterns of communications. Forester (1984) has also applied this perspective to an analysis of the concept of administrative rationality.

The process of developing new approaches to public administration theory has itself been a subject of some speculation. Both Morgan (1984) and Lovrich (1985) have written articles indicating opportunities that might arise from a diversity of paradigms in a field such as public administration, while White (1981) has explored some of the difficulties encountered by those seeking to develop alternative approaches. Finally, several recent articles in the *Public Administration Review*, including contributions by Cleary and McCurdy (1985) and White (1986), have discussed various approaches to research in public administration.

Organizational Dynamics

Several theorists identified with the field of public administration have effectively contributed to organization theory generally over the past several years, while others have adapted models of organization theory to public organizations. For example, Cohen (1984) has discussed the influence of conflicting subgoals on organizational search effectiveness, while Scholl (1981) has proposed an alternative to the goal model of organization, one he terms a political model. More broadly, McGregor (1981) has reviewed the work of Charles Lindblom in terms of its impact on the study of organized systems, especially as it emphasizes authority, exchange, and persuasion.

Adaptation of more general approaches to organization theory to the field of public administration has included Bozeman's (1981) discussion of organization design and Korten's (1984) development of the concept of strategic organization. Korten's work suggests that traditional models of organization are not well suited for the future and that strategic management represents a positive alternative, one that carries with it "a proactive commitment to the ideal that the purpose of organization is to serve the needs of people, while facilitating the human growth of all participants" (p. 341).

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The possibility of reordering complex organizations for the future is also addressed by Cleveland (1985), who suggests that information is now our most basic resource, but that the models of organization now employed were based on resource scarcities of other kinds. Such models, emphasizing influence and control, may be inappropriate to an information society, thus suggesting the possibility of major shifts in our approaches to organizing complex tasks. Under such conditions, hierarchy is likely to be an early victim.

One striking development among public administration theorists interested in organizational dynamics is an increased attention to psychological issues. In part, this work has been stimulated by new approaches to organizational learning developed by Argyris (1980) and others, but it also includes attention by Romzek (1985) to psychological linkages between work and nonwork involvements, and by Agor (1985) to managerial intuition.

Most interesting is the use of psychoanalytic constructs to understand organizational life. Baum (1982, 1983a, 1983b) has investigated the psychological relationship between advisers and their clients, as well as the psychodynamics of the bureaucratic lives of planners. Diamond (1984) has described bureaucracy as "an externalized self-system" and has outlined various psychological responses to stress in complex organizations (Diamond and Allcorn 1985). The later work suggests several distinct managerial styles that seem to characterize managers under stress. For example, one response growing from a fragmented self-image is trying to control events and feelings through rigid, perfectionist behavior.

Interorganizational Policy Implementation, Political Economy, and Public Choice

Several other approaches to public administration theory, most notably an increased attention to the development and operation of interorganizational networks, have been of great importance. Following the theoretical position outlined by Aldrich and Whetten (1981), several scholars have examined the patterns that emerge when several agencies interact regularly with respect to specific policy developments. O'Toole and Montjoy (1984) focus on situations in which two or more agencies are asked to work together toward implementation of a particular program, finding that with certain structures of interdependence, the chances of successful implementation are improved. Keller (1984) employs a political economy approach—considering both politics and economics—to the analysis of networks involved in groundwater management. The study of interorganizational networks is one among many uses of the political economy approach proposed by Goodsell (1984), who suggests such an approach be applied as well to administrative histories, business-government comparisons, program evaluation, and policy analysis. It should be noted, with respect to interorganizational networks, that Goodsell proposes a more subjectivist approach than normally assumed by interorganizational theorists. Finally, we should

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note that several theorists, such as Alexander (1985) and Springer (1985), have proposed revised approaches to policy analysis and implementation.

Relatively few articles appearing in the 1980s have extended the public-choice approach prominent during the 1970s, although both Berg (1984) and Butler (1983) have provided critiques of certain work in this area. An important and related body of work, however, growing out of the economic approach to bureaucratic behavior proposed by Niskanen (1971), has appeared. The broadest application of this work is Bendor and Moe's (1985) proposal for an adaptive model of bureaucratic politics, a model based on what they see as a circular flow of influence characteristic of representative government. "Citizens pressure legislators through elections, legislators influence the bureau through budgets and oversight, the bureau affects citizens through the costs and benefits generated by regulatory enforcement—and the circle is closed when citizens link their electoral support to legislators' positions on agency-relevant issues" (p. 757). (In the actual model, interest groups replace citizens as actors in the system.) The result is a model emphasizing decision making and adaptation under conditions of limited information, one that is claimed to conform certain aspects of pluralist and incrementalist thought.

More specific applications of this work, primarily centering on the relationship between bureaus and legislatures, have also been developed. Miller and Moe (1983) suggested limitations in the budget-maximizing capacities of bureaus, emphasizing instead the legislature's decision-making process; Eavey and Miller (1984) have similarly suggested that bureaucratic agenda control does not lead to monopolistic influence over legislatures but a process of bargaining that eventually determines budgetary outcomes. Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985) extend this work by analyzing the strategic behavior of bureaus and the ways in which legislatures detect and counter bureaucratic efforts to increase budgetary support.

Concluding Comments

The periodical literature in public administration theory over the past six years demonstrates the diversity and complexity of the theoretical enterprise. Certainly public administration theorists have continued to address many traditional concerns of public administrationists, such as the role of public organizations in the governance process. In terms of shifting areas of emphasis, the increased attention now being paid to the ethics of public service (along with related topics such as citizenship) is dramatic. Additionally, the more positive (not positivist) approach of epistemologists and the new interest of public administration theorists in psychological studies are noteworthy. Finally, interest in interorganizational networks and economic models of bureaucratic behavior has been strong. The picture of public administration theory that emerges from the periodical literature is one of a dynamic and changing field; whether that characterization should be read as a lack of coherence or as an indicator of the breadth and complexity of the field is considered later.

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Approaches to Public Administration Theory: The Books

In terms of the substantive areas covered by the representative articles reviewed here, public administration theory in the 1980s has much in common with the work of previous generations of scholars. In terms of approach, however, public administration theory today is strikingly different from that of earlier years. In order to illustrate the difference, the major books in public administration theory published in the 1980s are discussed in terms of a classification scheme similar to that used by Burrell and Morgan (1979) in their important work, *Sociological Paradigms in Organisational Analysis*.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that "all theories of organisation are based upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society" (p. 1), an assumption that leads them to suggest two dimensions on which theories of organization can be arrayed. The first dimension focuses on assumptions about the nature of social science and includes questions related to ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology. They maintain that each of these questions can be answered in two ways and that the resulting sequence of responses can be grouped to form a single dimension, which they call "the subjective-objective dimension." This dimension ranges from German idealism, which emphasizes the subjective nature of human affairs, to the more familiar sociological positivism, which seeks to apply the natural science procedures to the collection and analysis of human behavior.

Their second dimension focuses on assumptions about the nature of society, essentially differences concerning the principal issue in the field of sociology—what they term the order-conflict debate. A slight reworking of this debate leads them to postulate a second dimension, ranging from "the sociology of regulation" to the "sociology of radical change." The former, again the more familiar, emphasizes the underlying order to cohesiveness of human systems, while the latter seeks explanations for radical changes in society.

The juxtaposition of these two dimensions provides a way of classifying various paradigms in sociological analysis, a classification Burrell and Morgan (1979) later applied to a review of works in organization theory, as illustrated in figure 3.1.

While one dimension of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) scheme is well suited to an analysis of public administration theory, the other needs substantial revision. Certainly the subjective-objective dimension would seem relevant to the study of public administration. Although those in public administration have rarely articulated the ontological issues as clearly as those in sociology (probably preferring to borrow these materials from others), public administration theorists certainly have debated epistemological and methodological issues in great detail over the years. Thus, we might join Burrell and Morgan in defining the subjective viewpoint as focusing on "an understanding of the way in which the individual creates, modifies,

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and interprets the world in which he or she finds himself" (p. 3). Similarly, we might define the objective dimension as searching for "universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is being observed" (p. 3). Moreover, those in public administration have differed with respect to questions about human nature, specifically raising questions concerning whether the individual acts voluntarily or deterministically. Some theorists have offered a concept of the individual as creating the social world, while others see the individual more as a product of the environment. In public administration, these assumptions have led some to focus on the role of values in personal change and others to focus on structural devices capable of influencing individual behavior. In this way as well, there would seem to be some justification in employing the subjective-objective dimension in a review of public administration theory.

The other dimension, however, must be changed to fit the field of public administration. Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed this dimension by attempting to identify what they saw as the key issue in sociology. But, as we would expect, the key issue in sociology is not necessarily the key issue in public administration. For this reason, we should drop the regulation-change dimension, replacing it completely with the key issue in the study of public administration.

The most logical candidate for that dimension, I would suggest, is "politics and administration," not the old politics-administration dichotomy, but the continuing tension between political and organizational concerns. Theorists in the field of public administration have tended to focus their work either on political questions, such as responsiveness and accountability, or on organizational questions, such as efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, while one might argue that political and organizational interests are not mutually exclusive, the particular tension that exists between the two defines the central problem of public administration today. Again, it is important to note that this dimension is not an adaptation of Burrell and Morgan but is one based on work in public administration.




FIGURE 3.1

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Works in the Objectivist Tradition

In previous decades, the objectivist tradition in public administration theory boasted such major contributions as Herbert Simon's (1957) *Administrative Behavior*, Vincent Ostrom's (1973) *The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration*, Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision*, Downs's (1967) *Inside Bureaucracy*, Selznick's (1949) *TVA and the Grass Roots*, Kaufman's (1960) *The Forest Ranger*, Wamsley and Zald's (1973) *The Political Economy of Public Organizations*, and Wildavsky's (1970)

Speaking Truth to Power. The 1980s produced relatively few distinctive contributions within this tradition.

Of the objectivist treatments of public administration theory that appeared in the 1980s, more focused on political structure than administrative control. (Such a finding is perfectly understandable inasmuch as the objectivist tradition supports a generic approach to the study of complex organizations, a point later examined in more detail.) Objectivist studies of the political role of public organizations in the 1980s include three second editions of important general approaches to public administration theory.

Charles T. Goodsell's (1983) *The Case for Bureaucracy* is admittedly a polemic in defense of the public bureaucracy; nevertheless, it is a work with important theoretical implications as well. The book, written as a response to recent attacks on the public bureaucracy by political leaders and academics alike, paints a far more positive picture of the public bureaucracy than that portrayed in the popular media or in many scholarly publications. According to Goodsell, the public bureaucracy, despite its admitted flaws, performs many important functions and is far less oppressive to its members and clients than the conventional wisdom in public administration contends. (It should be noted, in addition, that Goodsell and several colleagues at Virginia Tech have been circulating a paper they refer to as the




FIGURE 3.3

"Blacksburg Manifesto" that seeks to develop a more positive role for the bureaucracy in a pluralist system of governance.)

Guy Peters's (1984) text, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, is distinguished from other texts in the field by two important theoretical perspectives. First, Peters argues that public administration is "an integral part of the political process" (p. 5) and that the traditional dichotomy between politics and administration has eroded and will erode further as the public bureaucracy plays a greater role in the policy process. Second, Peters forcefully argues for a comparative approach to public administration, an approach almost completely absent from most similar treatments. Finally, Seidman and Gilmour (1986) have provided an updated version of Seidman's *Politics, Position, and Power*, emphasizing the expanded role of third parties in the delivery of domestic services and examining in some detail the increased role of the federal courts in regulatory activities.

Other recent works in the objectivist tradition have focused on the public bureaucracy and the policy process. Although a wide variety of policy studies have appeared in recent years (and are treated elsewhere in this volume), the theoretical underpinnings of the study are well represented in William Dunn's (1981) *Public Policy Analysis*. Dunn describes policy analysis as an applied social science oriented toward developing information in such a way that it will be of use in resolving policy problems. Especially important for our purposes is the general reliance of the field on the objectivist methods of the natural sciences; in Stuart Nagel's (1980) words, "Policy analysis is not something new methodologically" (p. 16). (In a related vein, the absence of major books dealing with issues of public choice during this period should be noted, although a variant of that tradition appears to be continuing in the periodical literature.)

While much of the recent literature in policy analysis has focused on the theoretical problem of agenda building and policy development (see John Kingdon's [1984] *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*), one recent focus in policy studies has been the implementation process. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), for example, consider in *Implementation and Public Policy* the variables that affect the achievement of legal objectives, such concerns as the tractability of the problem, the ability to structure implementation, and other variables affecting support for a particular program. Similarly, Ripley and Franklin (1982), writing in *Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation*, examine the implementation of public policy in a variety of areas, such as protective, competitive, or redistributive programs. Finally, some scholars have chosen to make specific recommendations for the conduct of agencies so as to ensure more effective implementation.

One noteworthy edited volume by Hall and Quinn (1983) examines the relationship between *Organization Theory and Public Policy* with most, although not all, of the contributions falling in the objectivist tradition emphasizing the importance of organizational environments in the policy process. Especially interesting

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is the section in their book that describes the increasing importance of interorganizational networks built around specific public programs. Under such conditions, the authors suggest, loosely linked networks, built around bargaining and negotiation rather than hierarchical structures, may become the primary unit of analysis for theorists in public administration.

Finally, several works that would fall roughly in the political/objectivist category focus on ethical behavior in the field of public administration. In a rather broad-ranging essay, Louis Gathrop (1984b) examines *Public Sector Management, Systems, and Ethics*. In the light of the increasing environmental uncertainty and complexity faced by public organizations, Gathrop suggests that "the preeminent purpose of public management . . . is the maintenance and enhancement of an ethical perspective that inspires the amplification of managerial innovation and creativity and, at the same time, facilitates the integration and convergence of social values" (p. 6). Although Gathrop remains obscure with respect to his proposed redesign of publ. organizations, his approach seeks to combine general systems theory with a somewhat more personalized ethic than would ordinarily be associated with such an approach.

In two recent books, John Rohr (1978, 1986) has made important contributions to the understanding of the ethics of public service. In the earlier *Ethics for Bureaucrats*, Rohr argued that the fundamental ethical problem facing public administrators was that involved in exercising discretionary authority, a problem that could be overcome by clearly understanding the values of the regime, especially as amplified by the Supreme Court. More recently, in *To Run a Constitution*, Rohr performs a detailed objective analysis of the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state as a prelude to a normative theory of public administration in a constitutional context. Rohr sees the agencies of government as subordinate to the three branches of government but simultaneously able to balance the various interests expressed there. Public administrators, key actors in this pluralistic balancing act, are to uphold the Constitution—to use "their discretionary power in order to maintain the constitutional balance of powers in support of individual rights" (p. 181).

Another book sharing much of the pluralistic orientation of Rohr's work is Douglas Yates's (1982) *Bureaucratic Democracy*. Yates is concerned with the tension that seems to exist between pluralist democracy and the desire for administrative efficiency in public organizations. Arguing that decisions are increasingly made in a bureaucratic democracy by administrative officials away from the public eye, Yates seeks mechanisms of political control over the bureaucracy that would provide public review of administrative activities while not impeding efforts to improve efficiency.

In addition to these works in the objectivist tradition, works seeking solutions to political issues through mechanisms for institutional control, the small number of books by public administration theorists that use the objectivist approach

in trying to understand organizational behavior should be noted. The small number here is surprising, for objectivists have always supported the viewpoint that all organizations—whether public or private—are essentially the same and can best be approached through a generic study of management and organization. Thus, for the objectivist interested in organizational behavior, public administration theory does not exist; what is most important is the development of general studies of organizational behavior.

But those trained in public administration do contribute to such a generic study. Two such contributions are noteworthy, one for its contribution to the generic study of organizations and the other for its curious adaptation of traditional studies of organizational control to the implementation of public policy. The first, Herbert Kaufman's (1985) *Time, Chance, and Organizations*, presents a theory of the life cycle of organizations based on social and even biological theories of evolution. Kaufman uses this approach not only in analyzing the rise and fall of organizations but also in predicting increasing levels of organizational complexity. George Edwards (1980), in contrast, is concerned with *Implementing Public Policy* and, in that sense, is representative of a larger group interested in implementation processes. What is most striking about Edwards's work is his rediscovery of organizational mechanisms long familiar to students of public organization. Not surprisingly, the implementation of public policy requires successful administration.

The Subjectivist Treatment of Organizational Issues

Public administration theorists produced relatively few books before the 1970s that would be considered primarily subjective in orientation; Waldo's (1948) *Administrative State* and Golembiewski's (1967) *Men, Management, and Morality* were notable exceptions. Theorists in the 1980s generated an impressive list of publications written from this perspective. Although covering a wide variety of topics, these books share an interest in viewing political and organizational issues from the perspective of those involved. Their concern is with the meaning of their experience rather than with the behavioral data of the natural sciences. In a sense, this work may represent an emerging orthodoxy in public administration theory, one consistent with trends in many social sciences today, but perhaps more advanced in public administration than in others.

Many of these works by scholars in public administration deal with organizational issues somewhat independent of political concerns and apply to organizations beyond those in the public sector. For example, several are explicitly critical of the effects of an organizational society—not only public organizations—on human growth and development. Denhardt (1981a) argues that modern life is carried out *In the Shadow of Organization*, that is, bounded by a new and encompassing ethic of organization that extends to many different aspects of social life. Through developments in phenomenology, critical theory, and depth psychology, he suggests a

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reordering of priorities that would give primacy to the growth of the individual rather than the productivity of the organization. Many of Denhardt's themes are illustrated in an edited work by Fischer and Sirianni (1984), *Critical Studies in Organization and Bureaucracy*.

Ralph Hummel (1982) pursues a similar line of argument in *The Bureaucratic Experience*, suggesting that "bureaucracy is a new society and a new culture. Bureaucratic functionaries represent a new personality type and speak a new language. Bureaucracy is a new way of exercising power" (p. vii). By examining the various ways different people—members, clients, and so on—interact with bureaucracy, Hummel hoped not only to facilitate our adaptation to the new bureaucratic culture but, more important, to help us transcend that culture.

In a similar but more specific fashion, Kathy Ferguson (1984; see also 1983) builds *The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy*, arguing that bureaucratic subordination parallels the subordination of women and that lessons learned from the experience of efforts at women's liberation might aid in reconstructing patterns of domination in complex organizations. For example, the efforts of feminine discourse to move beyond the submerged discourse of women's experience might suggest ways to open to question the more public but more constrained system of bureaucratic discourse in our society.

In *The New Science of Organizations*, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1981) argues that the market-centered society has engendered a particular kind of organization, what he calls the "economizing organization." This type of organization, based on the idea of instrumental rationality (the coordination of means to given ends), has been insensitive to both psychological and ecological concerns. In contrast, Ramos proposes a new science of organizations that would delimit the influence of economizing organizations and lead to new organizational designs. The result would be a new multicentric or reticular society in which different forms of organization would be applied to different purposes, always with a view toward maintaining environmental stability.

Two other books go directly to the question whether hierarchically structured organizations can be fundamentally reordered. Fredrick Thayer (1981) argues for *An End to Hierarchy and Competition*, in which the alienating effects of hierarchy would be reduced as the artificial distinctions that cause some to be designated leaders and others followers were eliminated. Similarly, Scott and Hart (1979) describe the ills of *Organizational America*, concluding with a plea for organizational reform, one in which the existing organizational imperative would be challenged primarily by professionals operating out of an interest in individualism.

In addition to these efforts in the critique of organizations, other books provide special analyses of the way in which organizational operations might be improved. Harmon and Thayer (1986), for example, provide a textbook review of many approaches to *Organization Theory for Public Administration*, concluding

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that organizational action is both a behavioral and a moral problem. More specifically, Robert T. Golembiewski (1985) continues his analysis of theories of organization development in a new book, *Humanizing Public Organizations*. Although much of this work is familiar to students of organization development, its theoretical importance to the field of public administration lies in its analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy, a moral and political question central to Golembiewski's (1967b) *Men, Management, and Morality*. Criticizing formulations of Democracy and Administration or Democracy vs. Administration, Golembiewski argues for Democracy within and through Administration. In contrast to others who have made the same point in abstract terms, Golembiewski attempts to specify exactly how such an arrangement might be brought about.

Another work of substantial importance to the field is Michael Lipsky's (1980) *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Lipsky first brought the term "street-level bureaucrat" to the attention of the field by pointing out that public policy is determined not merely by legislators and managers at high levels of government but by the police officer, the nurse, and the welfare worker (among others), who engage in the direct delivery of services. Lipsky writes that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out" (p. xii). Finding that systemic constraints on the professional practices of street-level bureaucrats result in confusion and conflicting demands, Lipsky offers several important suggestions for reform, suggestions addressed to the concerns of street-level bureaucrats but not without relevance to those at all levels of public agencies.

Works by other public administration theorists interested in organizational topics have ranged widely. Shan Martin (1983), for example, proposes *Managing without Managers*, that is, creating autonomous work groups in lieu of today's over-supervised structures. Howell Baum (1983b, 1987), in contrast, in both *Planners and Public Expectations* and *The Invisible Bureaucracy* has explored the psychodynamics of organizational involvement, arguing that both conscious and unconscious intentions and motives affect the individual's understanding of, and activity in, complex organizations.

Subjectivist Treatments of Political Issues Facing Public Organizations

A number of interesting treatments of political issues facing the field of public administration have been developed from the subjectivist stance. In each case, the role of public administrators in the governance process is the central issue, with matters of accountability and responsibility considered essential. And, in each case, the values and intentions of the individual administrator are seen as the basis for understanding and altering existing patterns of administrative action. Among these works, several derive from the New Public Administration of the early 1970s and some re-

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lated concerns for ethics and citizenship, several are noteworthy for their applications of alternative epistemological stances, and several provide broad reinterpretations of the literature of public administration from a value-critical perspective.

The movement generally referred to as the New Public Administration is primarily associated with theoretical developments in public administration in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, several books published during the 1980s are closely tied to that movement. Without question, George Fredrickson's (1980) *New Public Administration* should be considered one of these. Indeed, Frederickson's book, based on a series of lectures at the University of Alabama, draws heavily from previously published materials dating back to the original Minnowbrook conference proceedings (Marini 1971).

A related contribution is Carl Bellone's (1980) edited volume of essays, *Organization Theory and the New Public Administration*. Of the essays, those by Frederick Thayer, Alberto Guerreiro-Ramos, and Michael Harmon are of special interest, as is the introduction by Luther Gulick, who describes the New Public Administration as engaging in a missionary zeal, "an inspired but sophisticated declaration of faith in a new humanity in a new society" (p. vii). The spirit of the New Public Administration was certainly contagious; there are more questions about its substance.

Although not explicitly associated with the New Public Administration, a recent book sharing many of the same concerns for ethics and citizenship is Terry Cooper's (1982) *The Responsible Administrator*. Cooper focuses on the question of administrative responsibility, as executed within the structure of public organizations. Noting the need to balance objective methods of achieving responsibility (Rohr) with those more subjective in nature, Cooper ultimately seeks an integration of the two through a matrix of responsible conduct drawing from important themes in the New Public Administration. "Only a deeply internalized set of moral qualities, mental attitudes, and regime values can maintain congruence with the organization's goals and . . . consistency with the obligations of citizenship in a democracy" (pp. 130-31).

Another set of works is distinctive in its use of alternative epistemologies to approach questions of political responsibility. just as Hummel (1982) used phenomenology and Denhardt (1981a, 1981b) employed critical theory in examining the limits of modern organizational life, others have pursued similar viewpoints in assessing more political questions. In *Action Theory for Public Administration*, for example, Michael Harmon (1981) explores the possible implications of phenomenology for work in public organizations. As a phenomenologist, Harmon sees the individual as an intentional being, suggesting that individual action is both normatively based and socially executed. This position leads to a conceptualization of the "proactive administrator," one who institutionalizes and facilitates consensual decision making both within the organization and with the clientele served. A

similar viewpoint characterizes a recent and theoretically distinctive text by Jong Jun (1986), *Public Administration: Design and Problem-Solving*. Jun develops an image of the field of public administration marked by a proactive view of change, a marked sensitivity to public values, and the skill and creativity for administrators to operate effectively within a turbulent environment.

Related applications of phenomenology to policy studies include Frank Fischer's (1980) *Politics, Values, and Public Policy* and David Schuman's (1982) *Policy Analysis, Education, and Everyday Life*. Fischer focuses on methodological problems in policy analysis, suggesting a way of bringing together factual and evaluative elements of evaluation. Schuman enjoys a similar perspective in an evaluation of the effect of education on the everyday life of individuals in our society. In this view, the evaluation of public policy must ultimately be based on an understanding of the meaning of the everyday lives of individuals and the interaction of their intentions with the social and political forces that surround them.

Finally, two books provide critical interpretations of the literature of public administration. Robert Denhardt (1984), in *Theories of Public Organization*, reviews the most prominent approaches to the field of public administration, discovering great consistency in the literature of public administration, especially in its dependence on the notion of instrumental rationality and its view of democratic accountability implicitly based in the old politics-administration dichotomy. Denhardt outlines a broader view of the work of public organizations, seeking to integrate the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness with an enhanced sense of democratic responsibility. In such a view, the administrator assumes an active but responsive role in discovering and articulating the public interest.

Similarly, in *The Enterprise of Public Administration*, Dwight Waldo (1980) summarizes several decades of important theoretical work in public administration, considering such themes as education for the public service, politics and administration, bureaucracy and democracy, and public administration and ethics. In addition to its careful synthesis of theoretical work on these important topics, Waldo's enterprise is important for the set of issues it outlines as emerging and prospective (chap. 11). From a subjective standpoint, one recognizes implicitly in this work an admonition that the values and intentions of theorists in public administration will play an important role in our shaping of the field over the coming years.

Concluding Remarks on Shifts in Public Administration

Theory

The categories defined by our classification scheme should not be taken as distinct or unchanging. Many theorists move in and out of various categories, especially along the political-organizational dimension. For example, both the Golembiewski and Lipsky books discussed earlier focus primarily on organizational operations, yet they have important implications for the political question of how public policy is to be

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determined. Some care must be exercised in using the categories; however, the classification scheme enables us to see rather dramatically the extent of the shift in public administration theory from objectivist to subjectivist thought, and perhaps less distinctly the increasing interest in political questions as opposed to organizational questions. Clearly, material that was very much out of the mainstream only a decade ago is now very much in the mainstream. In the following section, the implications of this finding is considered, including the question whether work that is integrative of material from all categories is necessary in order to build a more coherent and integrated theory of public organizations.

Framing an Agenda for the Future

Given recent developments in public administration theory, where might we expect the field to move in the future? What are the issues that will frame the agenda for public administration for the next several years? Several possibilities present themselves.

The first question is whether there can be a coherent and integrated theory of public organizations, a question that has been most often approached through commentary on the potential for our achieving disciplinary status. I argue that a discipline, in both the academic sense and the practical sense, is formed by the possibility of developing theoretical coherence within a given field. A discipline requires rigor and perspective—although not necessarily a paradigm. What hopes do we have of such an achievement?

At various points in our history, other disciplines have been eager to embrace public administration under their own theoretical banner. Many early writers in the field and some still today argue that public administration is made distinctive by its relationship to the governmental process. In contrast to this position, others have argued that the behavior of individuals within organizations and the behavior of organizations themselves is much the same regardless of the kind of organization being studied.

Somewhere between these positions is the view that I suspect is most popular among theorists today—that public administration is best viewed as a profession drawing from many different theoretical perspectives. Since no single discipline can currently provide the range of knowledge needed by administrators in the public sector, it seems reasonable to bring coherence to programs through their professional orientation.

Unfortunately, this view of public administration as a profession, perhaps even more than the other views presented here, precludes the possibility that we shall achieve a distinctive theoretical orientation or that we shall fully satisfy the needs of practitioners in the field. While information from other disciplines may

indeed be of use from time to time, if there is something distinctive about public organizations, none of these disciplines will directly capture that difference. By taking the position that public administration must merely draw from other disciplines, we are in danger of enhancing the periphery of work in public organizations while neglecting the core.

If we take the position that political science fails to comprehend the full range of concerns of those in public organizations by failing to give full consideration to organizational and managerial concerns; if we take the position that organizational analysis is also limited through its failure to comprehend adequately the moral and political context of work in public organizations; and if we take the position that a view of public administration as a professional field of study fails because it must always borrow from other disciplines and never address our own concerns directly—is there any hope of developing a discipline around the concerns of those in public organizations? I think the answer is yes. But I think that answer must wait until we address a second question, one related to what is acceptable, or even proper, in terms of academic research.

For those in the field of public administration, the answer to this question has been intimately bound up with the question of the proper relationship between theory and practice, but more profoundly it has to do with the validity of various approaches to knowledge acquisition. In my view, the shift toward a more subjectivist position in public administration theory holds forth considerable promise for establishing a better connection between theory and practice, an issue I have addressed elsewhere (Denhardt 1984). This is not merely to say, however, that researchers in the field of public administration should always address their work primarily to practitioners. Although I hesitate to use the terms *pure* and *applied* to refer to two different modes of research practice, I do feel that public administration theorists, as well as other researchers in the field, have a dual obligation: to enhance the state of knowledge of public organizations generally and to transmit our understanding of the world of public organizations to those active in that world.

But however we resolve the theory-practice issue, that issue is related to more general controversies surrounding the appropriate basis for knowledge acquisition in our field and in the social sciences generally. Typically, this argument has been waged in terms of contending epistemological positions, with positivism, phenomenology, and critical theory being most prominent. As we have seen, there have been well-defined shifts in emphasis over the past decades. In my view, however, the relationship between various modes of knowledge acquisition and various patterns of human action has not yet been fully explored, nor have we sought ways of integrating the various approaches now available to us.

In addition to questions we might raise about the proper modes of knowledge acquisition, we must also consider more carefully some fairly basic substantive issues in our field. Students of public administration recall that the most important

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issue in the early days of public administration was the question of how to run a constitution, that is, how to manage public agencies honestly and efficiently (and, one hopes, in a way consistent with the public interest). The question was perfectly appropriate to that time, a time of corruption and inefficiency, but it may no longer hold such centrality in the field of public administration. Certainly we complain about the occasional public scandals and the apparent inefficiency of such areas as military procurement practices. Those are important concerns, but they may not be central. Instead, the central issues of public organization today are probably better expressed in terms of the quality of the public service and the responsiveness of the public bureaucracy in a democratic society.

In my view, public administration in the past has been limited by two important positions deeply rooted in the history of the discipline: (1) a view of moral and political accountability conceived in hierarchical terms, in terms of responsiveness of agencies to elected officials; and (2) a transposition of business values or at least managerial values into the conduct of public agencies.

While such views may have been responsive to the concerns of the nineteenth century, they may not be appropriate to the concerns of the late twentieth century and beyond. Now, with the massive growth of public bureaucracy and the inevitable discretion that must be given administrative officials, we must recognize that those in public organizations have a direct impact on the lives of individuals, not only as they execute orders handed down from the legislature, but also as they act on their own in pursuit of public purposes. Whether we like it or not, the proper moral and political basis for public organizations can no longer be encapsulated in the hierarchical relationship between agencies and legislatures.

We should also call into question the wholesale adoption by public agencies of the values of private organizations. Indeed, I would propose that just the opposite should occur. Certainly, major aspects of public policy are being decided or seriously affected by so-called private agencies. Many of these private organizations far exceed in their size and complexity governments in other countries and previous governments in this country. Modern organizations of all kinds have an enormous impact on the personal lives of individuals in society, a trend that suggests that all organizations in a democratic society should be evaluated by the degree of their publicness, the degree to which they express values defined publicly rather than privately. In such an effort, public administration theories, especially theories of democratic administration, might come to be models for organization theory in general.

All of this leads toward a new approach to defining the field of public administration, an approach that has been outlined elsewhere (Denhardt 1984), that we are students not merely of public administration but students of public organizations, that our concern is with managing change in pursuit of publicly defined societal values. Around such a definition, one that focuses on action rather than agencies, I think we have a chance of building a new theory of public organizations,

one that recognizes the diversity of our field but also acknowledges our common purposes. There is something distinctive about administrative action in public organizations, and that distinctiveness should provide the basis for a coherent and integrated theory of public organizations.

One final question has to do with the roles and responsibilities of theorists themselves. In my view, the connection between thought and action, theory and practice, demands that public administration theorists share a moral obligation with practitioners in public organizations. This responsibility, the responsibility of the theorist, is especially well illustrated if we consider developing what might be called a normative theory of practice. To the extent that theorists participate in the normative design of institutions and processes, they share a responsibility for outcomes as well. A final challenge to theorists in the field of public administration is to understand the moral implications of their own work, for this defines the vocation and obligation of the theorist.

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From the Professional Stream

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CURRENTS and SOUNDINGS

THE DEADLY SINS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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I

No one can guarantee the performance of a public service program, but we know how to ensure non-performance with absolute certainty. Commit any two of the following common sins of public administration, and non-performance will inevitably follow. Indeed, to commit all six, as many public service agencies do, is quite unnecessary and an exercise in overkill.

(1) The first thing to do to make sure that a program will not have results is to have a lofty objective—"health care," for instance, or "to aid the disadvantaged." Such sentiments belong in the preamble. They explain why a specific program or agency is being initiated rather than what the program or agency is meant to accomplish.¹ To use such statements as "objectives" thus makes sure that no effective work will be done. For work is always specific, always mundane, always focused. Yet without work there is non-performance.

To have a chance at performance, a program needs clear targets, the attainment of which can be measured, appraised, or at least judged. "Health care" is not even a pious intention. Indeed it is, at best, a vague slogan. Even "the best medical care for the sick," the objective of many hospitals in the British National Health Service, is not operational. Rather, it is meaningful to say: "It is our aim to make sure that no patient coming into emergency will go for more than three minutes without being seen by a qualified triage nurse." It is a proper goal to say: "Within three years, our maternity ward is going to be run on a "zero defects" basis, which means that there will be no "surprises" in the delivery room and there will not be one case of post-partum puerperal fever on maternity." Similarly, "Promoting the welfare of the American farmer" is electioneering, while "Installing electricity in at least 25 per cent of America's farms within the next three years"—the first goal of the New Deal's Rural Electrification Administration, which was, perhaps, the most successful public service agency in all our administrative history—was an objective that was specific, measurable, attainable—and attained. It immediately was converted into work, and very shortly thereafter, into performance.

(2) The second strategy guaranteed to produce non-performance is to try to do several things at once. It is to refuse to establish priorities and to stick to them. Splintering of efforts guarantees non-results. Yet without concentration on a priority, efforts will be splintered, and the more massive the program, the more the splintering effects will produce non-performance. By contrast, even poorly conceived programs might have results if priorities are set and efforts concentrated.

It is popular nowadays to blame the failure of so many of the programs of Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty" on shaky theoretical foundations. Whether poorly conceived or not, quite a few of the Headstart schools had significant results; every one of them, without exception, was a school that decided on one overriding priority—having the children learn to read letters and numbers—despite heavy criticism from Washington and from all kinds of dogmatists.

Whether poorly conceived or not, quite a few of the Headstart schools had significant results; every one of them, without exception, was a school that decided on one overriding priority—having the children learn to read letters and numbers. . . .

An even more impressive example is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the thirties. Despite tremendous opposition, the bill establishing the TVA only passed Congress because its backers promised a dozen different and mutually antagonistic constituencies: cheap power, cheap fertilizer, flood control, irrigation, navigation, community development and whatnot. TVA's first administrator, Arthur Morgan, a great engineer, then attempted to live up to these promises and to satisfy every one of his constituencies. The only result was an uncontrollably growing bureaucracy, un-

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controllably growing expenditures, and a total lack of any performance. Indeed, the TVA in its early years resembled nothing as much as one of those "messes" which we now attack in Washington. Then President Roosevelt removed Morgan and put in a totally unknown young Wisconsin utilities lawyer, David Lilienthal, who immediately—against all advice from all the "pros"—announced his priority: power production. Within a year, the TVA produced results. Lilienthal, by the way, met no opposition, but was universally acclaimed as a saviour.

(3) The third deadly sin of the public administrator is to believe that "fat is beautiful," despite the obvious fact that mass does not do work; brains and muscles do. In fact, overweight inhibits work, and gross overweight totally immobilizes.

One hears a great deal today about the fallacy of "throwing money at problems," but this is not really what we have been doing. We have been throwing manpower at problems, with Vietnam, perhaps, being the worst example, and it is even worse to overstaff than to overfund. Today's administrators, whether civilian or military, tend to believe that the best way to tackle a problem is to deploy more and more people against it. The one certain result of having more bodies is greater difficulties in logistics, in personnel management, and in communications. Mass increases weight, but not necessarily competence. Competence requires direction, decision, and strategy rather than manpower.

Overstaffing is not only much harder to correct than understaffing, it makes non-performance practically certain. For overstaffing always focuses energies on the inside, on "administration" rather than on "results," on the machinery rather than its purpose. It always leads to meetings and memoranda becoming ends in themselves. It immobilizes behind a facade of furious busyness. Harold Ickes, FDR's Secretary of the Interior and one of the New Deal's most accomplished administrators, always asked: "What is the fewest number of people we need to accomplish this purpose?" It is a long time since anyone in Washington (or in the state governments) has asked that question.

(4) "Don't experiment, be dogmatic" is the next—and the next most common—of the administrator's deadly sins. "Whatever you do, do it on a grand scale at the first try. Otherwise, God forbid, you might learn how to do it differently." In technical or product innovation, we sometimes skip the pilot-plant stage, usually to our sorrow. But at least we build a model and put it through wind tunnel tests. In public service, increasingly we start out with a "position"—that is, with a totally untested theory—and go from it immediately to national, if not international, application. The most blatant example may have been the ultra-scholastic dogmatism with which we rushed into national programs in the "War on Poverty" that were based on totally speculative, totally untried social science theories, and backed by not one shred of empirical evidence.

However, even if the theories on which a program is based are themselves sound, successful application still

demands adaptation, cutting, fitting, trying, balancing. It always demands testing against reality before there is final total commitment. Above all, any new program, no matter how well conceived, will run into the unexpected, whether unexpected "problems" or unexpected "successes." At that point, people are needed who have been through a similar program on a smaller scale, who know whether the unexpected problem is relevant or not, or whether the unexpected success is a fluke or genuine achievement.

Surely one of the main reasons for the success of so many of the New Deal programs was that there had been "small scale" experiments in states and cities earlier in Wisconsin, for instance, in New York State or in New York City, or in one of the reform administrations in Chicago. The outstanding administrators of the New Deal programs—Frances Perkins at Labor, Harold Ickes at Interior, or Arthur Altmeyer at Social Security—were all alumnae of such earlier small-scale experiments. Similarly, the truly unsuccessful New Deal programs, the WPA for instance, were, without exception, programs that had not first been developed in small-scale experimentation in state or local governments but were initiated as comprehensive, national panaceas.

(5) "Make sure that you cannot learn from experience" is the next prescription for non-performance in public administration. "Do not think through in advance what you expect; do not then feed back from results to expectations so as to find out not only what you can do well, but also to find out what your weaknesses, your limitations, and your blind spots are."

Every organization, like every individual, does certain things well. They are the things that "come easy to one's hand." Nevertheless, every organization, like every individual, is also prone to typical mistakes, has typical limitations, and has its own blind spots. Unless the organization shapes its own expectations to reflect the accuracy of results, it will not find out what it does well and, thus, not learn to apply its strengths. Moreover, it will not find out what it does poorly and will, thus, have no opportunity to improve or to compensate for its weaknesses or its blind spots. Typically, for instance, certain institutions expect results much too fast and throw in the towel much too soon. A good many of the "War on Poverty" agencies did just that. Also, there are many organizations which wait much too long before they face up to the fact that a program or a policy is unsuccessful—our Vietnam policies, both civilian and military, probably belong here. One can only learn by feedback, and we know that feedback from results always improves performance capacity and effectiveness. Without it, however, the weaknesses, the limitations, the blind spots increasingly dominate. Without learning from results through feedback, any organization, like any individual, must inevitably deteriorate in its capacity to perform. Yet, in most public service institutions such feedback functions are either non-existent or viewed with casual skepticism. If the results do not conform to expectations, they are all too frequently dismissed as irrelevant, as indications of the obtuseness of clients, as

the reactionary obscurantism of the public, or, worst of all, as evidence of the need to "make another study." Most public service institutions, governmental ones as well as non-governmental ones, are budget-focused, but the budgets measure efforts rather than results. For performance, the budget needs to be paralleled with a statement of expected results and with systematic feedback from results on expenditures and on efforts. Otherwise, the agency will, almost immediately, channel more and more of its efforts toward non-results and will become the prisoner of its own limitations, its weaknesses, and its blind spots rather than the beneficiary of its own strengths.

(6) The last of the administrator's deadly sins is the most damning and the most common: the inability to abandon. It alone guarantees non-performance, and within a fairly short time.

Traditional political theory, the theory inherited from Aristotle, holds that the tasks of government are grounded in the nature of civil society and, thus, are immutable: defense, justice, law and order. However, very few of the tasks of modern public administration, whether governmental or non-governmental public service institutions, such as the hospital, the Red Cross, the university, or the Boy Scouts, are of that nature. Almost all of them are manmade rather than grounded in the basic essentials of society, and most of them are of very recent origin to boot. They all, therefore, share a common fate: they must become pointless at some juncture in time. They may become pointless because the need to which they address themselves no longer exists or is no longer urgent. They may become pointless because the old need appears in such a new guise as to make obsolete present design, shape, concerns and policies. The great environmental problem of 1910, for instance—and it was a very real danger—was the horrendous pollution by the horse, with its stench and its liquid and solid wastes, which threatened to bury the cities of that time. If we had been as environmentally conscious then as we are now, we would have saddled ourselves with agencies which only ten years later would have become totally pointless and yet, predictably, ten years later they would have redoubled their efforts, since they would have totally lost sight of their objectives. Moreover, a program may become pointless when it fails to produce results despite all efforts, as do our present American welfare programs. Finally—and most dangerous of all—a program becomes pointless when it achieves its objectives. That we have a "welfare mess" today is, in large measure, a result of our having maintained the welfare programs of the New Deal after they had achieved their objectives around 1940 or 1941. These programs were designed to tackle the problems caused by the temporary unemployment of experienced (and almost entirely white) male heads of families—no wonder that they then malperformed when applied to the totally different problems caused in large measure by the mass movement of black females into the cities 10 or 15 years later.

The basic assumption of public service institutions,

governmental or non-governmental ones alike, is immortality. It is a foolish assumption. It dooms the organization and its programs to non-performance and non-results. The only rational assumption is that every public service program will sooner or later and usually sooner outlive its usefulness, at least insofar as its present form, its present objectives, and its present policies are concerned. A public service program that does not conduct itself in contemplation of its own mortality will very soon become incapable of performance. In its original guise it cannot produce results any longer; the objectives have either ceased to matter, have proven unobtainable, or have been attained. Indeed, the more successful a public service agency is, the sooner will it work itself out of the job; then it can only become an impediment to performance, if not an embarrassment.

A public service program that does not conduct itself in contemplation of its own mortality will very soon become incapable of performance.

The public service administrator who wants results and performance will, thus, have to build into his own organization an organized process for abandonment. He will have to learn to ask every few years: "If we did not do this already, would we now, knowing what we know now, go onto this?" And if the answer is "no," he better not say "let's make another study" or "let's ask for a bigger budget." He better ask: "How can we get out of this?" or at least: "How can we stop pouring more effort, more resources, more people into this?"

II

Avoidance of these six "deadly sins" does not, perhaps, guarantee performance and results in the public service organization, but avoiding these six deadly sins is the prerequisite for performance and results. To be sure, there is nothing very reconcile about these "do's and don'ts." They are simple, elementary, indeed, obvious. Yet, as everyone in public administration knows, most administrators commit most of these "sins" all the time and, indeed, all of them most of the time.

One reason is plain cowardice. It is "risky" to spell out attainable, concrete, measurable goals—or so the popular wisdom goes. It is also mundane, pedestrian and likely to "turn off" backers or donors. "The world's best medical care" is so much more "sexy" than "every emergency patient will be seen by a qualified triage nurse within three minutes." Furthermore, to set priorities seems even more dangerous—one risks the wrath of the people who do not really care for electric power or fertilizer, but want to protect the little snail darter or the spotted lousewort. Finally, of course, you do not "rank" in the bureaucracy unless you spend a billion dollars and employ an army of clerks—"fat is beautiful."

Perhaps so, but experience does not bear out the common wisdom. The public service administrators who

face up to goal-setting, to ordered priorities, and to concentrating their resources (the public service administrators who are willing to ask: "What is the smallest number of people we need to attain our objectives?") may not always be popular, but they are respected, and they rarely have any trouble at all. They may not get as far in their political careers as the ones who put popularity above performance, but, in the end, they are the ones we remember.

III

But perhaps even more important than cowardice as an explanation for the tendency of so much of public administration today to commit itself to policies that can only result in non-performance is the lack of concern with performance in public administration theory.

For a century from the Civil War to 1960 or so, the performance of public service institutions and programs was taken for granted in the United States. It could be taken for granted because earlier administrators somehow knew not to commit the "deadly sins" I have outlined here. As a result, the discipline of public administration—a peculiarly American discipline, by the way—saw no reason to concern itself with performance. It was not a problem. It focused instead on the political process, on how programs come into being. *Who Gets What, When, How?*, the title of Harold Lasswell's 1936 classic on politics, neatly sums up one specific focus of American public administration, with its challenge to traditional political theory. The other focus was procedural: "The orderly conduct of the business of government" an earlier generation called it. It was a necessary concern in an America that had little or no administrative tradition and experience and was suddenly projected into very large public service programs, first in World War I, then in the New Deal, and finally in World War II.

We needed work on all phases of what we now call "management": personnel, budgeting, organization, and so on. But these are inside concerns. Now we need hard, systematic work on making public service institutions perform.

As I noted, for a century, from the Civil War until 1960 or so, performance of public service institutions was taken for granted. For the last 20 years, however, malperformance is increasingly being taken for granted. Great programs are still being proposed, are still being debated, and, in some instances, are even still being enacted, but few people expect them to produce results. All we really expect now, whether from a new Department of Education in Washington or from a reorganization of the state government by a new governor who preaches that "small is beautiful," is more expenditure, a bigger budget, and a more ineffectual bureaucracy.

The malperformance of public service institutions may well be a symptom only. The cause may be far more basic: a crisis in the very foundations and assumptions on which rests that proudest achievement of the Modern Age, national administrative government.²

But surely the malperformance of the public service institution is in itself a contributing factor to the sickness of government, and a pretty big one. Avoiding the "deadly sins" of public administration may only give symptomatic relief for whatever ails modern government, but at least we know how to do it.

Notes

1. On this, see my article, "What Results Should You Expect? A User's Guide to MPO," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 36, pp. 12-19.
2. I hope eventually to finish a book on this subject, tentatively entitled "Can Government Be Saved?", on which I have been working for ten years or more.

WHAT REALLY IS PUBLIC MALADMINISTRATION?
Gerald E. Caiden

In the United States, most public arrangements now hum along at such a satisfactory level, that they are taken for granted and rarely questioned. Public administration ensures that things governments want done do get done reasonably well. Indeed, it works so well that most people don't have to think about it at all until unless they object to what government is trying to do or they run foul of public administration or emergencies shatter their complacency. Otherwise, when public administration falters, mostly it manages to detect its own malfunctioning and frequently institutionalized fail-safe procedures kick in for instantaneous correction. Most people's well-being would be impossible without such high levels of performance.

But public administration does go wrong, sometimes horrendously wrong. Things don't get done at all or done so badly that everybody gets upset. Malfunctioning goes undetected for too long. The fail-safe devices do not operate or prove to be inadequate. No matter how well-performing an administrative system may be, how pleased people might be with it and how difficult it is to conceive of improving it, somewhere things are wrong, mistakes are being made and justifiable grievances are being ignored. The fact is that much administrative wrong occurs, warnings go unheeded, evidence is suppressed, correctable errors

are ignored, and too little is done too late to avert avoidable tragedy.

Not a day goes by when somewhere an administrative scandal is exposed which has had preventable disastrous results following a long period of neglected warnings. For instance, failure to follow routinized safety procedures and to inspect whether such routinized operations were actually being carried out has resulted in spacecraft, airplane and train crashes, ferry and boat sinkings, nuclear plant accidents, chemical explosions, oil spills, toxic poisoning, epidemics, auto and bus accidents, collapsed buildings and bridges, crushed spectators, and diseased patients, with considerable loss of innocent lives. Failure to audit finances and to see whether any accounting operations were actually being carried out has resulted in huge diversions of loans, fraud, kleptocracy, tax evasion, money laundering, smuggling, conspicuous consumption, vote buying, colossal theft, currency and stock manipulations, ruinous investments, and speculation, with considerable loss of hard earned monies. These administrative disasters occur so frequently with such destruction and involve so many people that they cannot be ignored or brushed off as some freak, isolated, rare occurrence.

As administrative malpractices are part and parcel of everyday life in modern society, for hardly a day goes by when people do not get irritated or annoyed or upset at some administrative malpractice, one would expect that obvious administrative malpractices would be a popular topic among public

administrators and that correcting them a key concern to researchers. But this has not been the case. Perhaps they have been realistic in recognizing that in the trillions of administrative actions that occur daily, a certain percentage no matter how minute will go wrong and that by concentrating on individual instances, attention will be diverted from the more important and pressing task of seeing that the rest continues to go right. Perhaps investigating the wrongdoing of administration is not as appetizing as its right side and some social stigma may sick to researchers who harp on the bad rather than the good of government arrangements. Despite major efforts that went into identifying bureaucratic dysfunctions in the 1950s, there are precious few thorough studies of particular dysfunctions. No typology of administrative pathologies and morbidities appears in any major academic text on administration, organization and management or even in books that purport to explore the phenomena of counter productive organizational behavior.¹

Identifying Self-Destructive Administrative Behavior

Self-destructive mistakes occur too frequently to attribute them to chance or accident or occasional weakness. Can they be inherent in large scale administration? Christopher Hood has sought to classify and explain some of the key mechanisms of such counter-intuitive behavior that contrive to defeat administrative effectiveness.² He identified at least five distinctive types of administrative failure: —

overkill or diseconomy: results are achieved at unnecessary high cost

counter productive: results are contrary to those desired

inertia: nothing happens in response to stimulus

ineffectiveness: responses evoked merely rearrange inputs and outputs achieving little or nothing

tail chasing: the more is supplied, the more is demanded

and eight mechanisms involved: —

under- and over-organization: red-tape (ritualized procedures) and bribery (corruption)

wastage: revolving door employees

big stick syndrome: self-defeating controls and threats

negative demonstration: actions trigger antagonistic or perverse responses

time-lags: delayed responses (fighting yesterday's war)

reorganization: structural changes as symbolic responses, tokenism leaving substance untouched

suboptimization: component units defeat overall purpose; conflicting objectives; lack of coordination

professional fragmentation: shuffling problems and costs around.

His was a step toward identifying administrative diseases based on policy failures mostly in British public administration.

In a more light-hearted vein, Thomas Martin consolidated all the then laws of administrative behavior or rather of administrative misbehavior (kludgemanship) in the world of bureaucracy (blunderland) in which "almost every effort of almost every bureaucrat in almost every bureaucracy is counterproductive, nearly always producing results contradictory to those predicted and planned...".³ He cited gems already assimilated into English managerial parlance such as:

Murphy's Laws (1956)

If something can go wrong, it will.

When left to themselves, things always go from bad to worse.

Nature always sides with the hidden flaw.

Parkinson's Law (1957)

Work expands to fill the time available for its completion.

Officials multiply subordinates, not rivals.

Officials make work for each other.

Expenditure rises to meet income.

Delay is the deadliest form of denial.

The Peter Principle (1969)

In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his maximum level of incompetence.

and their many corollaries and variations, together with famous

quotes applied to administration such as Lord Acton's "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" and Gresham's "Trivial matters are handled promptly — important matters are never solved".

More seriously, Robert Kharasch investigated the laws of institutional behavior or rather of federal agency misbehaviors, blunders and gamesmanship and concluded that their malfunctioning was systematic, consistent and accelerating such that "Our great institutions are out of control".⁴ Peter Drucker came to similar conclusions and stated that "malperformance is increasingly being taken for granted...All we really expect now...is more expenditure, a bigger budget, and a more ineffectual bureaucracy".⁵ Whereas Kharasch attributed malfunctioning to self-justificatory axioms that could be combatted by sixteen rules of institutional design, mostly tough minded managerial axioms, Drucker blamed "six deadly sins in public administration":—

giving lofty (unspecified) objectives without clear
targets which could be measured, appraised and
judged

doing several things at once without establishing
and sticking to priorities

believing that "fat is beautiful," i.e. that

abundance not competence got things done
being dogmatic, not experimental

failing to learn from experience and feedback

assuming immortality and being unwilling to abandon
pointless programs.

Whereas Kharasch believed that public organizations were programmed for failure and could be programmed for success, Drucker was more sanguine. Avoiding the sins would not guarantee performance and results but at least it would be a prerequisite as "most administrators commit most of these "sins" all the time, and indeed, all of them most of the time" due to the cowardice of practitioners and the lack of concern with performance by theorists.

William Pierce went further in listing comprehensive types of bureaucratic failure besides malperformance.⁶ He listed corruption (theft of materials, misuse of time on the job, bribery, misuse of office, conflicts of interest), misallocation of resources, technical inefficiency (waste, diseconomies, poor management, inappropriate investments, lack of innovation), ineffectiveness (useless activities, quiet ineffectuality, bad advice, egregious errors), subservience to clients, lack of coordination, conflicting objectives, spoils system, displacement of mandated objectives, favoritism, foot-dragging, arbitrariness, and inflexibility. His study was based on eleven cases of administrative failures in U.S. federal government, variously attributed to inadvertent legislation (written without forethought), ambiguous goals, inappropriate sanctions, incompetence, incompatible tasks, interorganizational conflict, defective management, turnover, excessive workload, and haste to

spend. He put forward 75 hypotheses each beginning with "Failure is more likely...". He went beyond fairly standard American public organization theory by combining these hypotheses within major themes relating to miscommunication, immeasurable outputs, technical difficulties (environmental uncertainty and task complexity), ineffectual coordination, disregard of costs imposed on others, political problems, governmental turbulence, role conflicts, incompetent personnel, non-accountability, and inappropriate mandates. Presumably all these factors were recipes for administrative disaster if left uncorrected.

Defining Public Maladministration

The breakdown of individual policies, programs and organizations did not constitute an indictment of a whole administrative system. They could always be aberrations although none of the quoted analysts thought so. They implied that whole administrative systems could self-destruct. Studies of post-colonial administrations in several newly independent states had indicated that systemically sick administrations did exist, which caused the societies they served so badly to fail to develop and even deteriorate. Unless they were turned around and turned around quickly, their future was bleak. Montgomery had gone some way in the mid-1960s to catalogue complaints against such obstructive administrative systems:

...resistance to change, rigid adherence to
rules, reluctance to delegate authority,
sycophancy toward superiors, "target"

mentality, indifference to the standards of efficiency, ignorance of the purposes behind regulations, generalist-elitist orientation combined with hostility toward technology... insistence on status and prestige symbols, "formalism" or adherence to traditional relationships while desiring to appear modern; and... job-stocking and overstaffing, corruption, xenophobia, and nepotism.⁷

But these were often-heard criticisms of public bureaucracies the world over and read remarkably similar to those of William Robson:—

...an excessive sense of self-importance on the part of officials or an undue idea of the importance of their offices; an indifference towards the feelings or the convenience of individual citizens; an obsession with the binding and inflexible authority of departmental decisions, precedents, arrangements or forms, irrespective of how badly or with what injustice or hardship they may work in individual cases; a mania for regulations and formal procedure; a preoccupation with particular units of administration and an inability to consider the government as a whole; a failure to recognize the relations between the governors and the

governed as an essential part of the democratic process.⁸

and he quoted from the 1944 Parliamentary committee on civil service training:

...over devotion to precedent; remoteness from the rest of the community, inaccessibility and faulty handling of the general public; lack of initiative and imagination; ineffective organization and waste of manpower; procrastination and unwillingness to take responsibility or to give decisions.⁹

Could there be a theory of public maladministration? Although individual administrative maladies have been identified for many centuries, no one has ever tried to combine them systematically. The closest attempt was made by F.H. Hayward who referred to common criticisms made of professionalism or the dangers of professionalism or professional depravity.¹⁰ Since government service was also a profession, public administration shared them:—

perversity — professionalism became the enemy of the ends which it should serve and resisted innovations

treason — professionalism opposed the great aims of humanity as a whole in mistaken defense of its own procedures

self-seeking — professionalism sought to acquire power, privileges or emoluments for itself

cultivation of complexity and jargon — development and retention of complicated and laborious methods of work and jargon, the tendency to create work and jargon as means of maintaining or expanding professional importance

fear of definiteness — professionalism opposed definition and preciseness because they would allow standards by which it could be judged

hatred of supervision — particularly from the uninformed general public

self praise — vanity, exaggerated claims made for past professional achievements

secrecy — professionalism resisted prying eyes

uncreativity — improvements mostly came from the laity and were opposed by professionals

abuse of power — professionalism was unchivalrous, tyrannical or cruel towards the weak in its care

malignity — professionalism waged a war of slander and spite against innovators, suggesting they were defective, unpractical, weak, unbalanced, without judgment, ignorant, hasty, plagiarizers, and motivated by self-seeking, self-achievement or private gain.¹¹

In these respects public administrators were the same as everybody else and they were subject to the same failings.

But the study of public maladministration as such had to await the spread of the institution of ombudsman from its native Scandinavia into the English-speaking world. Here, after 1960, was an organization established by governments to receive and investigate public complaints against government administration, a veritable gold mine of information about public maladministration. In 1973, Sir Kenneth Wheare chose maladministration and its remedies within British government administration as his topic for the Hamlyn Lectures.¹² But his main interest in so doing was focusing on comparative jurisprudence and showing how remedies for maladministration in Europe were superior to those in the United Kingdom. He did state that maladministration was present in all social organization, that the more administration there was, the more maladministration there would be, that while maladministration was difficult to define, most people could describe it by examples (illegality, corruption, ineptitude, neglect, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness, undue delay, discourtesy, unfairness, bias, ignorance, incompetence, unnecessary secrecy, misconduct, and high handedness). The best that could be done was to quote an ombudsman's definition of maladministration: "administrative action (or inaction) based on or influenced by improper considerations or conduct." Bernard Frank elaborated on this position in his view of the ombudsman as an office to prevent:

... injustice, failure to carry out legislative intent, unreasonable delay, administrative error, abuse of discretion, lack of courtesy, clerical error, oppression, oversight, negligence, inadequate investigation, unfair policy, partiality, failure to communicate, rudeness, maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, inefficiency, violation of law or regulation, abuse of authority, discrimination, errors, mistakes, carelessness, disagreement with discretionary decisions, improper motivation, irrelevant consideration, inadequate or obscure explanation, and all the other acts that are frequently inflicted upon the governed by those who govern, intentionally or unintentionally.¹³

Based on actual complaints investigated by the British version of the ombudsman, Geoffrey Marshall concluded that maladministration was both a matter of instinct and an acquired technique.¹⁴ Facetiously, he suggested 15 maxims for the potential maladministrator, which give the flavor of administrative gamesmanship: —

- Don't volunteer written explanations of decisions
- Don't allow access to technical, legal or other advice received
- Frequently change policies randomly

- Arrange for high position turnover so that different people deal with the same case
- Delay acting on favorable jurisdictional points until after expiry of possible client remedies
- Ensure overlapping responsibilities without easy coordination
- Don't record (but misfile) correspondence
- Don't volunteer assistance
- Leave uncertainty about conclusions reached and next steps
- Draw out consultation
- Refer to being overworked
- Jumble communications
- Keep files moving
- Open multiple files without cross-referencing
- Arrange for occasional erroneous release of libellous internal memoranda.

Again, these are all singular rather than institutionalized instances of maladministration. None of them include crimes committed by people in organizations either on their own behalf against organizational norms (theft, violation of trust, fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement) or at the behest of their organization (genocide, torture, murder, robbery, coercion, terror, intimidation, crimes against humanity, etc.).¹⁵

A novel experiment was tried in the early 1970s at the Institute of Administration at the University of Ife, Nigeria,

where 72 Nigerian civil servants wrote case studies of malpractices. Factor analysis pointed to six leading causes preventing initiative — corruption and lack of integrity, community conflict and aggression, inefficiency, sectarian conflict, misconduct and indiscipline, and bad authority relationships. Specific cultural items — "rumor, accusations, denunciations, suspicion, intrigue, threats, blackmail, coercion, malice and inequitable treatment of individuals without cause"— suggested a paranoid personality in "a social climate of pervasive anomie, distrust and lawlessness".¹⁶ As Yoriba culture was "dysfunctionally distorted toward a schizoid-paranoid form of culture personality," there could be little room for initiative where suspicion, intrigue and insecurity was combined with the stultifying effect of authoritarianism in which deference was paid to age and rank. Here was a culture of maladministration akin to repressive authoritarianism found throughout history and depicted in its modern form by Franz Kafka before being exemplified in Nazism, Stalinism and Latin American fascism.

Blaming Bureaucratization

Institutionalized maladministration is not attributed so much to authoritarian cultures or psychotic individuals as to increasing reliance in human arrangements on the bureaucratic form of administration, i.e. the process of bureaucratization. The critics of bureaucratization range ideologically from extreme Left to extreme Right but they all have one thing in common — they do not like contemporary society or certain dominant aspects of it.

They blame the process of bureaucratization and the bureaucratic form of administration which they see as being inherently defective and a curse on modern society. They dislike bureaucratization altogether or for what it does to society, organization and individuals. They object variously to authority, technocracy, meritocracy, materialism, consumerism, capitalism, state power, complexity, mass culture, elitism, large organizations, self-serving administration, impersonality, complexity, legalism, specialization, careerism, formalism, dependency and anything else they attribute to bureaucratization. They seek to reverse the process of bureaucratization, that is, to turn back the clock to before the organizational society or to advance the clock to a debureaucratized (or post-bureaucratic) society, to liberate people from organization, to eliminate rule by officials, to reduce administration by experts, to minimize public sector administration, to make organizations less dysfunctional and to get rid of administrative diseases.

Bureaucratization, according to its critics, has been a wrong step for humanity. To reform bureaucracy, to improve it, to make it work better, would only make things worse. It should be replaced altogether with alternatives that are not inherently bad. The critics think this way because they see beyond bureaucracy, beyond instrumentality, to the ultimate goals and objectives of society.¹⁷ For the Left, bureaucratization has been associated with exploitative capitalism, public bureaucracy and the administrative state have been seen as handmaidens for capitalism,

and bureaucratic organizations have been viewed as counter productive for genuine democratization. For the Right, bureaucratization has been associated with creeping socialism, public bureaucracy and the administrative state have been seen as handmaidens for the socialist state, and bureaucratic organizations have been viewed as counter productive to liberty and enterprise. Neither has envisaged bureaucracy in its future and neither has come to terms with bureaucratization. Both have distorted history and contemporary reality to fit preconceived notions of naive simplicity. Big government and big business are more allies than enemies in the contemporary world and they are both more or less bureaucratic in operation.

The New Right says that is just the trouble; they are too cozy, too interdependent, too self-aggrandizing, too unaccountable, too secure, too complacent, too inefficient, too unproductive, too illiberal, too uncompetitive, too stagnant. Big government should be reduced, privatization expanded, free markets (and free choice) restored, and individual self-reliance boosted, even if it increases economic inequality and reduces political liberty. The New Left agrees; they are too bourgeois, too self serving, too corrupt, too coercive, too alienating, too stifling. Big government should be decentralized, public organizations made more representative, self-management encouraged, demarchy¹⁸ boosted, even if private enterprise is increased and the political monopoly of the Communist party is ended. Both the New Right and the New Left propose radical if diametrically opposed solutions.

Both want to get rid of the administrative state and any possibility of bureaucratic government¹⁹ because they do not want bureaucrats to rule or fill power vacuums. The New Right would prefer to rely almost exclusively on private initiatives and market forces while the New Left would prefer autonomous self governing communities. Neither really tackles the challenge of contemporary bureaucracy or bureaucratization.

Less politically motivated opponents of bureaucratization do believe that they have better solutions and that they can reverse the process of bureaucratization. They do not associate bureaucratization with either capitalism or socialism but with the evolution of a global economy, industrialization, urbanization and the need to deliver uniform goods and services on a larger and larger scale. The scale will continue to grow but the model of production, the techniques of administration, and the nature of organization will be transformed by technology, especially information technology. The rigid hierarchical structure of bureaucracy will be replaced by more flexible, participatory, temporary organizations beyond bureaucracy²⁰ as machines replace human labor altogether in the post-industrial world. The adhocracy of the future²¹ would be smaller, less hierarchical, more professional, less routinized, more innovative, providing more creative, meaningful, stimulating work and more collaborative, personalized, responsive management. Computers spell the death of bureaucracy. They will reduce the number of clerical functionaries and blue collar workers, ensure the accurate dissemination of

information, eliminate much job fragmentation, place people into electronic networks, minimize paperwork, decentralize decision-making, broaden effective participation, and free people from economic serfdom.

Once we enter the realm of futurizing and science fiction, it is anyone's guess what the future may hold. Far from correcting the undesirable fruits of bureaucratization, they may well be exacerbated. So far, there has been no sign of their reduction. Bureaucracy has not declined. Big has not turned out to be so ugly. On the contrary, as people wake up to their rights all over the world and raise their expectations, so they insist on constitutionalism, rule of law, equal consideration, due process, equity, protection, access, competence, regularity, quality, fairness, responsibility, accountability, openness, and those other factors that have promoted bureaucracy. Bureaucratization may well have peaked. That will not be known just yet. In the meantime, the process of bureaucratization has transformed the way people work and live. There have been great gains and heavy costs. Undoubtedly some cherished values of the past — self-reliance, individual initiative, independence, integrity, the work ethic, altruism, competitiveness — have suffered in the process of bureaucratization and bureaucracy has been carried too far in some areas, but this does not mean that other equally cherished values have not gained more and that bureaucracy cannot be readjusted.²² On the other hand, bureaucracy does carry within it a high propensity for maladministration.

Bureausis and Bureaucratic Dysfunctions

Bureaucratization has transformed the way people work and live. For many, the change has not been easy. A few have never accepted the change. They hate bureaucracy, all bureaucracy, and resent it. Because the source of criticism is external to bureaucracy, Victor Thompson termed this anti-bureaucratic, non cooperative behavior "bureausis," whose basic ingredient was "immaturity, the dysfunctional persistence of childish behavior patterns"²³ by people unable to adapt to the complexity, impersonality and impartiality of modern organizations. These bureaucrats resist answering personal questions as an invasion of their privacy, have low powers of abstraction and need to personalize the world, feel powerless and alienated because they want to be the center of attention everywhere and want instant gratification. They find intolerable the rationalism, orderliness, impartiality, and impersonality of bureaucracy. As other avenues of employment decline, they are employed in bureaucracies where they behave with the same non-cooperation, personalization, alienation and suspicion, which spill over in the way they treat others inside and outside the organization, and so give rise to justifiable complaints about maladministration.

Apparently the rest of us adjust to being small cogs in a large impersonal organization and accept the fact that we lose control over personal destiny, lose our freedom and independence, and realize the need to get along and conform as good organizational/bureaucratic people. But bureaucracies generate

tension and insecurities and in reducing them, we also indulge in behavior which is dysfunctional to the organization; we indulge in "bureaucratic behavior"²⁴ such as dramaturgy (or creating a favorable impression), aloofness, ritualistic attachment to routines, petty insistence on turf, appearance of busyness, resistance to change, and excessive protection (the paperwork proof). These do not advance organizational goals but reflect the personal needs of individuals; they are self-serving behavior patterns. Harry Levinson disagreed.²⁵ His research on the psychological problems of individuals at work (which resulted in accidents, absenteeism and alcoholism) led him to conclude that the way an organization was managed impacted the mental health of people who worked in it. "Logically, then, an important mode of preventing emotional distress was to understand organizational malfunctioning...".²⁶ In short, maybe the organization was more to blame than the individual.

That bureaucracy had inherent dysfunctions had long been known. Its unanticipated dysfunctional consequences had been subject to much sociological analysis. Karl Marx had identified the maintenance of the status quo, promotion of incompetence, alienation, lack of imagination, fear of responsibility, and rigid control over the masses. Michels had recognized that democratic participation was technically impossible in complex organizations. Max Weber perceived that bureaucracy threatened democracy by demanding the sacrifice of freedom. But it was Robert Merton in the 1930s who first emphasized dysfunctions that impeded

effectiveness when conflicting or displacing organizational goals i.e. means became ends in themselves.²⁷ He later identified rigidity,²⁸ while Selznick added bifurcation of interests²⁹ and Gouldner punative supervision.³⁰ These and other dysfunctions (mediocrity, officiousness, stratification, gamesmanship) sabotaged bureaucracy.

Studies of over-bureaucratized organizations such as multinational corporations, armed forces, prisons, legal systems, mail services, and welfare agencies indicate how the functional elements of bureaucracy — specialization, hierarchy, rules, managerial direction, impersonality and careerism — if overdone turn dysfunctional and counter productive, alienating employees and clients. Its virtues became vices. Whereas specialization was supposed to increase production, too much specialization entailed dull, boring, routine soul destroying work that brought about careless performance, soldiering and sabotage which resulted in low productivity. Similarly reliance on written rules led to excessive red-tape and legalism which actually resulted in goal displacement, group norm substitution, corruption, and discrimination. The career service concept which was supposed to ensure competence could result in narrow minded, time serving mediocrities. An organization can start out with all the virtues of bureaucracy and soon decline with all its vices, a process which James Boren described as mellowization "as dynamic action is replaced by dynamic inaction".³¹

Jack Douglas believes that contemporary bureaucracies go through cycles similar to those experienced by ancient dynasties. They begin dynamically and grapple with real problems directly, simply and successfully. They have vigorous administration and entrepreneurial bureaucrats uplifted with ideas and bounding confidence bending the rationalistic, legalistic forms to achieve their goals. Because they work or work better than any predecessors people demand more and get hooked on entrepreneurial bureaucracy. They grow, adopt increasingly formal-rational methods of recruitment and administration and become increasingly distant from the people, and stifling. Their efficiency declines and they subvert their resources and power, becoming corrupt and usurpatory, succumbing to machinations that eventually give way to self-serving, change resistant, devious, ineffective and corrupt bureaucrats. They decline into bureaucratic factionalism, inertia, "the fluorescence of (useless) reform movements" (that mostly rationalize their appeals for more power, money and personnel), irresponsibility, and self-directing fiefdoms, invoking rebellion by the populace and conquest by new entrepreneurial bureaucrats who repeat the cycle. He compared the dynamism of the Roosevelt New Deal social welfare bureaucrats such as Henry Hopkins with contemporary social welfare agencies:-

...some of the bureaucrats are still dedicated, at least when they begin, but they soon burn out from the immensity of the rules, the relative inflexibility of the regulations, and the apparent

uselessness and unprofitability of all their efforts...Careerism, alienation, factionalism, inefficiency, and displacement of goals are their most important products.³²

He largely blamed the informational pathologies inherent in bureaucracy, such as the divorce of income from expenditure and inputs from outputs, the lack of marketing price and profit signals, the absence of proportioned feedback, information distortions and blockages, the emphasis on conformity, the propensity for sabotage, hyperinflexibility, elongated chains of command, enfeudation, conspiracy to defraud and deceive, disinformation, and sheer size. But they are not the only bureaupathologies that attack public administration.

Bureaupathologies

These vices, maladies, and sicknesses of bureaucracy constitute bureaupathologies (see Table 1). They are not the individual failings of individuals who compose organizations but the systematic shortcomings of organizations which cause individuals within them to be guilty of malpractices. They cannot be corrected by separating the guilty from the organization for the malpractices will continue irrespective of the organization's composition. They are not random, isolated incidents either. While they may not be regular, they are not so rare either. When they occur, little action is taken to prevent their recurrence or can be taken as in the case of anorexia (debilitation) and gattopardismo (superficiality).³³ They are not just physical

TABLE 1
COMMON BUREAU/PATHOLOGIES

Abuse of authority/power/position	Favoritism	Lack of credibility	Reluctance to take decisions
Account padding	Fear (of change, innovation, risk)	Lack of imagination	Reluctance to take responsibility
Alienation	Finegling	Lack of initiative	Remoteness
Anorexia	Footdragging	Lack of imagination	Rigidity
Arbitrariness	Framing	Lack of performance	Rip-offs
Arrogance	Fraud	Indicators	Ritualism
Bias	Fudging/ fuzzing (issues)	Lack of vision	Rudeness
Blurring issues	Gamessmanship	Lawlessness	Sabotage
Boondoggles	Gattopardismo	Laxity	Scams
Bribery	Ghost employees	Leadership vacuums	Secrecy
Bureaucratiese (unintelligibility)	Gobbledygook/jargon	Malfeasance	Self-perpetuation
Busywork	Highhandedness	Malice	Self-seeking
Carelessness	Ignorance	Malignity	Self-serving
Chiseling	Illegality	Meaningless/make work	Slick
Coercion	Impervious to criticism/suggestion	Mediocrity	bookkeeping
Complacency	Improper motivation	Mallownization	Sloppiness
Compulsive	Inability to learn	Mindless job performance	Social astigmatism(failure to see problems)
Conflicts of interest/objectives	Inaccessibility	Miscommunication	Soul destroying work
Confusion	Inaction	Misconduct	Spendthrift
Conspiracy	Inadequate rewards and incentives	Misfeasance	Spoils
Corruption	Inadequate working conditions	Misinformation	Stagnation
Counter-production	Inappropriateness	Misplaced zeal	Stalling
Cowardice	Incompatible tasks	Negativism	Stonewalling
Criminality	Incompetence	Negligence/neglect	Suboptimization
Deadwood	Inconvenience	Nepotism	Sycophancy
Deceit and deception	Indecision	Neuroticism	Tail-chasing
Dedication to status quo	(decidophobia)	Nonaccountability	Tampering
Defective goods	Indifference	Noncommunication	Territorial imperative
Delay	Indiscipline	Nonfeasance	Theft
Deterioration	Ineffectiveness	Nonproductivity	Tokenism
Discourtesy	Ineptitude	Obscurity	Tunnel vision
Discrimination	Inertia	Obstruction	Unclear objectives
Disconomies of size	Inferior quality	Officiousness	Unfairness
Displacement of goals/objectives	Inflexibility	Oppression	Unnecessary work
Dogmatism	Inhumanity	Overtkill	Unprofessional conduct
Dramaturgy	Injustice	Oversight	Unreasonableness
Empire-building	Insensitivity	Overspread	Unsafe conditions
Excessive social costs/complexity	Insolence	Overstaffing	Unsuitable premises and equipment
Exploitation	Intimidation	Paperasserie	Usurpatory vanity
Extortion	Irregularity	Paranoia	Vested interest
Extravagance	Irrelevance	Patronage	Vindictiveness
Failure to acknowledge/act/answer/respond	Irresolution	Payoffs and kickbacks	Waste
	Irresponsibility	Perversity	Whim
	Kleptocracy	Phony contracts	Xenophobia
	Lack of commitment	Pointless activity	
	Lack of coordination	Procrastination	
	Lack of creativity/experimentation/	Punitive supervision	
		Red-tape	
		Reluctance to delegate	

either; organizations also suffer definite mental illnesses or neuroses too — paranoid, compulsive, dramatic, depressive, and schizoid.³⁴ To correct them, wholesale changes are needed, i.e. administrative reform. But how are bureaupathologies to be tackled? Who knows of them? Who can identify them for what they are? Who can attempt a cure? And what happens when cures are attempted?

The greatest obstacle for public administrators to overcome is that of bureaucratic complacency and inertia. Bureaupathologies often create a comfortable, serene and relaxed atmosphere in which work is performed after a style and everything on the surface looks fine.³⁵ But dig below the surface, as ombudsman and whistleblowers reveal, and maladies abound and persist. The people in the diseased organization agree that what is being done is unsatisfactory and capable of considerable improvement. As individuals they all welcome change and reform. They may even be agreed on the specific changes they would like to see made. Plans may have been made, guidelines readied, staff prepared, but they are still waiting for a more opportune moment that never seems to arrive. Or they have kept abreast of discoveries in their field and are keen to try some new ideas. But nobody is prepared to take the first step and the same ideas are discussed repeatedly without any action being taken or some people do take upon themselves the responsibility for initiating change and design suitable, feasible, doable proposals, which they know beforehand are acceptable. But they never hear again what happened

to their proposals. Nobody knows why. They have been lost in the works.

In such inert organizations, the people are not lazy. On the contrary, they work hard and keep busy coping with daily demands. Everybody appears to be fully occupied, carrying out their set tasks and observing the directions issued to them. Each is loyal to the organization, each approves of its mission, each is keen to do a good job. All are aware of its shortcomings and deficiencies. They know of its mistakes and errors and can recount horror stories they know about. Between them, they have a pretty good idea how it can be improved, and they personally are willing to try something different to improve its performance. Yet, somehow nothing changes. The same old patterns and routines are preserved, the shortcomings and deficiencies are perpetuated, mistakes and errors are repeated. When the organization does change, it moves slowly, incrementally, and predictably, and then not always in the right direction. It fails to adjust in time to changes in its environment. It becomes insensitive to criticism. It appears not to know or want to know what is really going on. Everything stays pretty much the same. Nobody knows why. Nobody admits responsibility. Nobody confesses error. Nobody ends wrongdoing. It is as if the organization has a mind of its own, a mind closed to any other way of doing things. In fact, by failing to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize or adapt to pressures that threaten its long term survival, it is in a serious state of decline threatening enormous social repercussions to the economy

and society, and to the individuals dependent on it for products and services and jobs.³⁶ A good shake-up may suffice to reinvigorate it but already it may be too blind to recognize threats, too inert to decide on a remedial course of action, too incompetent to make and implement the right actions, too crisis ridden to accept the need for major reform, and perhaps even too far gone to save. This truly is public maladministration in extremis. Although by no means confined to the public sector, it is the kind of public maladministration that lowers the reputation of public administration and leaves a bad taste in people's mouths.

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Crisis of Public Administration as a Discipline in India

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Reviewing the current status of the public administration discipline in the Indian universities, this paper raises questions about the relevance of so-called theories and approaches in public administration, developed in an alien context, to Indian realities. It is argued that the management science orientation and the practical concerns of the discipline have taken it away from its broader social science moorings. A meaningful discipline of public administration in India has to reckon with the undifferentiated nature of administration and politics and the deep involvement of the administration in the social structure and processes. The theories of the state, especially the theoretical developments in the conceptualisation of the 'third world' state, need to be related to the structure and operation of public organisations. Public administration as a subject of study has thus to be located within a broader field of political theory. A discipline that avoids analysing the role of administration in sustaining a structure of domination, repression and injustice, is not a genuine social science but a courtier subject.

PUBLIC administration as a special field of study is very young in our universities. In 1949, the University of Madras was the first to set up a department of public administration and local self-government. Presently, about 30 odd university departments of public administration are offering courses on the subject. The major universities in the country like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Delhi have not felt the need for a separate department of public administration. The subject is still considered as an integral part of political science. It was with the setting up of the Indian Institute of Public Administration at the instance of the Paul Appleby Report¹ that universities like Chandigarh and Jaipur thought of opening separate public administration departments. From this year (1987), the Union Public Service Commission has introduced a full paper on public administration for the all-India and central services examinations. This step is likely to embolden many universities (or, more appropriately, teachers) to treat public administration as an autonomous course and form a separate department. The UGC has so far not formed a separate panel on public administration. It is now likely to be pressurised into accordin recognition to public administration as a separate discipline. Historically, the setting up of a new discipline has always been highly controversial. The current efforts to autonomise public administration in our universities need to be debated purely from the standpoint of its academic status and substantive content. As a starting point, one should have a look at the essential nature of higher learning which is supposed to be the objective of university education. As Oakeshott wrote:

It (a university) is concerned not merely to keep an intellectual inheritance intact, but to be continuously recovering what has been lost, restoring what has been neglected, collecting together what has been dissipated, repairing what has been corrupted, reconsidering, reshaping, reorganising making more intelligible, reissuing and reinventing. In principle, it works undistracted by practical concerns: its current directions of

interest are not determined by any but academic consideration; the interest it earns is all reinvested.²

The first difficulty one encounters in sponsoring the candidature of an autonomous public administration discipline is its excessive concern to be 'practical'. In this orientation, the disciplinary attention is focused essentially on the issue of 'efficiency' in government. Historically, as a breakaway subject, public administration emerged with the intention of making government more business like. That was precisely the objective of Woodrow Wilson the originator of politics-administration dichotomy. Elaborating this point, Vincent Ostrom observes that "the theory of administration presumed that technical solutions were available to public problems. Once decisions specifying policy objectives were reached we assumed that the translation of these objectives into social realities was a technical problem within the competence of professional administrative expertise".³

Since the days of Taylorism and the Gulick Urwick papers on the Science of Administration (1937), public administration has developed much like a 'vocational' subject based on the POSDCORB philosophy. The objective has been to study government with a view to diagnosing its ills and prescribing proper remedial measures against them. Hence, 'principle' of administration and 'techniques' of administrative improvement proliferated in the discipline with tremendous speed and these principles and techniques had virtually taken over the whole field of public administration. Equipped with this new found knowledge, 'experts' in public administration could easily merge with the so-called 'management' scientists. There was no concern about loss of identity, nor was there any questioning of the shaky epistemological foundation of the so-called 'management science'. "Efficiency for what purpose?", "how does micro efficiency in an organisation effect overall social efficiency?" These broader questions have not had much relevance in the management orientation.

Public administration as it has developed

in the US has been the model for most Indian scholars in this field. As mentioned earlier, the discipline was born and developed in America as a body of knowledge that would be of practical use in making government more businesslike. Dwight Waldo, the doyen of public administration in the US, was very categoric in his assertion that "it is now unrealistic and unproductive to regard public administration as a subdivision of political science...". His advocacy has been for a "professional perspective" on the analogy of medicine. To quote Waldo, "if the analogy to medicine has any validity, this means that we must be concerned not with a theory but with theories, indeed, with theories of many types, many dimensions and facets. The professional stance does not by a simple coin-in-the-slot procedure provide 'answers', nor does it even provide a complete and clear agenda of theoretical problems. It does provide a framework large enough to embrace our theoretical problems, it helps to classify the problems posed and to define the nature of proper answers; it gives direction on the time at which and the level at which to seek solutions".⁴

Waldo's unhappiness with American political science and his eagerness to start a subject that would be interested in practical problem-solving led him to the advocacy of a new discipline of public administration. It was naive to think that the professional approach would solve the boundary problem of a discipline and its theoretical underpinnings.

Wallace Sayre's reaction to Waldo's proposal was that in suggesting a professional perspective, present ambiguities were being exchanged for new and larger ones.⁵ Fred Riggs⁶ was much more explicit in his criticism of the Waldo approach with its in-built suggestion for separation of public administration from political science. In his view, premature professionalism and neglect of theoretical issues by public administration had been the cause of its alienation from political science. Both functionalism and behaviourism, according to Riggs, have tended to draw attention to partial or

micro aspects of government. Political science and public administration must join hands to study government as a whole system. As Riggs said:

To strengthen political science, I believe we must try to recapture the sense of the wholeness of government which our forebearers, from Aristotle to the Federalists, so clearly felt, without losing, of course our new-found ability to examine sub-components of government and to utilise newly discovered high-powered methods. Attempts to separate politics and administration as subjects of study, then are doomed to failure and frustration.

American public administration has travelled a long way since the days of Waldo's ardent advocacy of an autonomous, practical discipline. Under compulsions of domestic and environmental pressures, the discipline has long shed its allergy to political science. In fact, the 'new public administration' movement in the late 1960s marked a vigorous attempt to celebrate a reunion of political science and public administration. Waldo's professional perspective was found wanting in 'relevance' and 'values'. Public administration was accepted as a crucial part of the political problem.

As one of the protagonists of the 'new public administration' movement wrote:⁷ "A public administration which fails to work for changes which try to redress the deprivation of minorities will likely be eventually used to repress those minorities". In other words, the 'distributive' functions and the social consequences of governmental institutions should be at the centre of any worthwhile academic discipline of public administration.

Back home in India, under American patronage and academic supervision, public administration was advocated as a new discipline in India with a view to bringing about efficiency in government. Paul Appleby, the Ford Foundation consultant in public administration in India, made this point very clear in his report. To quote him, "The general idea is that professionalisation of public administration should be advanced in order to encourage more widespread and conscious study, reflection, and exchange of learning and to establish certain instruments charged with special responsibility for administrative improvement in terms not adequately covered at present".⁸

The initial thrust was thus towards 'professionalisation', almost echoing the old sentiment of Dwight Waldo. Efficiency in administration should no doubt have top priority in a country wedded to planned socio-economic reconstruction through direct state intervention. But, from the very beginning the tendency had been to shun broader social science considerations in discussions on administrative problems. One of the reasons for the poverty of the discipline of public administration in India has been its narrow 'practical' concerns and avoidance of broader social science theorising in allied disciplines such as sociology,

political science, economics and history. From the very start, public administration in India has busied itself with 'practical action' intended to repair and reinvigorate administration without caring for an adequate understanding of the context and environmental conditions of such action. Nor has there been any explicit effort to examine the social consequence of institutional action.

In this evolutionary process the Institutes of Public Administration at the central and state level have come steadily to assume the character of administrative clinics. 'Training' means a brief period of hospitalisation of the patient—the civil servant. Jet-set 'consultants' are going round diagnosing organisational ailments and prescribing appropriate 'medicines' for their cure. Even OPD type wings would be found advising ailing public organisations that would queue up for instant advice and ready relief. No wonder, consultancy is a thriving business now in India!

Possibly, the institutes of public administration were compelled to go into this trade under pressure from the government. Partly also they had to carve out an area of their own, distinct from that of the university departments of public administration. The result has been what can be called the vocationalisation of public administration. Oakeshott's description of vocational education is worth our quotation in this context:

For most people it (vocational education) is an education in one skill. The skill may be complicated and may have a considerable intellectual content, or it may be simple and easily learned. But it is, essentially, a highly specialised education, and not only on account of its concentration upon a single skill. For, learning here means acquiring a specific body of knowledge and being able to move about within it with ease and confidence and to use it. The sort of familiarity which a carpenter or a builder may have with his tools and his materials often goes far beyond anything that is achieved, with his tools and materials, by an historian of the papacy or a classical scholar, but there is reason for this, namely, that his is a strictly circumscribed body of knowledge which does not significantly look outside itself. The design of a 'vocational' education is to be concerned with current practice and always with what is believed to be known.⁹

Public administration as a vocational subject is interested in picking up relevant skills and communicating these to the students or applying these to problem-situations in administration. Increasing vocationalisation is evident from the recruitment of more and more technicians in public administration institutes such as computer analysts, engineers, financial and budgeting experts.

Vocationalisation has another problem. It is client-oriented. In pursuing vocationalisation, the institution turns its attention more to client needs than to the inner logic of a discipline. So, there is a creeping danger of subversion of the knowledge base of a dis-

cipline in any attempt toward excessive vocationalisation at the university level.

For the institutes of public administration, there are certain advantages in vocationalisation. The government being the financing authority there is understandable expectation for some concrete services from these captive institutes. They must service the government departments.

What should cause concern is the steady vocationalisation of public administration studies in our universities. The university departments of public administration are now competing with the institutes of public administration and the government staff training institutes in the field of 'training' and 'consulting'. There is much thoughtless emulation of the activities of these institutes. Slowly one observes a noticeable change taking place in the University syllabi for public administration. Subjects like 'hospital administration', 'co-operative management', 'management of public enterprises', 'business administration' and 'organisation and methods' are now the major foci of public administration studies. The university departments take pride in being 'modern' and 'management'-oriented. The offering of training programmes has become a status symbol for many of them and often they would be found approaching various government departments and agencies for programmes and funds.

The university departments would in that case have to have a variety of 'technicians' on their faculty on the lines of the institutes and staff colleges. Even if this is permitted (which is exceedingly difficult in the university set-up), the question that needs to be answered is: what kind of education in public administration a university department should plan and offer?

In an institute of public administration or a staff training college, the 'intellectual' activities that go on take many things for granted. Larger issues like the nature of the state, administrative history, the constitutional structure and the form of government, the political process, and the social structure are of little or no concern for such institutes. A university department of public administration, by contrast, need not bother about such instant concerns as improving performance of a government department or agency, 'training' of civil servants and offering consultancy services at a price.

Being free from such demands on faculty time, the university department can more profitably engage itself in deeper understanding of the state and the logic of governmental structure and operations. To cite an example, an institute of public administration may work for the improvement of the district collectorate. Contrastingly, an university department may study the district collectorate in a wider historical perspective and raise questions about the very existence of the collectorate alongside the newly evolved panchayat raj structure that seeks to democratise field administration.

A major concern of a university department should be to locate governmental organisations and operations within the framework of broader theories of the state. Public administrative machinery and operations derive their nature and character from the overarching state theories. One cannot, for instance, understand American public administration without a proper appreciation of the principle of separation of powers and the influence of interest groups in administration. In the western developed capitalist countries, the role and shape of public administration have been conditioned basically by the liberal-pluralistic conceptualisation of the state. Reliance on private initiative, limited public sector and a basically regulatory stance of the state are the necessary concomitants of the liberal pluralistic concept of the state. The 'welfare' stance of the developed capitalist state has its roots in the capitalist need for "reproduction" of useful labour for capitalist accumulation. It is an *ad hoc* accretion, not the essence of state activity.

At the other end of the spectrum, a post-revolutionary socialist state would be having a very different kind of administrative machinery within the overall conceptualisation of the state. Note, for example, Lenin's observation on the goals of socialist management:

...as we begin socialist reforms we must have a clear conception of the goal towards which these reforms are in the final analysis directed, that is, the creation of a communist society.¹⁰

Lenin elaborated in great detail the principles of socialist management to accelerate the process of social reconstruction of the USSR after the October Revolution.¹¹ Similarly, there are many innovative management ideas in Mao Zedong's numerous writings and speeches which are inspired by the peculiarities of local situations.¹²

As one turns to the so-called 'third world' countries, the inchoate theory of state takes on a strange mixture of liberalism, pluralism and socialism.¹³ Objectively, the private sector co-exists with a burgeoning public sector. The public organisations and the parastatal agencies proliferate, as there is a constant trend toward increasing state intervention in the economy and tremendous diversification of governmental activities spawning newer and newer public organisations. The 'third world' is surely not a homogeneous category. The dependency theorists focus attention on exogenous actors whose influence on country-specific development obviously vary from situation to situation. All these countries falling in this class do, however, share in common large scale government intervention in socio-economic reconstruction. It is in this context that a new sub-discipline of public administration was born under the title of 'development administration', profusely aided by American scholarship and blindly abetted by the Indian scholar. Many of the problems of development administration can be traced

to the confusion in the theory of the third world state. Strangely enough, most discussions on development administration are obsessed with 'development bureaucracy', development schemes and their implementation without caring to examine the underlying assumption of an 'autonomous' state and a 'benign elite' as champions of modernisation and development.¹⁴ The meaning and directions of social change remain unclear; correspondingly, the agencies and modalities of change remain vague or, at best, narrowly articulated. All in all, development administration as a subdiscipline is basically a statist approach to 'development'.

If the nature of the state itself is in most instances at the root of poverty, inequality, and injustice in the third world this needs to be seriously examined and exposed. Public administration as a discipline has then to have a new paradigm that would provide adequate explanatory and conceptual strength to relate administration to social power structure and the forces of reaction and conservatism.

State theories, unfortunately, do not find adequate place in the public administration syllabi at the university level. Another important omission is the discussion on 'politics' as such and the relationship between politics and society. Politics in the East Asian sense of authoritative allocation of values orients us towards the inputs in the environment that set the agenda for government decision-making. The nature and manifestations of 'power' in society need to be understood to explain what happens or does not happen in administration. Beside other societal forces, bureaucracy itself deserves careful study as a power group. Weber himself hinted at that when he characterised the bureaucracy as a 'status stratum'. Weber's political theory has never attracted the attention of public administration scholars in India. Only his structuralist description of bureaucracy is discussed instead *ad nauseam*.¹⁵

Even if Weber occupies some place in the syllabus, Marx is virtually unheard of. Marx's views on the state, politics and bureaucracy are generally considered as heretical. If public administration as an academic discipline has to embark upon a fruitful analysis of the bureaucracy and administration in the third world, the Marxist formulations as have evolved in recent years deserve careful study.¹⁶ In the third world situation where the post-colonial state continues to be in the grip of an all-pervasive and ascendant bureaucracy and the society remains highly inequitable, administrative policies and their implementation need to be studied within a broader framework of class, caste and power. Even public administration researches by US scholars like Riggs and Presthus have brought out clearly the undifferentiated nature of social reality where politics and administration cohabit the social space in the third world. Any mechanistic and

political study of public administration in such a context is bound to be highly artificial and unrealistic.

Public administration syllabus in most of our universities seems to have paid scant attention to the 'political approach' to public administration. Also, political sociology that is concerned with the interface between politics and society is an 'unheard of thing' in public administration syllabus.

Politics in India with its emphasis on the social base of politics including party system and interest group polities is not part of the post-graduate syllabus in public administration. Usually, there would be a descriptive paper on Indian public administration. Constitutional government in India focused on constitutional evolution and basic constitutional law can at best be found as an optional paper. The Indian political system, the historical evolution of the Indian administrative system, the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the basic constitutional law of the country deserve much more attention as core themes of any worthwhile public administration discipline.

Indian developmental realities embrace the planning objectives and processes, programmes and schemes, project implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and politics of development planning. This is yet another important area on which academic discussions should be focused. Logically, planning and public policy analysis can be coupled together as twins in the public administration syllabus.

In fact public administration as a new subject in our universities has been in search of an identity. Political science from which it broke away has been shunned with vengeance, as it were. Lured by the false promise of a management science, public administration has sought to ape the ways of management science. In the process, its social science content has diminished alarmingly. The study of public administration as a social science has necessarily to lean heavily on history, sociology and political science. Instead, the university departments have moved more toward the kinds of syllabi that can be found in the institutes of management and public administration. Higher education at the university level strives for critical and unbounded knowledge. If public administration should be taught in our universities, it is perhaps improper to treat it as a uni-disciplinary subject. Probably the best course would be to have a centre for the study of government and public policy as a multi-disciplinary school pooling together the resources of political science, history, sociology and a few other allied subjects like economics, and social psychology.

Our public administration academics are often carried away by the mystique and apparently convincing logic of the western academics. As Fanon wrote so very rightly, "the native intellectual has thrown himself greedily upon western culture".¹⁷ No attempt is made to ponder over the applicability of concepts and theories formulated

in an alien context to our local situation. American public administration is basically the product of a national culture that treats government as an integral part of the business ethos of the country. In England, public administration has grown up under conditions of a decentralist unitary government based on parliamentary sovereignty. The discipline of public administration in India has to draw on the Indian politico-administrative history and contemporary reality. Fresh conceptualisation is necessary as ours is a post-colonial state with a hangover of bureaucratic dominance operating under conditions of vast territorial spread, large-scale illiteracy and poverty, and constitutionally delimited spheres of action of two levels of government. The implications of the overtly capitalist path of development need to be related to the structure and operation of administration.

Public administration as a member of the large social science family, in a 'third world' situation, has to respond to the realities of this world. The question of 'relevance' assumes importance in this connection. Public policies that overtly or covertly tend to perpetuate class hegemony have to be studied from the point of view of their implications for property or class relations. If, three and a half decades of 'planned development' have failed to have a significant dent on poverty, the nature of planning itself needs to be thoroughly scrutinised. In a country where communal violence erupts at regular intervals and the spectre of drought and semi-famine conditions haunts a large part of the land annually, can the discipline of public administration continue to have a perverse kind of clinical detachment? Following Ashok Mitra, one can raise the question can social science research "be divested from social realities, the reality of class conflicts, the reality of exploitation, the reality of inequalities in the distribution of incomes and assets, the reality of last ditch efforts on the part of vested interests, including the government, to prevent land reforms"?¹⁸

An academically worthwhile public administration discipline in India has to have anchorage in broader social science interactional field. Only then can we strive for the formulation of appropriate concepts and theories for explaining the structure and operation of 'administration' in our special socio-economic situation.

In times of turbulence when the directionality of development is manipulated by vested interests, social science has a responsibility to expose the reality and come out with a strident ideology of protest. Public administration in India has so far been playing just the opposite role of an advocate of the status quo. The highly centralised, bureaucratic state in India is presently in the throes of a deep crisis. But the analysts of public administration continue to harp on the theme of improving the managerial competence of the overdeveloped bureaucracy. Decentralisation, strengthening of grass-

roots institutions and genuine popular participation need academic encouragement. A policy of de-bureaucratisation and popular involvement in public sector decision-making call for appropriate organisational innovations. The class linkages of the bureaucracy and its overt and covert support for the forces of conservatism and social repression and economic exploitation can be unmasked by a new kind of ombudsmanic posture of the discipline. Unfortunately public administration studies and research, in general, have failed to sense the crisis and remained therefore by and large an arid intellectual field.

Unlike the physical sciences, social sciences are essentially ethical sciences. The idea of a good society and a moral existence is an inescapable motto of social science. A public administration discipline that avoids analysing the role of administration in sustaining a structure of domination, repression and injustice is not a genuine social science but a courtier subject. At the university level, what is needed therefore, is a discipline of public administration that would be sensitive to social crisis and radical enough to expose the myths and rituals of an overwhelming bureaucratic state apparatus. Under conditions of under development, it has also a moral duty to chart out the methods of social transformation. Such a discipline can grow and develop only in close association with political science and allied social sciences.

Notes

- 1 Paul A Appleby, "Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey", Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 1957.
- 2 Michael Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics", Methuen, London, 1962, p 310.
- 3 Vincent Ostrom, "The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration", The University of Alabama Press, 1973, pp 5-6.
- 4 Dwight Waldo, 'Scope of the Theory of Public Administration' in Charlesworth (ed), "Theory and Practice of Public Administration", Philadelphia, 1968.
- 5 Ibid, p 27.
- 6 Ibid, pp 32 and 61.
- 7 H George Frederickson, 'Toward a New Public Administration', in Frank Marini (ed), "Toward a New Public Administration", Chandler Publishing Co, San Francisco, 1971.
- 8 Paul Appleby, "Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey", Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, Delhi, 1957, p 62.
- 9 Ibid, p 308.
- 10 V I Lenin, "Collected Works", Vol 27, 1965, p 127.
- 11 See, in this connection, K Varlamov, "Socialist Management: The Leninist Concept", Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977.
- 12 For interesting discussions on Mao's management thought, see John Bryan Starr, "Continuing the Revolution", Princeton, 1979, Chapter 5.
- 13 On the conceptualisation of the Third World state, see Alfred Stepan, "The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective", Princeton University Press, 1978, Chapter I.
- 14 See, in this context, Harry Goulbourne, "Politics and the State in the Third World", The Macmillan Press, 1979. Another interesting work in the same field is : Vicki Randall and Robin Theobald, "Political Change and Underdevelopment", Macmillan, London, 1985.
- 15 For a full-length discussion on Weber's contribution to political theory, see David Beetham, "Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics", George Allen and Unwin, 1974.
- 16 See Victor M Perez-Diaz, "State, Bureaucracy and Civil Society", The Macmillan Press, 1978. Also, Pandav Nayak, "Developing State as a Historical Structure", Printwell Publishers, Jaipur, 1986.
- 17 Frantz Fanon, "The Wretched of the Earth", Penguin Books, 1980, p 176.
- 18 Ashok Mitra, 'Relevance of Social Science Research' *Social Scientist*, Vol 10, No 11, November, 1982.

20

Emerging Issues in Public Administration

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My task is staggering: to identify emerging trends in the overall field of public administration, itself an "emerging superdiscipline," as John Rouse (1982) has aptly termed it.

To make this task manageable, I have taken two decisions. First, the word *emerging* is interpreted as referring to an issue that is on the way to trend status but not quite there. Issues that have already emerged—and are still very hot (e.g., cut-back management, pay comparability)—are left to other authors of this book to examine. I shall review issues that are currently in the process of emerging, or that ought to be emerging. These would be candidates for future trend status, so to speak.

Second, I am being shamelessly subjective in selecting candidates for future trend status. A Naisbitt-like content analysis of the latest faddish ideas appearing in recent periodicals does not underlie this chapter (Naisbitt 1982). Instead, five issue areas have been picked for discussion that reflect my own orientation to the field. They are proposed as lines of inquiry in which the field could profitably invest substantial work in the decades to come. In making this selection I have deliberately avoided futuristic-sounding choices that are "far out" for attention-grabbing reasons, concentrating instead on notions that have clear ties to current research and close association with norms already embedded in the field.

Administrative Ethnography

The first of the five issue areas concerns organizational culture. This topic has already emerged in the field of business management and is now doing so in the study of public management. For several years, certain management scholars have been fascinated with the shared values, habits, folklore, symbols, and rituals of business

corporations. In effect, this interest has required such researchers to become amateur anthropologists, writing thumbnail ethnographies of the firms under scrutiny (Deal and Kennedy 1982; Kilmann, Saxon, and Serpa 1985; Sathe 1985; Schein 1985).

This new ethnographic interest has enlivened business management research, known for its often plodding character. Concern and curiosity have been aroused about what exists beyond the corporation's formal organization chart and official goals of production and profitability. The presumption of the research is that corporate life is characterized by extrarationality as well as rationality, and by pattern initiation at the level of rank-and-file workers as well as top management. The ultimate objective of this study seems, however, frankly instrumentalist: how to help the manager (especially the incoming manager) fit into and then shape the corporation's unique culture.

It is not as if organizational culture in government bureaucracies has never been investigated. Herbert Kaufman's classic on the Forest Service possesses elements of this orientation (Kaufman 1960). Harold Seidman's discussion of culture and personality within the federal establishment is also germane (1980, chap. 6). Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) have characterized the distinctive (and fascinating) culture of an entire national bureaucracy, that of Israel. M.ynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell have dissected the subcultures of reorganization in a Kansas department (1986).

What is now needed is a more systematic research on the cultures of public bureaucracy. Less I be misunderstood, I do not mean by *systematic* an organized program of research that adheres faithfully to a single paradigm or methodology and thereupon accumulates scientific knowledge. My proposal is more open-ended, calling for increased work on the cultures of administration in a number of ways simultaneously. The research can be carried out with positivist, interpretist, or radical humanist ontological perspectives. It can employ ideational or adaptationist concepts of culture. Methodologies can be qualitative or quantitative, using interviews, observation, or participation. My own view is that any of a variety of research approaches are capable of contributing insights on this matter; the task is not to agree on the single rigorous research design that will then supposedly yield validated findings but to commit ourselves to basic exploration, using middle-range theories and multiple methodologies.

My personal preferences are for fairly tangible indicators of organizational attitudes and behaviors and an explicitly comparative approach. Patterns of speech, written language, internal governance, dress and deportment, and internal interaction should be examined. Studies can be made of architectural settings, office accouterment, and personal life styles. Other topics of research can be organizational stories, ceremonial rites of passage, logos and nomenclatures, and models of heroes and villains. While preliminary hypotheses and hunches will by necessity govern how we study these matters, it is important always to expect the unexpected

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and accept the discovered cultures on their own terms. Uniqueness and diversity must characterize such ethnography, not elegant typologies and proven hypotheses. Comparisons between carefully selected bureaucracies will help, by providing contrasts that highlight features that will otherwise be hidden from view. Admittedly, the consequence of such cultural study will not be ethnoscience, but a process of lively and diverse inquiry that will generate fresh insights, informed speculation, and reasoned interpretation (see Goodsell 1981).

The fascinating possibilities that could be uncovered by such research can be imagined by such questions as: What are the cultural differences between, say, bureaucracies that serve the poor (welfare departments) and those that serve the middle class (Social Security offices)? Do diplomats have a negotiating culture and military planners a confrontational one? Are consumer-protection agencies liberal and utility regulators conservative? Are staff planning units big spenders and budget offices tightwads? How do soldier policemen compare to clubhouse firemen? Do city managers in small towns operate in a peacetime atmosphere and their big-city counterparts in a wartime climate? The hypothetical cultural contrasts to be explored, discarded, and uncovered are endless.

The objects of such administrative ethnography would be two. First, as students of public administration, we will come to understand in richer detail than before the descriptive variety of administrative life. Like business management, public administration has traditionally been preoccupied by formal structures, not informal realities. Also, it has had a holistic bias, expressed by such notions as the civil service, integrated management, and the executive branch. We need constantly to disaggregate these artificially compounded ideas that are popular in our field and then describe faithfully the differentiations that are found.

Second, this emerging research could lay the basis for a deeper sense of identity and self-awareness on the part of members of bureaucracies. As its culture becomes more visible, participants in the single organization can begin to see themselves more clearly, as can a crowd seated in a rounded amphitheater as compared to the flat floor of, say, a hotel ballroom. This cultural awareness can lead to deeper bonds, more pride, and greater morale. Individuals are no longer mere bureaucrats, but members of a unique cultural entity whose content is clearly seen.

Administrative Biography

The second proposed research direction for the field is to write on the lives of people. In other words, more biography as well as more ethnography is needed in public administration. Just as we must know and appreciate organizational cultures more fully, we must become better acquainted with the field's past leaders and noteworthy personalities.

CHARLES T. GOODSELL

Once again, our business colleagues seem to be ahead of us. An established tradition in the subfield of business history is the preparation of biographies of great entrepreneurs. Books abound on leading historical figures like Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, Eli Whitney, E.I. DuPont, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie. Also, a tendency to glorify corporate chief executive officers has created a proliferation of profiles of individual businessmen. Business best-sellers such as *In Search of Excellence* stress the importance of the executive's personality and charisma (Peters and Waterman 1982).

In public administration, we do not seem to give as much credence to the individual life story. Our historical materials tend to direct attention to such classic writings as Wilson's essay and great documents such as the Brownlow report. Another tendency in administrative history is to stress eras, as in the Leonard White volumes, or civilizations, as in E.N. Gladden's work (1972). Individual founders, entrepreneurs, pioneers, administrators, and intellectuals of the field do not emerge as flesh-and-blood men and women but as figures immersed in events and historical periods. Exceptions can be found to this tendency, for example, Robert Caro's (1975) *The Power Broker*, Eugene Lewis's (1980) *Public Entrepreneurship*, and Doig and Hargrove's (1987) *Leadership and Innovation*, but they are rare.

At least three reasons for writing added administrative biography can be advanced. First, it is an effective way of teaching the history of the field and the history of public agencies. Forgotten incidents and arcane details become vivid when narrated from a human perspective. The unfolding of an individual life is a convenient temporal framework for coverage of a given chronological timeline of events. Because of the great impact certain individuals have had on our public institutions, biography can become a key to unraveling causality. One does not have to insist on a great-man theory to agree that the history of the Forest Service cannot be understood without studying the life of Gifford Pinchot. Similarly, the FBI cannot be understood without J. Edgar Hoover, the TVA without David Lilienthal, NASA without James Webb, and the modern Pentagon without Robert McNamara. And as for the field as a whole, a superb book that simply must be written will relate the history of American public administration itself through the life of Luther Gulick.

The second reason for biography is its capacity to convey values. When administrative norms are presented as ethical codes or legal precepts, they are disembodied from life. While case studies, such as those developed by the Inter-University Case Program, place normative dilemmas in concrete situations, they are rarely compelling as conveyors of values; the human actors themselves are usually not center stage, hence the reader finds it difficult to relate to the dilemmas personally. In biography, however, we have the opportunity to identify in an immediate, human way with others' ethical struggles. To illustrate, Kenneth Lasson's (1978) book on six frustrated federal officials gives us a more vivid picture of civil service morale problems than all of the Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee

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Attitude Surveys combined. Similar biographical sketches could be done for whistle-blowers, striking schoolteachers, politicized bureau chiefs, and bribe-tempted police officers. Exposure to such material will impart to civil servants far more ethical consciousness than the code of ethics hung on an office wall.

A third reason is suggested by a comment of Dwight Waldo's, offered during an interview conducted by Brack Brown and Richard Stillman (1985): "Where I think we fall down badly is in failing to provide what I will boldly call an inspirational component in our training programs. What I have in mind, for example, are biographies and essays in which public service careers are portrayed honestly but favorably" (p. 463).

Indeed, inspiration can be the clinching reason to make the writing of administrative biography an emerging trend in the field. Biography does not merely teach history or convey values, but can instill a sense of dedication and commitment. It can help provide young men and women headed for the public service with the motivational grounding that substitutes for the almighty dollar, the incentive that prevails elsewhere in the employment world. Extended portrayals of great administrators such as William Jump, Rexford Tugwell, George Marshall, Frances Perkins, and William Ruckelshaus are capable of demonstrating the driving power of a sense of mission apart from naked greed or mere thirst for power. Moreover, such biography can put to practical work David Hart's (1985) splendid idea of utilizing the search for fame as an appropriate motivating force for serving the public good.

At the same time, hagiographic glorification of our discipline's great figures is not desirable. In fact, it would detract from the capacity of biography to show that administration involves compromise and requires dirty hands as well as holiness and halos. A model here could be Lytton Strachey's (1918) *Eminent Victorians*, whose sympathetic but myth-destroying biographic sketches of nineteenth-century figures such as Florence Nightingale (herself a great administrator) created role models for the literate young of the World War I era. Indeed, recent articles in the pages of *Public Administration Review* on Paul Hoffman, Paul Appleby, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Charles Beard seem to point us pretty squarely in this direction (Burke 1984; Cleveland 1982; Goodsell 1986).

The Analysis of Analysis

The third issue area that should emerge relates to the technology of administration. In the past, public administration has generally been a rather unreflective consumer of technology. This tendency has many roots, including the central place of the efficiency criterion in our constellation of values, the presence of inexorable political demands to cut costs, and a sense of defensiveness and insecurity that makes the field gimmick prone. Public administration as a fraternity always seems to fear being

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behind the times—hence becoming an easy prey for aggressive hucksters of the latest technological hardware and management acronyms.

I propose that we move from being unthinking enthusiasts of new technology, bedazzled by the substantive features of the technology itself, to more sober, self-conscious acquirers and users of new products and services. To accomplish this end, we must study more adequately the extended implications of present and contemplated administrative technology. This study would cover the technology's long-term consequences, its actual (rather than imagined) deployment, and peculiarities of the process of technological change itself, as experienced within the specific context of political administration.

By technology, I do not refer alone to pieces of machinery or physical methods of production but as well to their surrounding social and organizational aspects—what is sometimes called the “sociotechnical system.” In public administration, we honor several such systems: financial management systems, management information systems, systems of office automation, and systems of organizational development intervention, to name a few.

Let me elaborate on my proposal for reflective inquiry by reference to the technology of policy analysis. We may not always think of policy analysis as a technology, yet one could argue that its combined elements of quantification, modeling, prescription, and evaluation constitute the most enduring and significant sociotechnology to enter public administration in half a century. Policy analysis, as a field and movement, has gone a long way toward reshaping the basic character of the discipline. Moreover, its influence shows no sign of receding. Without making any judgments on the issue, it is time we conduct a concerted study of the uses, impacts, and processes of policy analysis as it is actually employed in concrete organizations. We need analysis of analysis, so to speak: a deployment of the very modeling, prescriptive, and evaluative techniques contained in this technology to examine the technology itself.

Some such work has already been done. We are seeing increasing numbers of studies that examine and reflect on whether analysis is in fact a problem-solving process, as it purports to be. Also under study is the influence of analysts in policy making, and the culture of analyst shops in government (Hansen 1983; Jenkins-Smith and Weimer 1985; Springer 1985; Wildavsky 1979).

A constructive way in which to extend and amplify this reflection is to employ the thought categories of technology studies. Such studies are usually directed to substantive problems such as hazardous waste and biotechnology, but they can be used to scan wider issue areas. Three concepts seem particularly promising.

First, the process of technological diffusion in policy analysis should be empirically studied. Although we know that every respectable administrative agency possesses a unit for policy development, program planning, or program evaluation, we do not know exactly what they really do. At the operations level, we have not

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closely analyzed the reports and memoranda to come from these shops or the actual activities of analysts (exceptions are Doty 1983; Meltsner 1976). At the decision level, we have not determined the extent to which—or under what circumstances—analytical output is taken seriously, used to justify prior decisions, or employed as a symbol of rationality. As J.D. Eveland (1983) has pointed out, technological adoption typically depends on local conditions, that is, the social details of the micro environment, not the fact that it is being dispersed generally in the society.

Second, the concept of technological assessment is helpful. Although when first introduced, the scope of this term was confined mainly to mathematical risk analysis or systems forecasting, it now incorporates speculation on long-term, unintended, or delayed social, environmental, and political consequences (Lawless 1977; O'Brien and Marchand 1982; Otway and von Winterfeldt 1982). In policy analysis, we simply do not know enough about the long-term consequences of decision analysis or program evaluation. As specific examples, we do not know enough about what impact statements do to the speed of the decision process, what the process of data collection does to goal structures, and what cost-benefit analysis does to valuation of organizational ends.

Finally, the concept of technological fit can be applied. Many argue that new technologies are not equally desirable in all settings and that at times appropriate (sometimes described as soft) technologies rather than state-of-the-art should be adopted. Although microcomputers give even the smallest and most unsophisticated organization great information-processing capacity, the efforts required to gather large volumes of information to take advantage of this capacity may not always be desirable. Stuart Nagel (1982) has provided a service to policy analysis by pointing out that simple, back-of-the-envelope analytical techniques are sometimes best.

A Global Perspective

As a fourth candidate for an emerging issue in public administration, a more global perspective for the field is needed. In some respects, the discipline of public administration as we know it today has its origins in America. A sizable proportion of the world's teachers, books, and scholars associated with the field as strictly defined is American. Moreover, ethnocentrism continues to pervade much of our thinking, our research, and our conference panels. We need to escape the Americanization of public administration; also, we need to transcend national boundaries generally in administrative studies.

Let me suggest, then, two separate foci for achieving a more global perspective. One is to decolonize the present subfield of comparative administration. It is colonialist in its thinking, empirically and conceptually. Comparative administration as a field of research is not so much comparative as it is the study of public adminis-

tration in foreign countries. Moreover, at least half of this study has been centered on a handful of countries, namely Britain, France, and Germany, and to a lesser extent Japan and the USSR. The remaining 170-odd nations of the world have individually received relatively scant attention; they are, in fact, usually grouped into gross categories derived from degrees of modernization or democratic rule. We simply must break out of this habit of uneven depth of treatment and escape a "leading models" syndrome. While granted that some national administrative systems have been more influential worldwide than others (mainly because of historical colonialism), it is high time to learn more details and seek deeper understanding of those that are only superficially known. After that is done, we can perhaps recategorize systems by less ethnocentric variables, such as country size, character of legislative-executive interaction, administrative style, language or religious diversity, economic system, or resource base.

Comparative administration is also ethnocentric with respect to its leading theoretical constructs. It can be argued that the Weberian model, perennially a favorite framework for comparative analysis, possesses a highly Western bias. Ideas such as modernization or development invariably imply progress toward Western ideals. Then, too, instrumentalist notions of administration that stress efficiency, effectiveness, and political neutrality are closely associated with the Anglo-American idea of a politics-administration dichotomy. Public administration can (and does) serve noninstrumental functions in many countries, such as making the power of the state concrete and expressing the regime's values toward certain groups. Also, of course, bureaucracy can operate as an employment agency of last resort or as a means of mobilizing political power, functions that should not be sneered at simply because they do not fit capitalist or democratic ways of thinking. Finally, organizing concepts commonly employed to diagnose the problems of Third World bureaucracies, such as corruption, formalism, and imbalance, imply better-worse scales of value on which the bureaucracies of rich and pluralistic politics are assumed to occupy the good end of the continuum, leaving all the rest strung out toward the bad end. These frameworks for thinking are ethnocentric, despite the comparative empirical incidence of such phenomena.

A second way to achieve a more global perspective for the field of public administration is to conduct more research than is currently being done on international public policy. I am not referring here to international public policy, a term best reserved for the actions of international bodies. Nor am I referring to comparative public policy studies, an area preoccupied with the variety of national policies.

Instead, such a focus would be directed at the growing interdependency of national governmental policy actions. Others have already pointed out this need. Fred Riggs (1976) contends that the requirement for a generalized or global framework for thinking about problems will inevitably lead to a pan-world recasting of the field, with American aspects of public administration being reduced to the status

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of a subfield (p. 652). Lynton Caldwell (1984) has called attention to the highly interdependent nature of land-use policy and the resultant rise of attempts to coordinate and control interventions across national boundaries; siltation of rivers in one country destroys hydrogeneration in another, for example, and intercontinental wind carriage of soil dust sets off desertization thousands of miles away. Harlan Cleveland (1985) argues that the enormous wealth, mobility, and diffusion of information in a world equipped with computers and united by satellite communications is causing the nation-state to leak out of its confines in three directions at once: to international coordination at the top; to multinational corporations at the sides; and to citizen participation at the bottom.

To illustrate some of the forces at work in this globalist trend, satellite remote sensing and aerial photography have led to revolutionary opportunities for world weather forecasting and natural resource discovery. Planetary population growth and varied levels of industrialization compel individual nations to join forces in such areas as immigration, hunger, fisheries, and acid rain. The eruption of international terrorist activity throughout the world requires the closest coordination on matters of air piracy, airport security, and the movements of suspects. In space, as we begin to exploit and colonize rather than just explore, governments will need integrated programs of space tracking, rescue, and the removal of debris. In short, as the globe shrinks and as national policies increasingly interconnect, policy research must transcend the nation state.

Two models are available for such a global policy perspective. One is strategic military and security policy. Another is the worldwide focus of international business and finance. Both models employ a global perspective to scan the environment, develop strategies, and pursue concrete objectives. Both do so by amalgamating vast informational and intellectual resources and then applying those resources in an integrated conceptual framework. A newly global civilian public administration can do the same, if equipped with equivalent resources and mandate.

In some ways, however, such an enterprise could even surpass these models. It could avoid the lingering nationalist paranoia inherent in security policy, and it could rise above the blatantly materialistic goals of international business. The resulting globalism would call for worldwide research and cooperation in a vast array of social and humanitarian matters of concern to all nations and people. Perhaps our discipline, which began on a rather puny scale as a governmental reform movement in the boroughs of New York, can become associated with cooperative research and problem amelioration on a worldwide scale.

A Teacher of Governance

A final proposal for an emerging issue in the field is restricted to the United States.

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In our country, we have thought of public administration as historically performing perhaps two major roles vis-à-vis the society. These are (1) implementer of statutes, the role defined by classical concepts of legislative rule in a democracy, and (2) servant of the chief executive, the role that emerged in successive Progressive eras and especially the New Deal. As we now approach the new century only a few years away, one wonders whether a third role should not now emerge—that of teacher of governance to society.

Those who are innately suspicious of government—whether free marketeers on the right or civil libertarians on the left—may wince at this teaching metaphor, for it implies a different and more crucial role for public administration than it has played in the past. The notion of teacher suggests the possession of superior knowledge and insight. It also implies a position of respect and influence. These inferences are deliberately intended in my choice of words, because it is my belief that American public administration will need to occupy a more elevated position in American society in the third millennium than we now customarily accept.

I am not speaking of a necessarily bigger bureaucracy, although that could be true as well. Also, I am not advancing the metaphor of teacher because the society is somehow becoming ignorant. Indeed, in terms of quantity and flow of information, the very opposite is true. Instead, the society will need more teaching because collective problems are becoming compounded in their complexity as technology advances and social interdependency increases; interest-group avariciousness and a self-regarding rights mentality are fracturing the capacity for political bonding and united action for common political goals; and the combined costs of arms, public services, and interest on the public debt are outrunning the society's political capacity to tax itself. This creates a permanent crisis of insufficient public resources.

What is needed from public administration, then, in such a society? A readiness to teach ongoing lessons of governance, I submit. I would, moreover, submit that public administration possesses a capacity to instruct society with respect to both the substantive knowledge and normative ideals of governance. In the realm of substance, such teaching will add to our collective understanding of intricate policy interconnectedness among the hard lessons of past governing experience, the long-term implications of present societal trends, and the full range of available public policy options. In the normative realm, this teacher will remind us of the need to accept duties as well as demand rights; sacrifice immediate self-interest to the extent necessary for a viable public order; concern ourselves with all the effects of proposed policy on others; and defend the interests of future generations, as well as our own.

It is true that other elements of society than public administrators already do much teaching to us. Political leaders set forth visions of the future and determine the policy directions of society, as they certainly should. Economic entrepreneurs provide the energy, vigor, and productive capacity that make the good life possible

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from a material standpoint. Reformers and clergy raise our moral sights, while scholars and intellectuals furnish new ideas and technologies.

Politicians, producers, and preachers are indispensable and should not be downplayed or dismissed. Their efforts have created the America we know today. Nevertheless, their combined teaching efforts will not be enough for governance in the twenty-first century. Politicians are limited by a time horizon fixed by the next election, even though the time implications of public policy are constantly extending. Entrepreneurs operate within an economic system where self-interest, not public-regardingness, is paramount. Reformers, religious leaders, and academicians contribute best as critics of government rather than partakers in governance. It is public administration alone that possesses the potential to teach society how to govern itself beyond the year 2000.

At the same time, public administration is probably not fully ready for this new role. Its potentiality for normative leadership must be further developed. Let me suggest three ways in which the discipline could begin to prepare for its impending responsibility.

First, we must establish the teacher's credibility. We must grope for ways to reverse the effects of our society's innate antibureaucratic biases. This task can begin by working out ways to demonstrate to the population the high levels of effectiveness that prevail within most public agencies. Not stopping at that, we must also continuously and visibly demonstrate that we are always attempting to improve agency effectiveness. Further, we must react to budgetary stringency, not with the rearguard tactics of trying to preserve programs at all costs, but instead with creative redefinitions of core agency missions.

For their part, academicians in the field can support the enhancement of credibility by supplementing their traditional preoccupation with adequate control of bureaucracy and turn to ways of legitimizing its lawful missions and operations. It is time that our theorists discuss bureaucracy's essential contributions to a democratic society as much as they do its dangers. Professional associations such as the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and the International City Managers Association (ICMA) must educate all of us—especially the public administration community itself—to a realization that we are not just another pressure group fighting for survival in a changing society, but a proud leadership cadre that is dedicated to making the ongoing process of change as constructive as possible.

Second, we must develop adequate forums in which to perform the teaching function—classrooms, if you like. These need to be acquired at two levels: (1) the interface between careerists and political appointees; and (2) at the level of citizenry as a whole. While present classrooms such as hearings, cooperative projects, training programs, college curricula, and the mass media are obviously vital as educational forums and should be retained, we can fashion additional ways in which teachers and learners come together in an atmosphere of trust.

At the level of careerist-appointee interface, the relation between lower political appointees and the federal Senior Executive Service (SES) would logically suggest itself as a setting for education. But the SES's size and flagging image may mean that more drastic reforms of the upper civil service are necessary. One idea to draw on may be the *grand corps* concept in French administration. A *corps* in this sense consists of high-morale professionals in a given substantive area who operate in all departments instead of just one. Thus they transcend the agency viewpoint, and can be accepted by incoming appointees as knowledgeable yet above the fray to some extent. Such corps members might thus succeed as administrative educators.

At the level of citizenry, we should think of forums where administrators have the opportunity to talk candidly and engage in informal interaction with citizens. Possibilities would be call-in talk shows broadcast on municipal cablevision; visits by administrators to schools and civic groups; public-sector plant tours; and administrative town meetings held in regional offices and city halls.

Finally, an improved language of dialogue should be fashioned for teaching governance. This is of critical importance, since the key words around which ideas cluster become symbols for the broader vision of what we are about. As the philosopher of language John Searle (1969) points out, the very fact that we employ certain words commits us to the underlying value premises embedded in those words (he calls these the constitutive rules of the institution). Our discipline should thus set out to promote verbal symbols that are adequate to public administration's teaching task. This will require not just coining cute phrases but building on language constructs of appropriate connotation already deeply rooted in our culture. One candidate here is the public interest (Flathman 1966). Although ridiculed by mostly academics, the term nonetheless directs dialogue to broad societal purposes and consideration of the interests of all affected parties (Wamsley, Goodsell, Rohr, Stivers, White, and Wolf 1987). Another possibility is high citizenship, which can be construed as imposing obligations of responsibility to the polity as well as a conferral of rights (Frederickson 1982; Frederickson and Chandler 1984). Further development of the symbolization of governance will be of major priority in the years ahead.

The Challenge Ahead

These five emerging issues are, as admitted earlier, not clear projections from present research or action agendas. They are a product of my world view. Nonetheless, each issue has also been raised by others, and none depart wholly from current concerns in the field.

Full emergence of the proposed issues will not be automatic or easy. Long-standing intellectual traditions in public administration create much resistance to each. The strong thread of scientism that runs through our field's history creates

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counterforces to the qualitative research contemplated by administrative ethnography, the humanistic research called for in administrative biography, and the reflective assessment of technology called for in an analysis of analysis. The field's continuing ethnocentrism argues against adopting a truly global perspective. Finally, our traditional dedication to a purely instrumentalist posture for public administration runs counter to the proposed teacher role.

At the same time, the field is by no means static intellectually. Indeed, one might argue that our emerging superdiscipline is filled almost to overflowing with paradigmatic diversity, conflicting cross-currents, and a continuing assault on all orthodoxies. We should be delighted that our field is not orderly and calm but turbulent and vital. This turbulence is what makes the five proposed issues not inconceivable as emerging lines of inquiry but ripe for serious dialogue. To illustrate, challenges from interpretivist and radical-humanist ontological-epistemological schools of thought are pushing aside the old monopoly once held by positivist social science on our research assumptions and procedures. The current low ebb but continuing survival of comparative administration studies is, quite possibl', preliminary to a vast new interest in the global perspective. A surge of interest in the normative dimensions of public administration is making good headway. The instrumentalist tradition of the field is being challenged by a call for elevating the public administration to the status of full partner in the process of democratic governance.

In short, one cannot be pessimistic about such a vital and dynamic discipline as our own. For an elderly centenarian, public administration is remarkably alive in mind and body. This gives us all an opportunity to participate in the field's constant reshaping as we move ahead.

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15

Research Methodology in Public Administration: Issues and Patterns

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Public administration was in an early stage of development when Luther Gulick (1937) called for a science of administration. His exhortation became a source of heated and continuing controversy (Dahl 1947; Simon 1947) that centered on positivist versus alternative views of appropriate research methodology. That debate, which continues today, has derailed public administration from attention to the real issue. That issue is not positivist versus other research methods, but the quality, continuity, and usefulness of research, whatever the methods. Traditional social science methods are valuable as a means of advancing the field. Indeed, the most valued research in the field comes from the social sciences and is based in its methods. Alternative methods may be equally valuable, although we do not espouse them. The test of methodology is whether it produces useful knowledge over time. Therefore, the current status of public administration research methodology is assessed, and changes for its future development are suggested.

Our assessment was conducted by examining research articles in *Public Administration Review* (PAR) and *Administration and Society* (A&S) published from 1975 through 1984. We conclude that public administration research is primarily applied rather than basic, lacks cumulativeness, and lacks the institutional supports required to change either of the first two conditions. Therefore, we concentrate our suggestions on institutional supports while giving attention to fostering basic research and cumulativeness of research.

As Lynton Caldwell (1968) noted in an earlier essay on methodology in public administration: "Method is not solely, or even most importantly, a matter of technique. It is first and foremost a way of thinking" (pp. 219-20). In search of a working understanding of methodology, we rely on Kaplan's discussion of this concept in *The Conduct of Inquiry* (1964). He distinguishes several senses of methodology: *techniques*, the specific procedures used in a given science; *honorifics*, a ritual

invocation attesting to concern with meeting standards of scientific acceptability; and *epistemology*, involving the most basic philosophical questions about the pursuit of truth. The first and third of these senses have the greatest bearing on this inquiry.

In addition, our primary concern is methodology used in academic research; that is, the conscious effort to advance knowledge about public administration. Thus, methods generally used in the social sciences are included, whether qualitative or quantitative in nature. We excluded methodologies for administrative research, such as program evaluation, client surveys, and productivity measurement. These methods focus on generating knowledge about the problems of particular organizations or programs, and are excluded from the scope of this study. They are oriented to the practice of administration rather than the study of administration.

As the foregoing suggests, methodology and research are closely linked. Methodology exists to guide the conduct of research; methodology is reflected in research. As a practical matter, therefore, our assessment of methodology is necessarily an assessment of public administration research.

Historical Issues in Public Administration Research Methodology

Public administration research methodology has been assessed infrequently, but five themes consistently emerge from the literature: (1) The eclectic nature of public administration makes it difficult to identify methodologies that define or are associated exclusively with the field; (2) research reflects too little interdisciplinary communication; (3) public administration research has not been cumulative; (4) the bridge between research and practice is an important consideration in the selection of research methodology; and (5) institutional support for research is inadequate for remedying knowledge deficiencies in public administration.

Public Administration: Academic Discipline or Profession?

The question "Is there a discipline of public administration?" has occupied a good deal of attention in the history of public administration thought (see, among others, Dahl 1947; Honey 1957; Mosher 1956). The practical import of this question is twofold. First, identification of the "stuff" of the field, as Dwight Waldo has often termed it, would help identify the phenomena and problems requiring investigation by its practitioners and, in turn, may help them to design appropriate methods for inquiry. Second, locating public administration in the larger constellation of social and natural sciences would have a direct bearing on identifying acceptable, common, or perhaps even paradigmatic research methodologies.

Writing in 1957, John Honey concluded that "a common pool of under-

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standing was lacking with regard to (a) what public administration is and whether it is a separate field or discipline from other social sciences, and (b) the nature of research that has meaning for public administration" (p. 238). In the intervening years, the intellectual core has sometimes been the topic of intense debate, and assertions about an identity crisis have been common (Marini 1971), but public administration seems to have arrived at an operative, if not a consensual, solution to the field question. Among the components of this operative solution are that public administration is centrally concerned with the operation and social role of public enterprises and therefore is a practical or professional field; while the scope of public administration practice is broad, the study of public administration is rooted in the social sciences and therefore in the methods of social science; and the problems associated with administering public enterprises demand research of both an applied and basic orientation.

From a research methodology perspective, this solution describes a field characterized by methodological diversity and a mixture of basic and applied research. This state of affairs is a wholly predictable outgrowth of directions identified by Dahl (1947) and Simon (1947) forty years ago (see also Waldo 1984). At mid-century, the controversy about excluding normative considerations from public administration was perhaps the dominant concern of the field. Dahl (1947) considered it perhaps the greatest stumbling block to creating a science of public administration. Simon (1947) argued that Dahl's concern was misplaced, contending it was the result of seeing the problem as characteristic of social versus natural science. He asserted that normative considerations are characteristic of applied as distinguished from basic science because the applied scientist's role involves reaching decisions grounded only partially in scientific knowledge. In Simon's terms, public administration has evolved as a basic and an applied science, the former concerned with establishing empirical propositions independent of the value system of the inquirer and the latter devoted to assisting with application of the empirical propositions for a specified set of values.

Interdisciplinary Communication

The breadth of public administration and its methodological diversity create unusual problems in spanning several boundaries—to academic disciplines, to others within public administration, and to the real world. When Mosher (1956) wrote about these problems in the 1950s, he lamented the absence of systematic ways for those in public administration to keep abreast of relevant developments in other fields and the ignorance about research from public administration within other fields.

Both the stock of knowledge and its rate of growth have increased significantly in the past thirty years, so it would hardly be persuasive to argue that the cause of this problem has abated. Nevertheless, the boundary-spanning problem has been partially resolved by the evolution of new organizational arrangements among

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and within academic disciplines. One of the trends identified by Mosher in 1956, that the other social sciences are converging with public administration with respect to interests and purposes, is partially responsible for generating these changes.

Among the manifestations of these new organizational arrangements are the creation of groups within or spinoffs from traditional academic disciplines, such as political science and economics, with central interests in public issues. Examples include the sections on Public Administration and Public Policy within the American Political Science Association. These groups have generated theory relevant to public administration and have provided opportunities for public administration scholars to keep abreast of developments in the traditional disciplines.

A new generation of interdisciplinary organizations has also sprung up to accommodate heightened interest in public problems. The Public Choice Society and the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM) are prime examples of this new generation of organizations. Still another development has been the evolution of public-sector groups within a wide range of professional organizations, such as the College of Public Programs in the Operations Research Society of America—The Institute of Management Science (ORSA-TIMS) and the Public Sector Division of the Academy of Management.

These changes in the organization of academic and professional interests have not been an unqualified blessing; nor have they eliminated all boundary-spanning problems. Scholars interested in public administration are now confronted with an overload problem of a new sort: how to select from among all the organizational options available for their professional development.

Perhaps a potentially more serious consequence of the multiplication of locations for public administration activity is the decline of agreement among scholars and practitioners about the basic terms of their field (Garson and Overman 1983). The community of scholars that existed in public administration until the 1960s have been supplanted by minicommunities. Although some public administration scholars view this as desirable because it improves the manageability of developments within accepted specialties (Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty 1969), other scholars are concerned because it portends that the values used to assess the worth of new knowledge are no longer widely shared (Newland 1984).

Cumulation of Knowledge

While interdisciplinary communication problems have perhaps diminished as new communities of scholars have organized to address new issues, another integrative problem has increased in importance: the cumulativeness of relevant knowledge. This criticism has been raised several times in the past (Kronenberg 1971; Mosher 1956). It is important to point out that the process of knowledge accumulation is not linear; the acquisition of new understanding is more probably a step function or an upward-sloping cyclical function. Our diagnosis of this problem is not predicated

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on the current level of achievement, but on processes and efforts to systematize empirical theory about public administration.

Impediments to cumulation arise from many sources, including disagreements among competing scholarly interests, changing public problems, and lack of a fixed-core content for the field. The vast scope of the field is a bar to any rapid accumulation of knowledge given the limited human and institutional resources focused on investigating relevant phenomena. The lack of cumulative knowledge also may result from some specific problems associated with incentives for research or investigator preferences for certain research methodologies. Whatever the causes, inadequacies of methodology for cumulating knowledge are reflected in certain characteristics of public administration research. For example, meta-analysis, the critical review and reanalysis of prior research and a popular method for synthesizing research in other fields, is little used in public administration. It is also our belief that a preponderance of public administration research focuses on early stages of theory development (i.e., problem delineation and variable identification), with only minimal attention to more advanced research reflecting the maturation of prevailing theories.

Bridging Theory and Practice

The need for utilitarian research within public administration was recognized in the earliest days of the field. The bureaus of municipal research, credited by Mosher (1956) as a parent of public administration, practiced strictly applied research. This tradition survives today in a wide array of governmental research bureaus and institutes. The practical orientation of these bureaus frequently drives out investments in basic research. Historical tradition, expectations of core funders, and bureau staff tend to work for applied research and against the advancement of basic public administration research. Thus academic public administration is simultaneously provided with and robbed of the means for advancement of knowledge by some of its own institutionalized values.

The perpetuation of the theory-practice distinction is primarily attributable to the limited scientific authority of public administration theory—and not to the value of theory se. Public administration would benefit from strong basic and applied research institutes, responsible to their constituencies, but free to pursue their separate objectives.

Institutional Support

Previous reviews of public administration research have found considerable fault with the adequacy of institutionalized support. Publication outlets (Mosher 1956) and funded support (Garson and Overman 1983; Honey 1957) were among the areas most heavily faulted. The availability of financial support continues to be a problem, but, as suggested above, academic public administration's own values also fail to support research adequately.

Indeed, public administration does not lack historical models, publication outlets, or governmental support for basic research. The Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council was a major force in the publication, support, and sponsorship of research from 1935 until 1945. The problem of publication outlets has abated significantly. At least a dozen journals, many of them founded since 1970, now complement *Public Administration Review* (Morgan, Meier, Kearney, Hays, and Birch 1981; Vocino and Elliott 1984). And governmental support for basic research in public administration has been steady, with occasional exhibitions of largess such as the National Science Foundation's Research Applied to National Needs (RANN) Program and the Office of Personnel Management's Organizational Assessments of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978.

While increases in the level of these institutional supports could make a difference for public administration research, they are not enough by themselves. What public administration lacks, in addition, and what is a central problem for advancing research, are values supportive of basic research. The low priority given to research is reflected in faculty recruitment and promotion, training of new Ph.D.s, and program goals and design: Universities are producing an abundance of nonresearch Ph.D.s and a dearth of research-oriented Ph.D.s in public administration (McCurdy and Cleary 1984).

University support for research does not automatically accompany support for teaching programs. Moreover, public administration programs tend to be viewed by university administrators as service rather than academic components (Dunn, Gibson, and Whorton 1985). Thus, when research bureaus are provided to support public administration programs, they tend to be viewed as service extensions of the university and oriented toward applied research and technical assistance rather than toward basic research.

Recent Critiques of Public Administration Research

Recent assessments of public administration research methodology reflect concern with two primary issues. The first is the degree to which research is adding to a verifiable knowledge base. The second issue is epistemological, involving the kinds of research questions that we can pierce with our methodologies, and whether our methodologies produce usable knowledge.

Several recent studies have looked at different bodies of research in public administration from the standpoint of their contributions to knowledge. Garson and Overman (1983) reviewed public management research, a subset of public administration research, for the years 1981-82. They concluded that the research was fragmented, noncumulative, and underfunded. A more recent study by McCurdy and Cleary (1984) analyzed abstracts from public administration doctoral disserta-

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tions published in *Dissertation Abstracts International* for 1981. They found that the vast majority of dissertations neither dealt with significant issues nor were conducted in a way that would produce findings in which one could have much confidence. They concluded that the lack of methodological progress, as evidenced by the low quality of dissertations, results from inadequate standards among leading public administration programs as well as the nature of the field itself. Jay White's (1986a) replication of McCurdy and Cleary's study found that dissertation research is not published and therefore not communicated beyond the dissertation committee. Whatever reasons explain the lack of publication (e.g., poor quality, lack of interest in publishing the dissertation), White concluded that dissertation research does not appear to be a major source of knowledge in the field.

The second issue, which is epistemological, has been addressed by a number of public administration theorists, most notably Catron and Harmon (1981), Denhardt (1984), Hummel (1977), and White (1986b). White argues that most critiques of public administration research have been grounded in positivist models, indicative of the natural and mainstream social sciences. He argues, however, that public administration research has not been viewed in the light of two other modes of research: interpretive and critical. He suggests that growth of public administration knowledge be interpreted in the light of all three modes of research.

Following White, we believe that methodological diversity in public administration is both appropriate and acceptable. Nevertheless, debates among the advocates of alternative modes are no substitute for research on substantive theoretical issues. The ultimate test of the value of these modes is whether they contribute to the development of a stock of knowledge and illuminate understanding of the field.

Contemporary Research Methodology

Methods and Data

Research articles published in *Public Administration Review* (PAR) and *Administration and Society* (A&S) from 1975 through 1984 were chosen as the population for assessing contemporary research methodology within public administration. PAR is the journal of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), a professional society whose mission is "to advance the science, processes, and art of public administration." It has a dual set of objectives aimed simultaneously at communicating with practitioners and advancing the science of the field. A&S is an unaffiliated journal published by Sage Publications. Its editorial policy "seeks to further the understanding of public and human service organizations, their administrative processes, and their effect on society."

In addition to considerations of manageability and convenience, several fac-

tors led us to choose research published in these two journals. First, *PAR* and *A&S* are among the premier journals in the field and, therefore, should be representative of current research methodology in the field. Second, research articles in these journals are peer reviewed to assure that they meet broad professional standards.

Symposia articles, professional stream essays, review essays, and special issues were excluded from the domain of *PAR* articles analyzed. Included in the analysis were 289 *PAR* and 194 *A&S* articles.

Analytic Categories

Each article was coded on eleven variables, about half reflecting purely descriptive information and the others requiring some interpretation of the contents of the article. The complete variable code book is presented in the Appendix. Seven variables provided primarily descriptive information, some of it purely for identification purposes, about each of the cases: year of publication, volume, issue number, author(s), author's organization, general subject area, sources of research support.

Four other categories were used to record information about the methodology used in the study. *Research Stage* is a taxonomic variable derived from earlier work by Gordon, MacEachron, and Fisher (1974). It represents the stage of social science research, reflecting the purpose for which the study was conducted. These research stages and purposes are summarized in table 15.1 (page 355). *Research Methodology* was adapted from an earlier taxonomy by Caldwell (1968). The categories of this taxonomic variable reflect general methods of inquiry used in the social sciences. *Methods of Empirical Analysis* was based on Gordon, MacEachron, and Fisher (1974), Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers (1976), and Vogel and Wetherbe (1984). This variable applied only to studies that used empirical observation. The categories of this variable range from case study to controlled field experiments. Each category of the taxonomy represents increasing internal validity (Campbell and Stanley 1963). *Focus* is a dichotomous variable that distinguishes whether the study was oriented toward theory building or problem resolution.

Research Results

Descriptive Characteristics of Public Administration Research. Figures 15.1 through 15.6 present research by primary subject matter, focus, source of research support, stage, general methodology, and methods of empirical analysis. These data are useful for two purposes: (1) characterizing public administration research in general and (2) identifying journal-specific variations. Our primary interest is with the former of these purposes.

The distribution of research by primary subject matter, reported in figure 15.1 (page 356), confirms the broad distribution of research in the field. Although the subject matters addressed in *PAR* are more evenly distributed than those in *A&S*, the journals share the four most frequent subject matters: administrative the-

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TABLE 15.1
Classification of Research Strategies

Research state	Research purpose
1. Problem delineation	To define what we are looking for, and the extent to which it constitutes a social problem
2. Variable identification	To identify variables that might be linked to the problem, and to describe possible relationships among these variables
3. Determination of relationships among the variables	To determine the clusters of relevant variables required for prediction, and to analyze their patterns of relationships
4. Establishment of causality among the variables	To determine which factors are critical in promoting or inhibiting the problem
5. Manipulation of causal variables for policy formation purposes	To determine the correspondence between a theoretical problem solution and the manipulable factors
6. Experimental evaluation of alternative policies and programs	To assess the expected, as well as the unanticipated, consequences of various programs and policies before and after they are applied on a large scale, and to determine the effectiveness of such programs in overall problem solution

ory, public management, public policy, and planning. Of these areas, *PAR* articles emphasize public policy significantly more frequently, and *A&S* articles focus on administrative theory relatively more intensively. Comparison of subject matters also indicates administrative functions (e.g., personnel, budgeting) are addressed much more frequently in *PAR* articles than *A&S* articles. Figure 15.2 (page 357) also shows that a majority of articles published in both *PAR* and *A&S* emphasize problem solving over theory development. Despite these similarities, the profiles for two journals also differ in one significant respect. *PAR* articles are predominantly problem oriented, whereas *A&S* publishes about equal numbers of theory and problem-focused articles.

The low levels of support for public administration research are apparent from figure 15.3 (page 358). Overall, 80 percent of the articles did not identify any sources of institutional support. The most important sponsorship category for articles published in both journals was "other," which primarily consisted of research funds provided to faculty by their universities. The National Science Foundation supported the largest amount of published research, but it was identified in relatively few *PAR* or *A&S* articles (5.5 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively).

Most articles reported the results of research at an early stage of development, as reflected in figure 15.4 (page 359). Over 60 percent of the articles in each journal dealt with either problem delineation or variable identification, the two




FIGURE 15.1
Distribution of Articles by Primary Subject Matter

lowest stages in the taxonomy. *A&S* published a moderately higher proportion of articles addressing determination of relationships among variables than did *PAR*. But only about 5 percent of articles published in both journals reported research that had been conducted at one of the three most advanced stages.

Figure 15.5 (page 360) indicates that the general research methodologies in

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


FIGURE 15.2
Relative Frequency of Theory vs. Problem-solving Orientation

PAR and *A&S* clustered in three categories: logical argumentation, legal briefs, and empirical analysis. Methodologies often associated with interpretive or critical theory, that is, historical or descriptive approaches (White 1986b), were infrequently represented. Mathematical models or comprehensive literature reviews were used in very small proportions, less than 3 percent of *PAR* articles and less than 8 percent of *A&S* articles. About half of all articles (52.2 percent for *PAR* and 49.5 percent for *A&S*) employed some type of empirical analysis. Figure 15.6 (page 361) indicates, however, that most empirical research consisted of either case studies or cross-sectional analysis. Very little empirical analysis involved field experiments, structural equations, or longitudinal studies.

Changes in Research Methodology over Time. As a means for identifying changes in public administration research methodology, the data were categorized into two five-year periods 1975-79 and 1980-84. The *A&S* distribution of research by primary subject topic was quite stable during these two periods, but there were significant shifts in the subject areas covered in *PAR* (table 15.2, page 362). Administrative theory, citizen participation, planning, and personnel all declined in significance as a proportion of total research. Finance, intergovernmental relations, and public policy increased significantly as focal areas for research. Few differences for the two periods were found for research sponsorship or research stage. In contrast, general methodologies changed significantly, with much greater emphasis on empirical analysis in both the *PAR* and *A&S* samples from 1980 to 1984 (table 15.3, page 363). The increased use of empirical analysis was distributed among three methods: case studies, cross-sectional analysis, and longitudinal analysis.




FIGURE 15.3
Sources of Research Support

Discussion

The analysis identified several differences between *PAR* and *A&S*. Among the differences were the distributions of subject matter and the greater emphasis of *A&S* on theory development. The editorial goals and objectives of the journals obviously influenced these variables. The similarities in results far outweigh journal idiosyncrasies, however. Moreover, replication and extension of our analysis by Stallings and Ferris (1988), covering forty years of *Public Administration Review*, produced similar results. Given the consistency of findings over time and across journals, three general evaluative statements about public administration research can be drawn.

First, public administration research is primarily applied rather than basic. Nearly three-fourths of the articles dealt with either problem delineation or variable

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


FIGURE 15.4
Distribution of Articles by Research Stage

identification; less than one-fourth dealt with theoretical relationships among variables. Moreover, the research lacks detachment from immediate and instrumental concerns. Most of the articles reporting empirical research were of either the case-study or cross-sectional-survey variety; few articles involved field experiments, structural equations, or longitudinal studies. Finally, the underlying purposes of conducting research tend to be problem oriented, which limits development and testing of empirical theory. Problem-oriented research tends to reduce the chances




FIGURE 15.5
Distribution of Articles by General Research Approach

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


FIGURE 15.6
Distribution of Articles by Methods of Empirical Analysis

that propositions about the field will be adequate statements of explanation and will be linked together in a system of explanation (Kronenberg 1971, 193).

Second, public administration research lacks cumulativeness. Both the methodology and the stage reflected in public administration literature indicate that research is not cumulative. Less than 4 percent of the articles in *PAR* and *A&S* combined were literature reviews of empirical research, a methodology indicative of a general concern with cumulation. Moreover, our personal reading indicates that much of the literature provided only citation reference to previous research and did not seriously engage the linkages between the current article and prior or contemporary research.

TABLE 15.2
Comparison of 1975-79 and 1980-84 Distribution
of Articles by Primary Subject Area

Subject matter	PAR (N = 289)				Total	
	1975-79	1980-84	N	%	N	%
Administrative theory	18	16.1	16	9.1	34	11.8
Public management	13	11.6	23	13.1	36	12.5
Citizen participation	9	8.0	6	3.4	15	5.2
Public policy making	9	8.0	42	24.0	51	17.6
Planning	20	17.9	16	9.1	36	12.5
Accountability	4	3.6	10	5.7	14	4.8
Personnel	15	13.4	17	9.7	32	11.1
Finance	6	5.4	24	13.7	30	10.4
Intergovernmental relations	4	3.6	11	6.3	15	5.2
Urban and regional government	1	0.9	3	1.7	4	1.4
State government	1	0.9	1	0.6	2	0.7
Federal government	4	3.6	0	0.0	4	1.4
Other	8	7.1	8	3.4	16	5.5
Total	112	100.1	177	99.8	289	100.1

A&S (N = 194)

Subject matter	1975-79		1980-84		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Administrative theory	27	28.1	31	31.6	58	29.9
Public management	18	18.8	13	13.3	31	16.0
Citizen participation	3	3.1	4	4.1	7	3.6
Public policy making	8	8.3	17	17.3	25	12.9
Planning	11	11.5	5	5.1	16	8.2
Accountability	6	6.2	9	9.2	15	7.7
Personnel	0	0.0	5	5.1	5	2.6
Finance	5	5.2	1	1.0	6	3.1
Intergovernmental relations	1	1.0	4	4.1	5	2.6
Urban and regional government	6	6.2	3	3.1	9	4.6
State government	0	0.0	1	1.0	1	0.5
Federal government	1	1.0	0	0.0	1	0.5
Other	10	10.4	5	5.1	15	7.7
Total	96	100	98	100	194	100

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

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TABLE 15.3
Comparison of 1975-79 and 1980-84 Distribution
of Articles by Methods of Empirical Analysis

		PAR (N = 289)				
Method of empirical analysis	1975-79		1980-84		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Case study	16	14.3	40	22.6	56	19.4
Cross sectional, correlational analysis	29	25.9	49	27.7	78	27
Structural equations: e.g., path analysis, LISREL	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.3
Longitudinal analysis	1	0.9	12	6.8	13	4.5
Controlled field or laboratory analysis	2	1.8	1	0.6	3	1
Nonempirical	64	57.1	74	41.8	138	47.8
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0
Totals	112	100.0	177	100	289	100
A&S (N = 194)						
Method of empirical analysis	1975-79		1980-84		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Case study	7	7.3	14	14.3	21	10.8
Cross sectional, correlational analysis	27	28.1	36	36.7	63	32.5
Structural equations: e.g., path analysis, LISREL	4	4.2	2	2.0	6	3.1
Longitudinal analysis	1	1.0	4	4.1	5	2.6
Controlled field or laboratory analysis	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0
Nonempirical	57	59.4	41	41.8	98	50.5
Other	0	0.0	1	1.0	1	0.5
Totals	96	100.0	98	99.9	194	100

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Third, public administration research lacks adequate institutional support such as university and extramural funding, organized research institutes, collaborative groups and external rewards. The primary indicator of support for research was financial. Eighty percent of the articles failed to identify any sources of financial or other institutional support. This omission is not caused by poor reporting, journal

policy, or faculty ingratitude. Instead, it is indicative of the low level of such support.

To compare the level of support for public administration research with another professional field, we analyzed reported support from articles published in the Academy of Management's two publications, the *Review* and *Journal*, for calendar year 1984. From a total of 105 articles, 40 percent acknowledged some kind of support, 22 percent reported receiving extramural support and another 18 percent received assistance from their university. This is twice the proportion of articles in *PAR* and *A&S*.

Thus, given the assessments above, we conclude that there is a notable convergence between the past and the present. Public administration research continues to be eclectic, noncumulative, skewed toward problem solving, and poorly supported. Public administration research methodology has not matured to a point where it is capable of sustaining the knowledge creation needs of the field. We find ourselves in basic agreement with Fritz Mosher (1956) who, over thirty years ago in a review of research methodology in public administration, concluded:

The field has not channeled its research efforts; its scope of interest seem unlimited; it has not developed a rigorous methodology; it has been pretty blasé about definitions; it has not agreed on any paradigms or theorems or theoretical systems; it has not settled on any stylized jargon or symbols; with a very few experimental exceptions, the field has not been modeled or mathematized into an "adminimetrics." (P. 176)

In order to advance the status of research methodology in public administration, we believe three general changes are necessary: (1) focus on core phenomena, (2) institutionalize research, and (3) improve specific methodologies.

Focus on Core Phenomena in Public Administration

As noted above, public administration is a remarkably diffuse field encompassing contributions from many disciplines. It is also a relatively small field, in terms of scholars pursuing its study, when compared with similar fields such as business administration. Public administration, therefore, needs to focus the scope of its scholarship if progress is to be made in understanding phenomena within its general domain. Golembiewski (1977) has suggested guidelines for achieving this goal. Among the guidelines is a "next bite" approach, that is, avoiding development of comprehensive theories and focusing instead on smaller pieces of appropriate reality. In addition to this strategy, two sets of core phenomena could provide a sharper focus for research within the field.

The Study of Characteristics and Processes That Differentiate Public Administration from Other Administration. This could be attacked as both an issue of

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political theory and as an empirical issue. A political theory approach would concentrate, as suggested by Woodrow Wilson (1887, 197), on those public purposes that define public administration. Empirical research should be grounded in the premise that public administration is a subset of two generic social processes: administration and governance (Willbourn 1968).

Political-administrative System Interface. The second anchor we propose for a redefined public administration core is the study of phenomena at the interface of the political-administrative system. Among the phenomena that would be the object of research given this definition of legitimate concerns are responsiveness or non-responsiveness to the political system; legitimacy of the administrative system in carrying out its politically mandated functions; legislative oversight of administrative agencies; representativeness of administrative agencies; and administrative reform (e.g., civil service reform for increasing the responsiveness of administrators to both the executive and the public).

Institutionalize Research

It is apparent that public administration research is very much a product of institutionalized norms and incentives. Substantial advancements in research methodology will occur only if new norms and incentives are legitimated. These changes would need to include the following.

Upgrade the Importance of Research in Faculty Roles. At the micro level, considerable progress can be made by better developing the capacity and incentives for public administration faculty to do high caliber research. Where the capacity does not exist, we suggest bringing in first-rate scholars from other disciplines. For existing faculty, vehicles such as the Interuniversity Consortium on Political and Social Research (ICPSR) summer program could be used to upgrade faculty research skills. Faculty incentives can be influenced by institutionalizing research as a promotion and merit criterion. The faculty tenure and promotion policies of individual universities could be significantly reinforced by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration's (NASPAA) adoption of standards that defined research as a faculty responsibility and required that public administration faculty be substantially engaged in teaching, service, and research. A recent study by Joseph A. Uveges, Jr., (1985) indicated that NASPAA standards have had a modest impact on M.P.A. curricula and program autonomy. Thus there is some evidence that the leverage of NASPAA standards might contribute to institutionalizing research.

Improve the Quality of Ph.D. Programs. A change related to upgrading faculty research roles involves increased emphasis on research-oriented Ph.D. pro-

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grams. Public administration continues to debate the issue of whether the Ph.D. should be conferred exclusively for research competence or whether a doctorate for practitioners is not equally appropriate (Birkhead and Netzer, 1982). The M.P.A. should be the terminal professional degree, and doctoral study should be devoted to developing a candidate's research competence. Schools that offer the Ph.D. or D.P.A. (Doctor of Public Administration) should provide intensive training in research and adequate numbers of research-oriented faculty to sustain the programs.

Develop Research Unit-Public Administration Program Ties. An expanded emphasis on the value of research would be greatly facilitated by stronger ties between formal research units and public administration programs. Universities considering creation of public administration programs should give serious consideration to funding research units at high levels relative to the instructional programs, for example, one-half the program resources.

Increase Funding for Public Administration Research. Without financial resources, adequate research cannot occur. This is an issue that needs to be resolved collectively by the profession and leading public administrators. The National Academy for Public Administration might initiate a dialogue with Congress about the needs for, and benefits from, research on public administration. Given the scale of our modern administrative state and its centrality in our society, Congress might consider creation of a National Institute along the lines of the National Institutes of Health. Within the current fiscal climate, such proposals would appear to be inopportune, but the scale of problems of modern public administration could easily justify a moderate amount of earmarked funds likely to repay the initial investment in a few short years.

Specific Methodological Improvements

In addition to changing incentives and norms, there is need for specific improvements in research methods used by public administration scholars.

More Extensive Use of Meta-analysis. One of the most important of these changes involves steps to increase the cumulation of research. Kronenberg's (1971) earlier call for a public administration proposition inventory was one means for dealing with this problem, but it has not been implemented in the fifteen years since it was suggested, probably because it was dependent on a large-scale, collaborative effort. An alternative means for increasing cumulativeness of research is wider use of meta-analysis. Meta-analysis refers to the set of methods used to establish facts by cumulating results across studies. These methods include literature reviews (Salipante, Notz, and Bigelow 1982), counting statistically significant findings, and averaging results across studies (Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson 1982). Also, the em-

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pirical analysis indicated that literature reviews were used infrequently and few studies advanced to mature stages of social science research. Both of these findings suggest the need for more attention to meta-analysis. An ancillary benefit of greater use of meta-analysis is that it can also be valuable for integrating results across different academic fields, a particularly important objective for an interdisciplinary enterprise such as public administration.

Case Study Methodology. Case studies have been stereotyped as a method of last resort, exploratory, and an attractive nuisance (Miles 1979; Yin 1981a). Given these critical views about case-study methodology, it would be appropriate to call for a significant reduction in the use of case studies in public administration research. Nevertheless, case studies will continue to be a popular method given the subject matter of the field and therefore a more realistic strategy is to focus on their improvement. Furthermore, abandonment of case studies fails to consider a revisionist view about their value that has developed in the past decade (Yin 1981b; Yin and Heald 1975). Recent refinements in the conduct of case studies have increased their potential validity (McClintock, Brannon, and Maynard-Moody 1979; Yin and Heald 1975). Considering their widespread use in the field, public administration scholars might undertake further refinements in case-study methods as a means for enhancing public administration research and contributing generally to development of social science methods.

Qualitative Methodologies. Another specific area for improvement is the use of qualitative methodologies within public administration. A grasp of qualitative methodologies is becoming increasingly important as interpretation and rhetoric regain prominence and respectability in the social sciences (Winkler, 1985). The empirical analysis confirmed public administration's already strong preference for qualitative research, an albeit diminishing one, but also questioned the adequacy of researchers' grasp of the tools and craft associated with qualitative methodology. There has been a small explosion of materials in recent years about qualitative research (Van Maanen 1979), and public administration scholars need to become both more proficient practitioners of this craft and contributors to the advancement of these methods.

Advanced Quantitative Methodologies. The call for better qualitative methodology is not a slap at its opposite number—more appropriately its complement—quantitative methodology. Although the empirical analysis indicated a significant increase in the amount of quantitative research in public administration, the techniques used were primarily confined to simple correlation and linear regression analysis. This represents an advance in the field's application of quantitative techniques, but public administration still lags behind other social sciences in the ap-

plication of advanced statistical techniques. Thus public administration scholars need to make more substantial use of causal analysis, structural equation models, and longitudinal statistical methods, and to develop working competence with new statistical methodologies sooner after they become available to social scientists than they do currently.

Two examples of advanced statistical techniques that would significantly enhance opportunities to investigate research questions characteristic of the field are Box-Jenkins time-series models and covariance structural modeling. Box-Jenkins is a technique for modeling changes in a time series of data to test the effects of specified interventions. Although it has not yet been applied widely, it has already been used to study such issues as the policy implications of economic change (Catalano, Dooley, and Jackson 1985) and the effects of the CSRA merit pay intervention on organizational performance (Pearce, Stevenson, and Perry 1985).

Covariance structural modeling, commonly known as LISREL (Joreskog and Sorbom 1981), is a causal data analysis technique that is much more powerful than path analysis, which became popular in the 1960s. LISREL permits simultaneous estimation of the relationship between observed measures of latent independent and dependent variables. LISREL has begun to appear with increasing frequency in sociology and management journals for research problems involving social and individual behavior.

Some attention needs to be given not only to specific techniques that might be integrated into the field but also to how those techniques are acquired by students and current scholars. An earlier study (Gazell 1973) of empirical research in public administration and political science found a high degree of methodological stability over time. Scholars kept using familiar, traditional approaches instead of learning new methods. Thus the field needs to develop support systems, for example, research workshops and doctoral consortia at professional conferences, to facilitate learning. Such support systems are equally applicable and necessary for public administration scholars interested in positive, interpretive, or critical research modes to develop and stay abreast of appropriate research methodologies. Clearly, such steps are only a partial answer. But they are necessary not only for moving the field to the forefront but also for improving the state of research practice.

Conclusion

Even if all the suggestions outlined above could be implemented instantly, it would take several years before their consequences would be noticeable. Although some of our suggestions require collective or institutional action, many can be implemented by individual scholars in the routine practice of their craft. For example, individual scholars can stay with research issues over the long term, improve the methodologies

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associated with case studies, and increase the application of more advanced statistical methodologies appropriate to the problems of public administration. The acceptance of these suggestions by the public administration community could serve to advance both the science and the art of public administration.

Appendix: Codebook for Analysis of Articles

VARIABLE 1: Year (1975-84)

VARIABLE 2: Volume (35-44)

VARIABLE 3: Number (1-6)

VARIABLE 4: Title

VARIABLE 5: Author(s)

VARIABLE 6: Institutional Affiliation(s)

VARIABLE 7: Topic

1. Administrative theory/bureaucracy/organizational theory
2. Managerial roles/public management
3. Citizen participation/representation
4. Public policy making/policy analysis/policy evaluation
5. Planning/administrative systems
6. Accountability/responsiveness/public interest values
7. Personnel
8. Other
9. Budgeting/finance
10. Intergovernmental relations
11. Urban and regional government
12. State government
13. Federal government

VARIABLE 8: Source of Research Support

1. National Science Foundation
2. Office of Naval Research
3. National Institute of Justice
4. National Institute of Mental Health
5. Ford Foundation
6. U.S. Department of Energy
7. None indicated
8. Other
9. U.S. Office of Personnel Management

VARIABLE 9: Research Stage/Purpose

1. Problem delineation

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2. Variable identification
3. Determination of relationships among variables
4. Establishing causality among variables
5. Manipulation of variables for policy making
6. Evaluation of alternative policies and programs
7. Other

VARIABLE 10: Research Methodology

1. Recollected experience: anthropology
2. Recollected experience: historical
3. Recollected experience: descriptive
4. Deductive reasoning: mathematical
5. Deductive reasoning: logical argument
6. Deductive reasoning: legal brief
7. Empirical analysis (inductive inference)
8. Other
9. Heuristic analogy (e.g., simulation)
10. Literature review

VARIABLE 11: Method of empirical analysis

1. Case study
2. Cross-sectional, correlational analysis
3. Structural equations (e.g., path analysis, LISREL)
4. Longitudinal analysis
5. Controlled field or laboratory analysis
6. Not applicable
7. Other

VARIABLE 12: Focus

1. Theory building (theoretical)
2. Problem resolution (practical)

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ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION : TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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Accountability in Public Administration : Towards a Conceptual Framework

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ACCOUNTABILITY IS at the heart of every government regardless of its precise form or pattern in which it is organised even though what varies is its focus, structure or mode of its articulation. A despotic regime is second to none in keeping the administrative system accountable, but this accountability is designed on the terms dictated by the top ruler. In a democracy, on the other hand, accountability inevitably acquires a much larger dimension for the fundamental reason that it derives its legitimacy from the people at large and its basic parameters, too, change.

The word 'accountable' seems to have come into usage in the English language for the first time in the year 1583, and the context was financial. Even today, financial accountability is an important part of it so much so that many public servants show their concern only for it and in the process either forget or conveniently ignore other equally vital components of accountability. The concept is a comprehensive one and covers all the activities undertaken by the government. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'accountable' as "liable to be called to account, responsible (to, for)". Webster's New International Dictionary of the English language gives a similar definition, explaining it as "liable to be called on to render an account". This definition is important, in the sense that it distinguishes it from a term like 'control'. Strictly speaking, 'control' is contemporaneous with an action or event whereas accountability is post facto in nature: it is only after an act has been accomplished that one is called upon to render an account of it. Of course, an awareness of being called upon to account is most likely to induce a certain behavioural and attitudinal change in the performers and may thus have an anticipatory effect. But the terminological purity demands its definition in the above mentioned way. Over the years, however, a certain looseness has come to characterise its usage and it subsumes all that which is covered by 'control'.

THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY

"Accountability, like electricity, is difficult to define, but possesses qualities that make its presence in a system immediately detectable." Thus observes the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, set up in Canada in 1976. The Commission continues:

To touch a live wire in a circuit is enough to establish the presence of electricity without further need of definition. The shock of recognition that attends the presence of accountability in a system of government may not be quite as direct, but it is nonetheless detectable. We see accountability as the activating, but fragile, element permeating a complex network connecting the government upward to parliament and downward and outward to a geographically dispersed bureaucracy grouped in a bewildering array of departments, corporations, boards, and commissions. Accountability moves through this network like the current in a circuit but always in some sort of relation to the control centre, the cabinet. The dispersal and structural complexity of the bureaucracy makes the control centre vulnerable to stoppages and short-circuits of overloading. The control centre, the government, although ultimately responsible for answering to the legislature, may find itself out of touch with what is happening, or failing to happen, at the other end of the network. Similarly, a signal from the centre may never reach the departmental unit or agency concerned or may reach it in so confused a state that judgements as to performance become impossible to make.¹

It is thus quite obvious that administrative accountability is an organisational imperative because first and foremost, it purports to evaluate its performance in terms of its goals. The goal is split up into definite tasks and responsibilities, and it is the individual administrators who are called to render an account of how they are discharging their responsibilities. Accountability is a concomitant of administrative responsibility, being, so to say, the obverse side of the coin, and thus construed, it is intrinsic to any organisation: concepts like hierarchy, span of control, unity of command, supervision, etc., are all accountability-promoting and enforcing mechanisms. So is the annual budget. But all these devices have to be properly sensitised, because accountability carries meaning only when it closely and firmly relates itself to the basic tasks and objectives of an organisation. Administrative accountability, one must always remember, is achievement-oriented;

this is its acid test. One may convey the thrust of this argument by paraphrasing it differently. What the North Star is to a mariner the organisational objective is to a public functionary. But accountability imposes other disciplines also. Necessarily, the resources, both human and financial, available to an organisation are limited, and these require to be reconciled with the main objectives. Administrative accountability seeks, in other words, to ensure optimisation of the available resources and at the same time to realise the organisational objectives. In addition to these core functions, some other purposes are also served by accountability. As the functionaries in a public organisation are under no obligation to raise their own resources, which instead come from the fund-providing agency more or less in an assured form, they may show tendencies of personalisation and privatisation of public resources, which must be strictly guarded against. This must be underlined, for misuse of public resources is notoriously widespread in many developing countries and top-level personnel evince a low commitment to their most effective utilisation. Above all, the ordering constitutional and political system of the land also places each public functionary within a framework of control and accountability, and to this end, a number of tools and mechanisms have been designed and put into operation. A correct perspective of accountability may be gained with a much sharper focus when a public functionary so socialises himself as to look at his official work strictly from the viewpoint of an ordinary citizen or, to be more apt, the 'daridranarayan', i.e., the poorest of the poor, to quote Mahatma Gandhi. All these appear to be essential in the immediate context of the expanding and activist government from which no escape is apparently possible. With the government taking up a vast array of new and novel functions, more so in social and economic fields, it becomes absolutely necessary to keep a continuous watch over them to find out how they are performed and, further, whether what is planned is indeed achieved or not. These call for the maintenance and orchestration of a system of accountability of the executive. Executive's responsibility to the legislature, legislative surveillance, judicial review, audit, control, financial advisory system in ministries, etc., are among the elements of a system of accountability so organised. These, in practice, are reinforced and supplemented by mass media, political parties, interest groups, political and electoral process, watch-dog organisations existing in the society, etc.

MAJOR FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability has two facets, somewhat separate but inter-related. The first one is basically political, and in a parliamentary system of government like ours the executive is kept under an obligation to give an account of its performance to parliament, and the latter has many devices and instrumentalities to this end. The second facet is primarily administrative and the executive in its turn holds the administrators in departments and other public agencies accountable for how they carry out their responsibilities. These two are complementary and they together constitute the foundation of a responsible government.

It is the executive's accountability to parliament which gives to such a system of political arrangements the nomenclature of parliamentary government. Why should the executive be accountable to parliament? The supreme executive authority in India is vested in the President of India, and the most important acts of state are performed in his name. But the President of India has been put under a firm constitutional obligation² to act in accordance with the 'aid and advice' given by the council of ministers with the prime minister at its head. As the president is bound by the advice given by the council of ministers the latter alone may be called to account.³

The executive's accountability to parliament is total and unabridged; and to assert such a relationship the latter has many ways and many occasions. The executive is obliged to remove people's grievances. Indeed, the redress of people's grievances precedes the grant of 'supply', that is, taxation. Besides, before the parliament grants funds to the executive it must satisfy itself about the merits of policies for which funds are needed. It also logically follows that parliament wants to ensure that the money so granted is spent on purposes for which the grant was accorded.

Parliament, thus, not only controls the purse but also puts the executive under its check and control for the whole gamut of its activities and to this end it has at its beck and call numerous tools as well as opportunities, such as parliamentary questions, adjournment motions, vote of no confidence, discussion on demands for grants, calling attention notice, half-an-hour discussion, zero-hour discussion, etc. The various conventional tools and mechanisms of enforcement of accountability may be viewed as falling within two broad types. The first type includes devices which are concurrent and contemporaneous and, thus, are of day-to-day application. Many of the parliamentary opportunities, like interpellations, adjournment motions, vote of no confidence, discussion on demands for

grants, calling attention notice, half-an-hour discussion, 'zero-hour' discussion, etc., fall in this category. This category of accountability is in the nature of control, strictly speaking. The second type of accountability is post facto in nature, which means that it activates itself after some action has already taken place. This, in a way, is post-mortem which is undertaken by way of evaluation of the work under scrutiny. Audit and the various committees of parliament exercise control after the event has occurred, and the thrust of this category of investigation is to find out why and how a particular item of work has been done. This is more in the nature of accountability than control.

This manner of classification is important from another angle too. The first category of accountability-enforcing mechanisms is basically directed against the political executive and is thus of a political nature. Tools like adjournment motions, no confidence motions, parliamentary interpellations, etc., are, in India as elsewhere, politically motivated and are aimed at the political executive. In contrast to this, the second type of accountability makes the career bureaucracy as its target and is, so to say, administrative in nature. Precisely because of these reasons, it is non-partisan in character, uninfluenced by those political considerations which weigh when, for instance, an adjournment motion is moved in the legislature.

Collective Responsibility

The council of ministers is accountable to the lower house of parliament, and the former is bound by the concept of collective or joint responsibility, which is the kingpin of the parliamentary system of government. The logic of the concept should be clear to all. In a parliamentary government, the party commanding a majority of votes in the Lok Sabha enjoys the prerogative of forming and running the government. Each of its members is thus required to secure that his policies command the agreement of his colleagues. The whole council of ministers has to resign if an important issue affecting any minister gets rejected by the Lok Sabha. A minister thus swims and sinks along with his other colleagues in the council of ministers. Within the council of ministers, of course, he persuades his colleagues to accept his proposals, and a strong minister would always carry the day. If, however, he fails to obtain the agreement of his colleagues on a policy which he considers to be very important or if he feels that he does not agree with a policy made in the cabinet and which he cannot publicly defend he must resign.

Ministerial Responsibility

The concept of collective responsibility does not imply that all matters of governance are discussed and approved in the cabinet; the rules and regulations have clearly specified the types of matters which are brought before the cabinet, the remaining ones being left to the care of individual ministers for their decision-making. The personal accountability of each minister to parliament extends to all matters within his competence, which is as basic a principle of the constitution as is the rule of law. A minister is accountable to parliament (Lok Sabha, to be precise) for his own actions --- or lack of them --- as well as for all those of civil servants serving in the ministry under his charge. The civil servants are protected by the well-known principle of anonymity. Parliament holds the minister responsible if something in his ministry goes wrong, even if he did not have knowledge of that or did not even approve of that. The minister's responsibility to parliament without any qualification or modification is the essence of ministerial responsibility.

It, however, does not follow that the concept of ministerial responsibility gives blanket protection to the civil servants. Vis-a-vis parliament, the civil servant is always protected; the former would be after the minister's head if something in his charge goes wrong. This point needs further elaboration.

There may, in theory, arise four kinds of situations. First, if a civil servant carries out an explicit order of the minister, the latter must protect him and take the entire responsibility when questioned in parliament. Secondly, if a civil servant acts properly, in accordance with the policy laid down by the minister, the latter must protect and defend him. Thirdly, if a civil servant commits a mistake or causes some delay but not on an important issue of policy and not where a claim to individual rights is seriously involved, the minister must acknowledge the mistake and accept the responsibility, although he is not personally involved. It is only in the fourth category of actions that the erring civil servant earns, at his minister's hand, and, what is more, publicly, the blame, although here, too, the minister continues to be accountable to parliament. This category includes situations where action has been taken by the civil servant of which the minister disapproves and has no prior knowledge, and the conduct of the official is plainly reprehensible. In such situations, the minister is not obliged to endorse what he believes to be wrong or to defend what is clearly shown to be error of his officer. Herbert Morrison even permits public naming of the erring official under certa

situations. He writes:

There is a circumstance in which I think a considerable degree of frankness is warranted. If a minister has given a specific order within the department on a matter of public interest and his instructions have not been carried out, then, if he is challenged in the parliament and if he is so minded he has a perfect right to reveal the facts and to assure the House that he has taken suitable action. Even so, he must still take the responsibility. It is, I think, legitimate in such case that disregard of an instruction should be made known even if it involves some humiliation for the officer concerned and his colleagues knowing that he was the one who disobeyed: for the civil service should at all times note that the lawful orders of minister must be carried out.⁴

T.T. Krishnamachari, Finance Minister in the Nehru cabinet, who resigned in 1958 on the life insurance corporation affairs, had probably such a circumstance in his mind when he said: "It would be impossible for any minister to accept the dictum that he must take full responsibility for the acts of his subordinate without being permitted to say that his subordinate did not reflect his policy or acted contrary to his wishes and directions."⁵ Even such a situation, nevertheless, does not absolve the minister of his accountability to parliament. As Jawaharlal Nehru observed, while accepting the resignation of Krishnamachari: "You very rightly say that according to our convention the minister has to assume responsibility even though he might have very little knowledge of what others did and was not directly responsible for anyone of these steps."⁶ Justice M.C. Chagla, who had constituted one-man commission to investigate into the LIC affairs had observed in his report: "The doctrine of ministerial responsibility has two facets. The minister has complete autonomy within his sphere of authority. As a necessary corollary, he must take full responsibility for the actions of his servants."⁷

This concept, as developed in the foregoing para, needs to be further clarified, particularly in the context of the emergence of party system in general and party discipline in particular. If this concept is applied in its rigorous form, the minister himself should appear before the parliamentary committees, to give an account of the functioning of departments under his charge. Similarly, the minister should resign even if a minor official in some remote part of the country commits some wrong either deliberately or innocently. The civil servant, who wants to see his minister out, may do things

which may excite the fury of the legislature and raise demands for the resignation of the minister. One should, therefore, inquire whether the minister should really be held responsible in such cases. In case a minister is to be held responsible for all that happens under his charge before the legislature, he may be excessively cautious and demand that all or most matters be compulsorily referred to him, a situation which would render the conduct of administration impossible. Also, the civil servants knowing that the matters might be discussed in the legislature would hesitate taking any action and develop the habit of referring all matters to the minister. In such a case, too, administration would come to a halt.

The political fact is that even in the case of serious mismanagement the minister is rarely visited with extreme legislative wrath because of the majority behind him. How many ministers resign when there is proven mismanagement of affairs under them? So long as the minister enjoys the support of his political party, in general, and of the prime minister, in particular, he cannot be dislodged from ministership: a political fact which demonstrates the practical limitations of the concept of ministerial accountability.

Even in its pure and pristine form, ministerial accountability has obvious limitations:

1. It is just a convention; without any legal sanction behind it. It is essentially a matter of conscience, a moral principle.
2. It is limited by sheer common sense. If some railway station master has misbehaved with the public, there will be no demand for the railway minister's resignation. Similarly, if there is drought, the minister of agriculture is not asked to resign.
3. A minister continues in his office so long as he enjoys the confidence of the prime minister.
4. If the minister is an important leader of his party and commands its wide support, he is always sought, never sacked.

OTHER TOOLS AND MECHANISMS

Reference so far has been made to the external aspect of accountability. Accountability has an internal aspect as well. All civil servants working in a ministry are accountable to the minister. As the minister is responsible to the legislature for actions (including inactions) of the civil servants, the latter must obviously be held accountable to him. This boils down to the

following:

1. The civil servants must know well their minister's mind and seek faithfully to project it in what they do.
2. They must observe, in all their official transactions with citizens, due process of law and laws of natural justice.
3. They must remain alive to the sensitivities of the legislature and must abjure from doing things which might embarrass the minister, particularly in his relationship with the latter.
4. They must be responsive to the larger public opinion.

Accountability is made more specific and is ensured by a complex of organisational and procedural devices. Hierarchy is itself an accountability-fixation exercise.⁸ Therefore, without adequate control and supervision over the actions of the lower levels, accountability can hardly be enforced. Span of control, unity of command, inspection, supervision, etc., are other well-known accountability-facilitating devices. Noting is also a mechanism of accountability. To ensure financial accountability, a financial advisory system is now a part of each ministry. Lateral agencies like the ministry of home affairs, ministry of finance, etc., are other accountability mechanisms. Nor should one forget that audit is a powerful tool of accountability, so powerful that the comptroller and auditor-general is one of the topmost constitutional functionaries of India and is independent of the executive.

Although, as said earlier, the minister has complete autonomy within his sphere of authority, he must soon learn, in order to survive, how much to do himself and where to stop. He must, in other words, concentrate on major matters of policy and leave tasks of day-to-day administration to the career civil servants. As Sir Warren Fisher has stated:

Determination of policy is the function of the minister and once a policy is determined, it is the unquestioned and unquestionable business of civil servant to carry out that policy with precisely the same goodwill whether he agrees with it or not.⁹

No hard and fast rules can be laid down about matters which need compulsorily be referred to the minister for his decisions: the secretary, the administrative head of the ministry, should know well his minister's mind and devise the reference-schedule accordingly. G.A. Campbell, in his book, 'The Civil Service in Britain',

observes:

A problem in all departments is that of deciding how much to refer to a minister. If a large number of cases are submitted, the political head may not be able to study the papers properly and may give decisions which show that he has not appreciated the problems: on the other hand, if the officials, send only what they consider to be the most vital matters, the minister may feel that he is being kept in the dark. What is a vast load to a politician not very competent at paper work will be tackled readily by a quick reader with an orderly mind and the gift of concentration. The experienced minister will have acquired the knack of picking out what is important in official files and of giving his directions clearly.¹⁰

Every minister has his own style of work. But it may, perhaps, be safely observed that he should generally shape and formulate policy, leaving day-to-day administration to the civil servants under him. He should ensure accountability, among others, by selecting and scrutinising cases on random basis and by invoking the managerial principle of rule by exception.

A CRITIQUE OF THE CONVENTIONAL MECHANISMS

The mechanisms designed to enforce accountability are the products of an era when public administration was small in size and what is more, engaged in tasks of simple character. Today, public administration has grown too big and complex and subject to multiple pressures of varying intensities with the consequence that the conventional tools of accountability enforcement are proving to be distressingly weak and ineffective. A study conducted by the present author some time ago about the parliamentary control over the executive in India showed: "Parliament, as presently constituted, is no match for the executive... it follows then from the foregoing that the classical mechanisms to keep the executive under control are found to be insufficient and inadequate. The fact is that the power of the present executive has enormously expanded. This, among others, calls for an alert judiciary, vigilant parliament, fearless watchful press, and powerful watchdog organisation." The study continued: "It is vital...that these institutions move forward to restructure themselves, re-design their business practices and reinforce themselves. Moreover, when a bureaucracy is unavoidable and inescapable, efforts must simultaneously be made to humanise and professionalise it."¹¹ Besides, parliament must insist

on getting adequate information about the functions and activities of each department. At present, it gets but an annual report of each ministry which is too inadequate to make accountability a feasibility. The flow of information to parliament is inadequate and moreover not in time, and thus one may not be able to form a sufficiently reasonable judgement on the functioning of the executive. Besides, parliament does not appear to have a consistent understanding of its own role. It presently spends a lot of its time in discussing trivial matters but when highly technical matters with far-reaching implications are brought before it, only a handful of MPs are seen to be present in the legislature.

The plain fact is that today the executive has grown too big to be amenable to a sensible and sustained system of accountability: it needs to be controlled in respect of its size and staffing.¹² At the same time, new paths in search for better accountability of public administration should be explored. This requires, among others, an innovative culture and a certain commitment to out-of-the-way approaches and strategies.

First and foremost, accountability must be imparted contents of a more positive nature. The commonly sighted administrative spectacles, like lackadaisical performance, playing safe, not providing leadership and drive to the organisation and features of this nature must be firmly discouraged. At present, accountability has been greatly devalued and has not been finely tuned. As a result, the public functionaries not taking decisions or given to procrastination and delay pass off undetected and unpunished. In short, accountability must become sensitive to reward and punishment, and must not remain one-sided which perhaps is the case at present.

To put in full application the foregoing proposition, it is vital to formulate and put into application an integrated view of accountability. The parliament must remain fully aware of its role and responsibilities, and oblige the political executive to render an account of its stewardship of the nation's public affairs. The council of ministers must set a programmatic vision before itself and set out to implement it by making appropriate policies ably supported by programmes and schemes and the necessary infrastructure. The individual ministers must on their part provide the necessary policy inputs in their respective areas of operation, ginger up the machinery of administration, and instil a sense of efficiency, purpose and economy in the department and the agencies under them. The minister must periodically review the policies and the programmes and take corrective action to ensure timely fulfilment of the targets. He must lead the bureaucracy, for the latter, when left to itself, remains self-programmed and besides, suffers

from a chronic incapacity to get out of the rut. The senior level bureaucracy must translate the policies into actionable programmes and schemes and must practise the concept of accountable management. The various levels in the hierarchy must be endowed with adequate powers and responsibilities. This needs to be underlined, for in many developing countries, it is characteristic of the lower-level personnel to have responsibility with power concentrated into the hands of top echelons. The classical tools of effective internal management, like inspection, visit, control and supervision, which have either fallen into disuse or are perfunctorily undertaken, must be activated, and the tone and standard in this respect -- as in many others -- must be set by the top civil servants themselves.

Certain pre-requisites must be met in order to make accountability a genuine, on-going proposition. Decentralisation, delegation, devolution and deconcentration are vital to accountability. As already emphasised, accountability is performance-based and result-oriented, but in a responsible system of government public functionaries are not permitted to make a short shrift of the prescribed procedures. This necessitates a drastic simplification of rules and procedures so that administrators do not have to waste time in attending to unnecessary procedures. No less urgent is the need for appropriate changes in personnel administration, especially training, placement, performance appraisal, promotion, etc. Administrative reform, including reform of the country's civil service, is among the pre-requisites to a system of effective accountability. Public administration is apt to become more accountable if it shows a greater degree of disposition to welcome more of management in it. A reporting system providing information on the progress made towards the fulfilment of organisational objectives must be put into operation, and follow-up action must be quick. No less necessary for promotion of a sense of accountability is increasing openness in administration. To secure this, the Official Secrets Act must be so revised as to grant to the citizens a right of access to official information in many areas of public administration. This requires an appreciation of the fact that the secrecy legislation at present tends only to keep the officials protected and thus unaccountable, and not the official information.

Most importantly, one should take cognizance of the most serious menace to accountability. Both, the functionary called to account for his performance and the one who takes the account, being human beings, it is vital that they be motivated by purely organisational objectives in their interactions. This is critically important, for accountability runs a grave risk of becoming personalised, thus promoting privatisation game at both ends. Nor should the network

of accountability get tainted or polluted, an aspect needing special care and attention. In many developing countries, the formal hierarchies in many organisations, especially those involving public dealings or other kinds of patronage, have been virtually converted into integrated circuits of corruption, thereby making a nonsense of accountability. This must be avoided at all cost.

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Paradoxical though it may seem, historically the government kept man under an unwaiving obligation to owe accountability to itself with no reciprocal self-discipline. Such a unilateral spirit abounds in public administration. The administrative system, to give an example, binds the citizens to a series of deadlines but itself enjoys complete immunity. The existing rules prescribe that citizens must submit to the income-tax bureaucracy their income-tax returns regularly by a particular date, but it takes its own time to dispose of the cases, thus keeping the tax-payers under an obligation from which it keeps itself fully released. The executive, a time has come, must reciprocate and become time-bound in its own turn. Thus, if a certain matter relating to an individual citizen does not get decided within a reasonably fixed period, the decision should go in favour of the effected citizen, an arrangement which would induce the administration to be more accountable.

Equally important it is to abandon the present system under which the laws (including rules, regulations, etc.) are enacted apparently for eternity with no fixed expiry date mentioned. It is largely under legislation that public administration formulates its functions and even when the need for such laws is no longer felt, functions continue to be carried out. The legislature must accord its acceptance to the concept of sun-set legislation. To extend the logic further, the executive must before long adopt the concept of zero-base budgeting, which is bound to introduce sanity and rationality in the whole range of administrative activities. The single greatest advantage of this concept is that every public organisation is regularly subjected to a severe review, the initial assumption being that it should be wound up unless it adduces convincing reasons why it should continue.

Last but not the least in importance is the need for social audit of many of the public organisations, particularly, public undertakings. Social audit is a new concept originating in the last decade, but sooner or later the social balance sheet is likely to become a mandatory part of the normal commercial balance sheet which many public organisations are under a legal obligation to

produce.¹³

Finally, the law of torts is not very well developed in India, which, too, induces indifference in the public functionaries towards their duties. At present, there are definite statutory provisions which shield public functionaries from legal action even when they are amiss in their performance thereby causing avoidable wrong or inconvenience to the citizens. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for instance, makes a sanction of the appropriate government, central or state, necessary before a public servant in its employment is prosecuted in respect of any "offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty."¹⁴ India has not yet signed the clause relating to payment of compensation to an aggrieved citizen by the state in the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights, but some recent judicial decisions appear to subject the public functionaries to a measure of discipline and thus make them accountable for their actions or inactions to the citizens directly affected. This is the most welcome sign. Early in 1983, the Supreme Court of India set a precedent by ordering the Bihar Government to pay Rs. 30,000 as compensation to an individual, who had remained confined in jail for as many as 14 years after his acquittal by the court simply because the government did not send the necessary release order.¹⁵ Since the state's actions, or inactions impinge so widely and deeply on individual citizens' lives and happiness, the public servants must be made liable for damages. Simultaneously, justice should be made cheap, quick and less bothersome.¹⁶ This is apt to make them aware of their duties and thus make them accountable.

CONCLUSION

It is necessary in the end to warn that the concepts discussed in the foregoing would yield fruits only when applied with commitment and conviction. A ritualistic application may leave us exactly where we are, and thus may make little difference in respect of accountability. The concept of programme budgeting, one needs to be reminded, was introduced in the Indian administration in the seventies, but the approach was rather mechanical resulting in a low level of gains. This must not be repeated. Besides, periodic reviews and evaluations must be regarded as but an integral part of the proposed framework, and the results of such exercises must be fed back into the system, the overall goal being the raising of productivity through better accountability.

The various tools and mechanisms of accountability discussed in

the present article must never lose a sense of proportion when put in action. Administration, primarily is action, is doing something; and nothing ought to be done to sap the initiative and drive of those carrying programmatic responsibilities. It would be fatal for administration if the public functionaries indulge in procrastination, betray in action, or move in circles simply because accountability has overawed and benumbed them.

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3. Yet, the President of India enjoys one effective power -- that of inviting of the leader of the party commanding a majority in the Lok Sabha to form the ministry. When no party has a clear majority, the President has to use his discretion, which confers on him a real power. One should not, however, assume that the President is infallible; if that were so, the impeachment procedure would not have been laid down in the Constitution.
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10. G.A. Campbell, THE CIVIL SERVICE IN BRITAIN, London, Gerald Duckworth, 1965, p. 221.
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12. The political climate in many developing countries, however, is liable to make such a view extremely unpopular, for public administration there is being increasingly viewed as some kind of a social security agency to provide employment to the jobless. This is notwithstanding the inconvenient fact that most public organisations are already over-sized and over-staffed.
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14. Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
15. The judgement was delivered by the division bench of the Supreme Court comprising the Chief Justice Mr. Y.V. Chandrachud, Mr. Justice A.N. Sen and Mr. Justice Ranganath Mishra, THE TIMES OF

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INDIA, August 2, 1983.

16. How Justice can be expedited can be illustrated by the American practice. In the USA, a civil suit may not take more than six months for its disposal. The Speedy Trial Act requires a criminal case to be tried within a total of 100 days. Also there is a law which says that the charge must be brought before the court within 30 days, failing which the case is dismissed.

ON METHODOLOGIES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

R.S. Ganapathy

1. Introduction: Policy Analysis is a comparatively recent phenomenon in public systems. Its origin was in the sixties in the United States and in India it is just beginning to come into vogue. In this paper, I propose to examine the nature of methodologies for policy analysis, their relationship with social sciences theory and implementation. Based on a critique of policy analysis, this paper attempts to develop an alternative, critical framework for policy analysis.

2. Background: The growth of policy analysis has been characterised by the application of various methodologies that are prevalent in social science inquiry and research. This growth is historically parallel to the growth of methodology in natural sciences over the last three hundred years. The positivist tradition, in social sciences has made enormous efforts to attain the status of natural sciences through rigorous, precise and analytic methodologies. The domination of the empirical method in social sciences and its application in policy analysis is a clear sign of this effort. Methodology is defined here in two ways: (a) the epistemological assumptions on which the search for knowledge is based, (b) the set of methods, techniques and approaches that are used in the acquisition and analysis of data for the solution of a problem. In this paper the term, methodology, is used in both these meanings. The application of social science knowledge for attaining practical ends is called instrumental use of knowledge. Policy analysis, in the mainstream, is concerned with such instrumental use of knowledge, for the design of interventions for social change. The direct parallel is that of engineering that has enabled mankind to technically control, dominate and exploit nature for human welfare. I

shall argue that each methodology not only generates a distinctive set of conclusions but also implies a prior, often implicit, choice of theory and ideology. I also argue that an uncritical choice of methodology will lead to predictable conclusions which support, maintain and reproduce the underlying ideology. The current disputes about differences between methodologies, breakdown of communication among them, their irrelevance to social practice and their fragmentation specialisation ~~are~~ recognised as major problems. I would like to add that policy analysis viewed here from the perspective of a critique of methodologies, is a relatively new area. Hence a spirit of modesty and provisionality must accompany any efforts in this direction.

3. Approaches to Policy Analysis: A critique Drawing from partial, fragmentary and widely dispersed concepts, I have constructed a typology of policy analysis methodologies (Table 1) that explores the characteristics of their dimensions. This typology has been constructed in order to generate insight into the predictable relationship between the methodological choice and policy analysis outcomes in a wide spectrum. The classification of methodologies is intended to portray the major theoretical traditions in policy analysis. The classification is of "pure" types juxtaposing major differences, though in reality there would be some combination of methods. Two caveats however must be emphasised: (a) typologies and classifications reflect a view focussing on appearances (b) tabular representations tend to suggest that the different approaches are equally important or powerful. This is not so,

TABLE 1
Models of Policy Analysis Methodologies:
A profile of their dimensions

<u>Model</u>	<u>Mainstream</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Critical</u>
<u>Dimension</u>			
1. Ideology	Status quo; Control over man and nature	Evolutionary change; Participatory trans- formation, Man- Nature harmony; Benevolent elite.	Radical change: Liberation and Social justice
2. Theory	Positivism; Modernisation	Social learning; Decentralism	Praxis; Holism
3. Goals	Explanation & prediction	Contextual interpre- tation of mean- nings; Sustainable, human change	Critique to expose under- lying assump- tions, values and interests; Structural change; Democ- ratic control.
4. Nature of Value-free, Knowledge objective, causal, cumu- lative		Value-laden, meaning- ful, problematic, non-cumulative	Value-laden; social as well as objective, praxiological
5. Social Relation- ships	Objective; neutral; reified through planned and commodified; change, new laws law-like genera- lisations	Objective but can be modified to another state through coping strategies	Contextual and political; historically specific laws can be trans- cended by collective action
6. World- view	Static present; status quo is natural, con- fined to appear- ances	Static but present can be modified to another state through coping strategies	Diachronic, existential change; open- ness; concen- trated with essence behind appearances
7. Problem Oriented	Recurrent patt- ern; Universal laws; A histori- cal, harmonious processes; quan- titative change	Contextually unique; localised interpre- tation; harmonious at macrolevel	Contextual and Structural; Structural contradictions; Qualitative Change

<u>Model Dimension</u>	Mainstream	Reformist-Normative	Critical
8. Argumentation	Causal-functional; decontextualised	Dialectical advocacy; use of multiple contexts	Critique of methods and the present order; historical, relational and materialistic analysis.
9. Methods	Empiricism; Rational-comprehensive models; Cost-Benefit analysis; Causal modelling; Survey research	Advocacy planning; Participatory management; Appropriate Technology; Futures Research-Techno-modelling; Survey long Assessment; Environmentalism	Dialectics; multiple methods for synthesis and integration
10. Typical Propponents	US public policy schools; Think Tanks; Bureaucrats; Established Interest groups	US planning schools; Futures-Research groups; Humanistic social scientists; Club of Rome; Alternative technology movement.	Radical Statistics Group-UK; Union of Radical-Political Economy US; Progressive Planners Network US; Educational groups following Paolo Freire; School of Critical Theory in Europe.

especially here. The mainstream positivist approach is "hegemonic" and dominates others in the Gramscian sense of ideological control. Logically, however, Table 1 illustrates important and predictable sets of relationships and tendencies (not in absolute sense) between the theory, ideology and methodology of three influential positions in policy analysis. The Table 1 is self explanatory. However, I will analyse some important issues in different approaches and clarify their implications.

The mainstream positivist approach to policy analysis, subscribes to what Auguste Comte said, in the 19 century, "From Science comes prevision, from prevision comes control". This is an excellent summary of instrumentalism. Increasingly since his day, social science has found it useful to consider social reality as a form of objective, "natural" reality. In its search for laws explaining social behaviour, it has claimed both ontological and epistemological primacy for the empirical method. Reality exists, only in the forms that are accessible to the senses directly or through surrogate, especially quantitative measures. Thus energy "exists" if we can measure it by reference to the sale of fuels, classes exist if they can be measured by people's wealth, location and education. Mainstream policy analysis accepts or rejects claims solely on the basis of whether or not they are consistent with the data. The laws that describe relationships among variables are universal, preferably quantitative and independent of context. The relationships are reified, i.e.: relationships among people appear as relationships among things. There is a clear distinction here

between facts and values as well as between ends and means. Mainstream methodology concerns itself only with facts and means. The quest of the empirical method, whether it is applied in cost-benefit analysis, regression or optimisation models is the "discovery" of order in an apparently disorderly reality. The policy analyst contributes to the realisation of order through the translation of research into policy. Explanation and prediction are the primary goals of this methodology (hence the integral link to control).

The critique of the empirical methodology has been particularly strong. Its merits including analytic rigour, avoidance of subjective biases and the construction of complex explanations, are well known. Its most important feature, however, is its usefulness in predicting, manipulating and shaping events. With advances in quantitative methodology and more cumulative research, the assumption was that some day, social science would be as "scientific" as natural sciences and policy analysis would be as effective as engineering.

Mainstream social science and policy analysis has traditionally focussed on explanation and causation. It has rarely concerned itself with understanding, meaning and intentionality. Keynesian economic theory, Kinship theory in anthropology, Exchange theory in sociology, the theory of Transformational grammar in linguistics, Modernisation theory in political science and Cognitive dissonance theory in psychology are basically causal theories.

The positivist methodology that was liberating in an earlier

era (freeing man from dogma, superstition, religious repression and rampant subjectivism has become progressively dominating in its consequences. It does not recognise the validity of other forms of knowledge or inquiry. Domination and control of nature has been extended unreflectively to the domination of man. Due to the formal constitution of theories as generalisable laws, people are treated as objects, as passive bearers of servo-mechanisms. Skinner's theory of operant conditioning is the most infamous example of this trend. Society, moreover, is seen as consisting of atomized individuals or events. The survey research method assumes this, denying the holistic, systemic nature of social phenomena. The averaging procedures like regression analysis focus on surface phenomena often carelessly grasped and too readily sensed. Correlation is often taken as a substitute for causation, in this method. The underlying structures and processes that give rise to the phenomena tend to be ignored. The only meanings are environmental stimuli and behavioural responses. Reality is what "is" and not what we make it. (This world view is directly opposed to the critical paradigm.) People are considered as the carriers and not producers of meaning. They merely exhibit and "emit" behaviour. They do not act purposefully. The status quo social order is considered "natural". The objective of policy analysis becomes one of preserving and reproducing the status quo.

For example, in energy planning, energy use surveys often form the basis of forecasting energy needs. By focussing on present patterns of consumptions (aggregated individual family consump-

tions) which is a surface phenomenon, policy analysis ignores underlying historical processes which generated these patterns. Policy analysis thus reifies patterns which perpetuate enormous inequities. Empiricism, then, has aided the policy analysts in constructing an abstract world, a world stripped of its social relations, social conflicts, social power and social inequality and yet this is called "applied social sciences" ! The distribution and use of energy in the future would simply resemble the past. This is how policy analysis serves as a means of social control. As we discuss later, only the critique of the present order has the potential to transcend this problem of repressive structures. Such a critique will expose the ideological assumptions and values behind methodology and nourish explicit consciousness about the consequences of every methodological choice.

Our capacity to deal with our societal problems has been going down due to two reasons. (a) Social problems are becoming more complex, more interdependent and more intractable and (b) Our education/knowledge system is more fragmented and more specialised now than ever before. In other words, we know more and more about less and less. This alienation of our knowledge system-reflected fully in policy analysis-from the social reality is the major cause of the ineffectiveness and irrelevance of policy analysis, today.

Policy analysis, in our times, has become a major source of legitimisation of the status quo interests and social order. It has become a new symbol of control as we mentioned earlier. A very

apt analogy is Humpty Dumpty's pithy description of the uses of words (the most potent of our symbols) in Alice in Wonderland.

"When I use a word" Humpty Dumpty, said, in rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose to mean. Neither more nor less". "The question is," said Alice, "Whether you can make words mean so many different things".

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "who is the master. That is all."

Policy analysis as we know it now, is dominated by the methods of mainstream, positivist economics and political science as well as management. It collapses processes (history) into results and quality into quantity. It is closely associated with the diffusion model which places research before action and implies that policy analysis must precede implementation. This is the reflection of the positivist model where explanation leads to prediction which in turn leads to control. The experimental, demonstration and pilot project approaches in policy analysis, reflect this philosophy of research before action, theory before practice, and concern with control.

Policy analysis reflects what is happening in advanced industrialised societies. i.e. fragmentation and specialisation of activities unrelated to one another, disjoined from life itself where work and leisure have been separated, and mental and manual division of labour has increased. Policy analysis has become a professionalised, technical activity. In other words, it has become a commodity. With the growing computerisation of information, policy analysis has become the exclusive preserve of trained people. It basically

degrades work as the vast majority of people will have to implement or suffer the consequences of somebody else's policy, in the making of which they cannot participate. In other words, policy analysis encourages alienation in our society by centralising power and encouraging dependency. In as much as policy analysis is oriented towards programme management, its unstated objective is to manipulate and train people to behave in predictable ways. This managerial focus (the word "manage" comes from the Italian word Managgiare which means to handle and train horses) is primarily concerned with means (how), rather than the question of ends (why and what). The ends are seen as given and the task of policy analysis is to identify the means to achieve those ends. The vast majority of us, in the eyes of the policy analysts, have become and remain as horses. Let us face it: there are obvious limits to what horses can achieve in an environment of domination and control.

Methodologies of policy analysis, in the mainstream tradition, are usually concerned with the choice of techniques. We mentioned earlier about the epistemological concern with basic assumptions about reality and knowledge that are inherent in any question of methodology. Usually, mainstream policy analysis ignores these questions.

Often, methodological choice ignores the reality of policy-making and asserts the primacy of method over substance and reality. This is what Alvin Gouldner once called as Methodolatory. Like

in many areas of public life, where different professions have reached the optimal point of their effectiveness, policy analysis too has reached its optimal point. I would like to argue that more policy analysis in the present context may not necessarily mean better policy making. We know that more teachers do not create better student quality; more doctors would not necessarily result in higher life expectancy and certainly more lawyers does not mean that the people's sense of justice will improve.

Three basic arguments why policy analysis is seen as ineffective, can be made- (a) Policy analysis is inefficient because it is a young science and with better training, more research, more rigorous methodologies and data bases, the efficiency of policy analysis will improve. I tend to strongly disagree with this argument. As it is constituted now, the structural underpinnings of mainstream policy analysis, will not make it effective even after one hundred years. (b) Policy analysis is ineffective because policy analysts have become too powerful. They define the problems, they propose solutions and they alone can evaluate the effectiveness of the solutions. The citizen as the key stakeholder has become a residual category. Hence, we need to persuade the policy analysts to involve citizens in policy analysis and other policy making processes. I disagree with this proposition as well because such a reformistic measure will simply mean more humane change but within the same structural framework. A number of reformistic methods as outlined in Table 1 attempt to do this. One can expect only

marginal changes from such an approach. (c) The argument here is that the policy analysis is the cause of our problems. This iatrogenic argument implies that policy analysis commodifies and dominates new areas of social life and creates dependency. The professionalism in policy analysis (more training, degree programmes, development of analytic methods, professional associations, journals conferences and professional certification) is the cause of the problem. Following this view, the question is not how to do policy analysis better but rather what is it that can be done, that is worth doing. Based on a critical awareness that traditional policy analysis is useless, exploitative and harmful is a world view that our social problems are basically conflictual in nature and in this zero sum situation, policy analysis necessarily would have to take an advocacy role. Such a critical policy analysis is not one, to establish optimality among a possible set of alternatives (i.e. policy analysis is not a rational choice problem). Rather it is an effort to create a richer synthesis by critically examining the underlying assumptions, world views and values. It is a perspective that recognises that conflict of ideas creates greater enlightenment.

4. Multiple perspectives in policy analysis

It is important to recognise that policy analysis can be carried out in many different ways. Social problems are complex, strategic, political and behavioural. There is usually an interlocking set of problems which defy easy analysis. These problems are, in the words of Ian Mitroff, typically "messy" problems. These

problems can be formulated in many different ways. Depending on the formulation, solutions will also be quite different. Another characteristic of these social problems is that there is no finality to these problems. Like a Faustian bargain they require constant search, inquiry and interpretation. These problems are usually unique and hence the logic of replicability of solutions is inapplicable. To quote an example, the energycrisis can be formulated as (a) supply crisis (b) demand management (c) technology/productivity deficiency and (d) structural imbalance. These four formulations are very different and lead to different solutions.

The basic proposition I would like to argue here is that we need multiple perspectives, in public policy research and analysis. Each of these perspectives may imply a different model of policy research and associated theory and methodology. A method has an implicit prior theory behind it, which organises data and facts. To gain meaningful insight into a social problem, we need multiple methodological perspectives, which formulate the problem differently. Graham Allison's pioneering work formulating the Cuban missile crisis (in The Essence of Decision) in three different ways (but within one—the mainstream-perspective) needs to be recalled here. A dialectical analysis of these perspectives will help us to become effective in dealing with a social problem. This approach is very similar to the ancient Jain doctrine of Syadvada. Its axiom is that every proposition is true only up to a point. For a true understanding of reality-creation of "gestalt",—one must generate multiple

propositions. Hence we cannot ascribe ontological or epistemological primacy to any perspective or mode of inquiry.

Table 2 illustrates the nature of such multiple perspectives of 'poverty' and corresponding typical solutions. These approaches will help us to locate ourselves along various dimensions and to learn of the consequences of such location for policy analysis outcome. For, the outcome of policy analysis is critically dependent on the prior perspective one adopts, as data analysis is organised by that perspective.

Again, policy analysis can take place at different levels of depth. To go back to our example in Table 2 i.e. poverty, it can be analysed at four different levels of depth. Formulation of the problem will depend on the choice among these levels. The Table 3 illustrates this.

If the policy researcher chooses to focus at, say, the level of symptoms, the solutions he will come up with will be very different than say, if he chooses to focus at the level of basic causes. In a recent evaluation of poverty research in U.S., it was found that it was focused mainly at the level of symptoms and came up with different strategies of income redistribution. This evaluation also pointed out that strategies for creation of jobs or restructuring of economic activities were not even considered by this research programme, because of its orientation at the level of symptoms.

TABLE 2
Many Perspectives of Poverty

<u>Professional Background</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	<u>Typical Recommendations</u>
1. Health	Nutritional deficiency; Environmental stress	Vaccination; Breast-feeding; Sanitation
2. Agriculture	Low food supply	Food production; Food aid; New agricultural technology
3. Architect/ Urban planner	Poor physical environment; Poor living conditions	More housing New settlements
4. Demographer	High density; High growth rate of population	Population Control; Family Planning, Migration and resettlement
5. Environmentalist	Degradation of the environment whose sustainable capacity has been exceeded	Environmental protection; Simpler life-styles for everyone Appropriate Technology
6. Marxist	Capitalism	Revolution
7. Manager/ Planner	Lack of management, coordination and planning	Development planning councils; management training; systems improvement; master plans.
8. Educationist	Ignorance; wrong attitudes and lack of skills	Education; mass communication
9. Neoclassical Economist	Maldistribution; lack of supply to meet demand	Fiscal policy; Income generation and employment programmes; economic growth.

TABLE 3Poverty: Levels of Analysis

<u>Level</u>	<u>Problem Formulation</u>
a) Symptoms	Nutritional deficiency, poor health, No housing & clothes
b) Immediate Causes	Low Income, low food intake, illiteracy
c) Underlying causes	Unequal access to and inadequate use of resources (food, education and health)
d) Basic causes	Contradictions and interactions within the economic structure and between the economic and political - social superstructure. These causes explain how resources are produced and distributed in the society.

5. Policy Analysis in US: A historical view :

We need to ground policy research in our material (economic and political) reality. While this may seem obvious, experience in U.S. suggests that policy analysis often marks a certain form of political practice. The mainstream policy research in U.S. is usually portrayed as progressive, scientific, objective, and a more effective way of dealing with public policy questions. To critically examine this claim, we need to understand the historical context in which the mainstream policy analysis developed in U.S. Such a comparative understanding is vital if we want to develop a strategy for policy research in India and to ground it in our material reality.

Let us briefly review the historical context of policy research/analysis in U.S. Robert McNamara introduced PPBS in the US Government when he became the Defence Secretary of John Kennedy, in the early sixties. His tenure represents a historical moment in the development of policy research in US. Throughout the 60s, President Johnson's Great Society programme, the expansion of the welfare (and military) state and the widespread social protest (civil rights, women's movement, hippie culture, the Vietnam war) created a historical context for the growth of policy research in U.S. The growth of public policy schools since the sixties and the mainstream perspective it represents, has to be understood in this historical context. Many researchers argue that the public policy research in US is the State's response to the crisis US society is facing in legitimating the status quo. Policy research, in other words, has

been portrayed as the new scientism, a new form of domination. The mainstream policy research in US addresses only the question of means, efficiency and accountability, rather than the question of ends. The ends or goals are always taken as given and often are implicit. The general proposition to make in this connection is that policy research, like other forms of knowledge, reflects the historical and material reality in a society and it will seek to justify the existing order, stratification and class structure in a society. In urban planning, for example, the central place theory was developed during this period as a functionalist justification of disproportionate resource allocation for cities (and then later to suburbs) to the detriment of rural areas. Mainstream policy research in US has always supported tacitly, a worldview in which the market economy is strong, continuous growth is possible, centralised planning is desirable and people can be treated as passive recipients of service delivery. Now under the Reagan administration, policy analysis, as all forms of planning, has lost its importance relative to the restoration of the market processes.

6. Transfer and Utilisation of Policy Analysis in India

Public policy implementation in the mainstream perspective, has always considered policy research for its instrumental use. The legitimacy of transferring policy research methods and practice from US or Europe needs to be examined with reference to the Indian context. It is my contention that context (both historical and material) is the critical determinant of policy processes.

Uncritical transfer of policy analysis practice across contexts can often be unproductive and harmful. There is also the danger that policy research in academic institutions in India might become a strategy for academic channelling of social protest. We should recall how widespread agrarian unrest gave rise to rural studies/rural development programmes in Indian universities in the last ten years. One of our normative concerns about policy research in India is to make it meaningful and responsive to the needs of the poor. The emergence of the profession of policy research as we conventionally understand it, may indeed be a threat to the needs of the poor. In US, policy analysis in several instances, has become a source of mystification, domination and dependency.

Policy research is usually done from the perspective of government agencies. Again this need not be the norm. Considerable work in advocacy planning in US and Europe demonstrates that policy research can be undertaken from the perspective of many different groups whether they be environmental or women's or consumers or the poor. Advocacy policy analysis is a relatively new area, with a high potential for effectiveness.

There is common, often unstated, assumption that policy analysis improves policy making. In recent years this has been challenged in a radical way. The connections between theory and practice, knowledge and action are very tenuous and in the field of policy making they are even more so. There is considerable evidence that policy analysis is a fairly minor determinant of

policy making. Other, more important, determinants are (a) the context (b) the leadership (c) politics of bureaucracy, interest groups and legislatures (d) public images, the media generates about the policy issues. The conventional diffusion model of policy research implies, that the research gets translated into practice (instrumental use of knowledge). This diffusion model typically focuses on a single, rational decision maker and represents by and large the middle class interests in preserving status quo social order and in making incremental changes. Work in different contexts indicates that this model is not realistic. In the words of Paul Feyerabend, "there are no data or facts independent of prior theory that organises them". This poses very clearly, what I would describe as, the theory-fact dilemma. i.e. choice among competing theories need to be based on empirical data. However, such data itself is dependent on a prior theoretical framework. The political use of policy research for postponing decisions and to justify decisions already made, are very well known. Again the question of interests looms large in the utilisation of policy analysis. For example, policy research supported by tobacco industry "proved" that smoking does not cause cancer while research sponsored by the U.S. Surgeon General "proved" otherwise.

Policy research utilisation theory has been stood on its head, as it were, in the last few years. If consensus building and collective understanding of the policy problem is the most critical factor in utilisation, then we might say that measurement

and objectivity in policy analytic methods is a threat to such consensus formation. Recent studies have many examples supporting this conclusion. These studies indicate that social learning rather than the experimentation/diffusion approach, is the appropriate model for policy research. Japanese experience in adoption of policy innovations as contrasted with the American experience in policy diffusion certainly bears this out. To quote Gunnar Myrdal in his Asian Drama "There are no facts about unemployment that are independent of the policy considerations that inform them. This suggests that we have to begin with the policy and then go on to collect data". This radical view of policy research utilisation tells us that the task of a policy analyst is not to explore how to translate research into policy but are (a) to uncover policies behind policy research agenda and (b) to uncover theory behind existing policies. Indian policy research setting is certainly unique and is therefore, different from US or Europe. The implications of this alternative utilisation model for India needs to be explored in some depth.

7. Towards Critical Policy Analysis:

In this section, I shall present a framework which is my reconstruction of policy analysis, drawing from the earlier critique of the mainstream approach. Critique of all methodologies (not excluding itself) is demanded in this framework. Aggressively exposing the ideologies, values, interests and assumptions behind apparently neutral, disinterested,

"scientific" policy analysis approaches, it returns them to their unprivileged situation in the world. In this sense, a critical policy analysis approach is not simply an alternative to others but it is an effort of discovering the transformation and synthesis. It does not criticise them, simply in order to abandon them. Such a framework is also explicitly normative in its commitment to social justice and liberation. This critical framework adopts multiple perspectives and a dialectical approach to policy analysis and let me characterise them briefly.

- a) A commitment to social justice and liberation
- b) Engagement in critique of all methods
- c) Construction of a policy and a plan from the critique through synthesis integration, not merely as an intellectual-cognitive activity but as a collective social action
- d) Methodological pluralism to generate multiple insights and dialogue among maximally divergent perspectives
- e) Development of policy analysis is a tool of intervention to promote equality in society (though we have enough evidence that social interventions including policy analysis in existing unequal social structures will always benefit the powerful)
- f) Recognition that knowledge is both objective and social and hence public participation is essential in itself to generate valid knowledge it is not merely an instrument to achieve cooptation or commitment from the public.
- g) power and conflict are addressed directly as relevant

issues in the critical policy analysis mode.

- h) Holistic and systemic analysis in a structuralist framework : the search for underlying essence behind appearances
- i) An historical approach that involves contextual material grounding and social specificity
- j) Generation of catalytic, facilitative, deprofessionalised roles to help people critically reflect on their condition and hence transform the society
- k) Demystification and repoliticisation of all policy analysis activities.

8. Policy analysis in India: Policy analysis in India while relatively uncommon in the form it is known in the United States, has been undertaken in a variety of ways. Our Constitution and legislation make policy pronouncements. Our five year plans involve a good deal of analysis about resource allocation and investment decisions. Several committees and government statements in the form of white papers, resolutions etc. make good deal of analysis of different policies. Most of the programmes that have been started are based on some kind of policy analysis. The methods that are used are of various kinds: econometric modelling, optimisation studies, social cost-benefit analysis, micro economic analysis, survey research, input-output models. As one can see readily, there is a domination of economists in such policy analyses, The Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance are largely dominated in this area by the economists. There are economic advisers in various Ministries. Important

decisions on investment, pricing etc are based primarily on economic analysis of policy choice. There is good deal of regulatory policy that is not based on economic analysis but on a legal one. The courts make policy without any formal analysis to aid them. Now areas like environmental impact assessment, technology assessment and global modelling are being tried out in a few cases to aid policy making.

The overall impact of policy analysis in India is largely marginal. Conflicts in value or a critique of various methods have hardly been attempted. In some instances analysis has sharpened conflict and has not been conducive to resolution. Major policy issues like foreign exchange, allocation and subsidies, cow slaughter or prohibition have hardly been influenced by policy analysis. In limited areas like identification of direct beneficiaries groups for antipoverty programmes, family planning programmes and minimum needs programme, policy analysis as choice among alternatives has been reasonably successful. In the energy sector, considerable policy analysis has been done in the form of studies and committee reports, addressing problems of pricing, inter-fuel substitution, demand management conservation and new technology development. Yet, this analysis has hardly had any impact in the rational management of our energy resources. Another area where policy analysis has failed is the administration of monopolies and restrictive trade practices. The concentration of economic power has been increasing after the enactment

of this legislation. In other areas like incomes-prices policy, worker participation and regional development, policy analysis has not been effective. Perhaps the reasons for this ineffectiveness of policy analysis is that there are several political and structural causes that generate the policy problems, and these causes are not addressed by the policy analysis. Policy analysis through replication of experiments and pilot projects has also not worked very well. The systemic nature of our problems defies conventional policy analysis which usually proposes discrete, direct attack on the problems. For example, public works programmes can no more alleviate unemployment. The income and price policy is no more effective for combatting inflation.

Our knowledge and public policy reflect and manifest the underlying essence and systemic unity of our social relationships. Hence, it is important to probe behind the surface phenomena which is the concern of mainstream policy analysis. However/^{we} may will have no alternative to conventional policy analysis in the medium term. A reformistic approach to policy analysis, can well work if we engage in it with a broad structural understanding and critical awareness of our social condition. An awareness of the limitation of such a response may help us to transcend our condition in the long run. Otherwise, the present pattern, which we observe in India, will continue to be managerial solutions (strengthening the policy-instrument nexus, stronger administrative political commitment not to dilute stated policy in implementation, removal of inconsistencies among policies and strengthening the management

through training, systems and monitoring to make policy more effective. Such a managerial or a programmatic approach to policy it is increasingly being realised, is very ineffective as it masks the political reality. The linear logic (policy \Rightarrow outcome) is faulty. The intervening structural processes that generate development and underdevelopment, justice and inequality will distort the anticipated causal relationship. Mainstream policy analysis usually ignores such structural, historical contexts.

9. Conclusion : To recapitulate, critical policy analysis is a unity of critical reflection and collective action-of praxis. It assumes theory and knowledge are themselves part of the activity of changing world rather than an "objective" stage prior to its implementation. It cannot be transplanted or transferred but must be reinvented. What is outlined here is a model not of theoretical-methodological priority that must be copied elsewhere but rather one that can be recreated in other contexts. What Paolo Freire was engaged in during his work in Brazil and Guinea-Bissau is the only example I can think of that comes close to critical policy analysis as outlined here. His work in adult education was not simply in literacy creation. He helped people to read their own reality (and not merely the words in a book) and to write their own future. Development of their critical consciousness was the key focus. His work focussed on learning from the masses who were to be taught.

The exploration of alternative perspectives in policy analysis

here is intended to create a critical awareness and sophistication in methodological choice. One finds methodological fetishism and isolationism pervasive in social sciences and in their application; policy analysis. If one is critically conscious, one may be able to overcome the structural limitations of methodologies and use them selectively, critically and effectively in a normative framework. Policy analytic methods, critically used, have the potential of being socially purposeful and help achieve progressive social goals. This analysis is meant as a progressive contribution to this dialectical process.

Department of Technical Co-operation for Development

ENHANCING CAPABILITIES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES



UNITED NATIONS
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I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. Governments in developing countries have long realized that effective public administration systems are essential to the achievement of national development objectives. Many have experienced expansions in the operational apparatus of administration. These have given rise to problems and difficulties that have inhibited the impact of public administration on the process of socio-economic development. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate measures to enhance administrative capabilities for more efficient planning and implementation of development programmes and projects and for the delivery of government services.

2. Administrative capability is the capacity to obtain intended results by means of organization. Administrative reform strategies and programmes have been the most popular devices for improved public administration in developing countries.¹ Administrative reform can be defined as the deliberate use of authority and influence to apply new measures to an administrative system so as to change its goals, structures and procedures with a view to improving it for developmental purposes.

3. Reform programmes take many different forms and use various modalities, depending on the country's heritage, its political, economic and social structures and environments and its development priorities. Generally, the results of reform programmes have fallen short of expectations. Among the reasons for this are the following: First, the adopted strategies and measures have tended to be inadequately planned at the stage of conceptualization, formulation and implementation. In instances where this has not been the case, other difficulties have had to be contended with. Of these, some of the most common are a failure to integrate administrative reform with socio-economic planning, a weakness of institutional support, and inadequate support from within the administration and among the general public. Second, reform measures have, quite commonly, been concerned with the mechanics of administration, financial and budgetary procedures, office practices and salary structures. The foremost concern has been directed primarily at strengthening the institutional framework for central and state or provincial administration by the adaptation of inherited structures, the redistribution of functions and responsibilities, the streamlining of administrative processes, and the revision of rules, regulations and orders governing the civil service. Third, the emphasis on economy and efficiency in government by means of administrative reforms has not always been compatible

with development. In other words, reforms have been geared more towards maintenance than towards development. Thus, they have resulted only in incremental improvements in existing arrangements which in themselves have been considered as detrimental to development.

4. Because of the continuing need for administrative improvement, Governments have persisted in their search for more relevant types of reforms in their administrative systems. The United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance has, in support of such efforts, given a central place to the study of administrative reform. In October 1971, the subject was discussed, in all its dimensions, at an inter-regional seminar organized by the United Nations Secretariat.² Special studies, reports and handbooks published by the United Nations have also dealt with pertinent facets of administrative reform programming.³ The United Nations Secretariat has also supported several technical co-operation projects dealing with administrative reform which particularly focus on the establishment of capacities for administrative reform in developing countries.⁴ At the regional and subregional levels, the regional commissions and public administration training and research institutions have undertaken similar activities.

OBJECTIVES

5. The present project is part of the global efforts being made to strengthen public administration systems in developing countries by means of administrative reform actions. Its immediate purpose is to document the experiences of developing countries in establishing

¹See *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, vol. I, *Report of the Seminar* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.II.H.5 and corrigendum); vol. II, *Technical Papers*, part one (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F/ S.72.II.H.6); vol. III, *Technical Papers*, part two (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F/S.72.II.H.7).

²See, in particular, *Public Administration and Finance for Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.II.H.2); *Local Government Reform: Analysis of Experience in Selected Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.II.H.1); *Development Administration: Current Approaches and Trends in Public Administration for National Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.II.H.1); *Survey of Changes and Trends in Public Administration and Finance for Development* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.78.II.H.7); and *Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.II.H.3).

³Some of the technical co-operation projects to strengthen administrative reform capacity are currently in operation in Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Mali, the Niger, Senegal, the United Republic of Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Argentina and Afghanistan.

or enhancing their capabilities for administrative reform. Specifically, the project has the following objectives:

- (a) To analyse the efforts being made to develop capabilities for administrative reform;
- (b) To identify the factors conducive and inimical to success in developing administrative reform capabilities;
- (c) To develop the criteria for the appraisal of such efforts;
- (d) To evolve guide-lines for the formulation and effective implementation of policies for developing capabilities for administrative reform under different political and social conditions.

SCOPE

6. The project is focused on capabilities for administrative reform and not on substantive programmes of administrative change (e.g., the reorganization of ministries, departments, the civil service and personnel administration, finance and budgetary reform and management services). While it is recognized that capacity development and actual reform activities interact and that there will be a variation in the nature and quantum of capacities, depending on the type and focus of reform, it is nonetheless necessary to emphasize the distinction between capacity and reform activity. Despite variations in capacities, there are some common elements therein for any administrative reform. These are organization, skills, resources, leadership and support. All of these components are vital to planning and implementing administrative reform, but the extent to which each component will be needed and how they will interact will depend on the nature, focus and scope of the specific administrative reform activity.

7. From an analytical point of view, administrative reform is viewed as a process of five stages, namely, conceptualization, initiation, formulation, implementation and evaluation. It is also possible to place these five stages in two phases: the input phase (conceptualization and initiation) and the output phase (implementation and evaluation), with the formulation phase being common to both. The advantage in conceptualizing administrative reform as a five-stage process is that the various components of capacity can be related to the phases of administrative reform process. For example, one can analyse what type of organization and skills are

necessary in the input phase as distinct from the output phase. In the present study, an attempt is made to identify the interrelationships between the stages of reform and the components of capacity and to use these interrelationships in suggesting appropriate strategies and guide-lines for the establishment or enhancement of capacities for administrative reform.

8. With regard to scope, two final explanatory remarks are necessary about the data used for the present project. First, most of the data were taken from broad and comprehensive administrative reform activities, and hence the major focus of the study remains on the capabilities for reform of public administration systems as a whole. However, attempts were also made to gather data in order to examine administrative requirements for the achievement of development goals in sectoral programmes. Second, difficulties were encountered in obtaining and using hard evaluative data on the operation and effectiveness of the administrative reform capabilities described in the present study. With the exception of impressionistic views and some official reports, there has been very limited material on the way in which administrative reform capabilities have been utilized in developing countries. An attempt has been made, therefore, to focus mainly on the approaches taken and the arrangements made to develop capacities for administrative reform and to refrain from any critical assessment of their utilization.

APPROACH

9. In developing the project, the needs and interests of the public officials responsible for establishing or enhancing capabilities for planning and implementing administrative reform have been firmly borne in mind. The approach taken has been mostly empirical, that is, to describe and analyse how administrative reform capabilities have been developed and utilized in developing countries and to recommend guide-lines and strategies for their improvement. In line with the recommendations of the interregional seminar which reviewed the draft of the monograph,⁴ the next phase of the project will be to undertake evaluative studies of administrative reform in selected developing countries.

⁴United Nations Interregional Seminar on Strategies and Measures for Enhancing Administration in Developing Countries, held at Bangkok from 8 to 12 December 1981.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: MAJOR CONCEPTS, PROCESS AND STRATEGIES

RATIONALE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

✓ 10. The growing concern with administrative reform in developing countries over the past three decades has several origins. Important among these are three: one relates to the discontinuities between a colonial administrative system and the needs and demands of sovereign Governments, another to the need for an administrative apparatus adequate for performing the expanding role of Governments in managing the economy, and the third to the desire to change the orientation and attitudes of civil servants and to introduce modern management techniques or processes in order to make the administration more efficient and effective in the delivery of services to the public.

11. All of these three sources should be familiar to students and practitioners of public administration. In their haste after independence to establish a national civil service and development administration, many Governments undertook a number of measures, such as the crash employment of local civil service personnel, the establishment of various ministries and agencies, and the introduction of local government institutions, new methods and procedures. It was subsequently realized that the introduction of these measures often caused problems. Initial public service reviews, therefore, devoted some attention to their solution. Further reform efforts were also prompted by the need for enhanced administrative responsiveness to the requirements of the vast majority of the rural population; in most developing countries, the latter are at the periphery of the administrative decision-making process. This concern for popular participation gave rise to administrative reform efforts that were aimed at decentralization to both the regional and local levels.

12. The most important incentive for administrative reform was the inadequate performance on the part of the administrative system in planning and implementing measures in the rapidly expanding public sector. Failure to implement economic development plans became a recurrent phenomenon. Studies confirmed that problems of implementation were the most intractable and that in most developing countries the major planning and implementation problems were primarily political and administrative rather than economic. Herein lay the genesis of several programmes for administrative reform which sought to improve the administrative apparatus for the mobilization and channelling of resources for the implementation of plans and projects and for guiding, monitoring and evaluating public sector enterprises. The increasing dichotomy between urban and rural areas, the failure to meet the basic needs of an increasing population, and the inade-

quacy of governmental policies and resources continue to provide additional impetus for administrative reform.

13. Another source of concern that prompted administrative reform relates to the need to modernize the methods, techniques and procedures of the administrative systems and to change the attitudes and behaviour of public servants. This is required in order to keep public administration abreast of the demands of the times and the environment, and to make it efficient, effective and responsive. The experience of many developing countries shows that administrative problems arise basically from weaknesses and rigidities in bureaucratic policies, processes and procedures and from their effects on the attitudes, motivation and behaviour of civil servants. In the current times of intense and close interaction between nations, of rapidly changing technology and of mass expectations of government delivery, the search for better management techniques, such as electronic data processing (EDP) and the programme and performance budgeting system (PPBS), and for appropriately oriented public servants will continue. The rapid expansion of government agencies and of employment in the public sector to undertake the increased role of the State in socio-economic affairs has generated considerable conflict and tension in society. Governments are burdened with an over-expanded and over-staffed machinery, while the private sector demands a decrease in governmental intervention. Recently, some developing countries have adopted measures to reduce manning levels of government agencies as part of the reform efforts aimed at minimizing governmental intervention and curtailing administrative costs.

14. While three major causal factors of administrative reform have in a broad sense been identified, it should be realized that these alone do not necessarily give rise to reform activities. Indeed, they may be present for some time without providing the impetus for any action for reform. Usually some catalytic event or situation has also to occur. Typically, catalytic events include radical political changes such as military rule, a revolutionary government, a new party government after a long period of rule by another party, defeat in war or civil war, severe natural disaster, widespread famine or a similar traumatic event.

CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES

Administrative capacity

15. There is a consensus that administrative reform is intended to enhance and/or expand the administra-

tive and managerial capacity of public administration to achieve national objectives or goals. Administrative capacity is considered a scarce resource and, almost universally, a limiting factor in the achievement of national development goals. There is a widespread tendency to understand administrative capacity in terms of a fixed quantum. It is pertinent to question this tendency and to examine the linkages between administrative capacity and the ends that it is supposed to achieve.

16. The administrative system in developing countries may carry out, to varying degrees, any number of major activities: protection (e.g., the police, military and judiciary), regulation (e.g., licensing, exchange control and investments), extraction (e.g., collection of taxes and fees), provision of services (e.g., public utilities and medical and educational services) and development (e.g., running of industries and preparation of development plans). The capacity to perform any of these activities will vary significantly because the attitudes, skills, organization and procedures required in each case will be different. For example, the attitudes, skills, organization and procedures needed in regulating licensing functions will be different from those required to run a factory or to organize community services. Yet there is insufficient appreciation of the need to analyse administrative capacity in the context of these varying activities and to use this analysis in examining the need, type, content and strategies of administrative reform.

Avenues for enhancing administrative capability

17. While there is limited recognition of the variations in administrative capacity, particularly in relation to its goals, there is agreement on the multiple avenues available for expanding or enhancing administrative capability. In addition to administrative reform, three other strategies can be discerned: institution-building, socio-political change and management development services (e.g., organization and methods (O and M)). The distinctions between administrative reform and the other three strategies are not clear. Usually administrative reform refers to system-wide changes (e.g., in personnel, finance, organization or procedures) or to the introduction of new ideas (e.g., central civil services agencies). Institution-building, on the other hand, entails the establishment of new institutions (e.g., special rural development projects and local government), while socio-political strategies comprise community development programmes, the representation of interest groups and the creation of consultative arrangements. Finally, management development services include the improvement of specific procedures and introduction of new techniques. The viability of these distinctions is questionable since an administrative reform may include not only reorganization but also the creation of new institutions, the establishment of consultative bodies for interest groups and the introduction of new procedures and techniques. The issues here are,

first, to examine the analytic validity and empirical utility of these distinctions; second, to explore the practicability of subsuming all these strategies under administrative reform; and third, to relate these elements to the specific goals of each administrative reform effort.

The meaning of administrative reform

18. Perhaps as a result of the frequent use of the phrase in recent years, there is a tendency to assume a commonly shared view of administrative reform. However, a closer examination will show considerable variation in what is meant or referred to as administrative reform. There is also a marked absence of any clear-cut criteria to distinguish administrative reform from other activities such as administrative improvement, administrative change and administrative modernization. Definitions of administrative reform tend to be broad and vague. Administrative reform has been described as an effort to apply new ideas to the administrative system with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of development; as a deliberate step to use power, authority and influence to change the goals, structure or procedures of bureaucracy; as artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance; and as a directed change of main features of an administrative system. Several United Nations documents define major administrative reform as specially designed efforts to induce fundamental changes in public administration systems through system-wide reforms or at least through measures for the improvement of one or more of its key elements, such as administrative structures, personnel and processes.

19. The problem with all these definitions of administrative reform is that, first, they are difficult to put into operation, and second, no serious attempt is made to distinguish these definitions from other activities designed to improve or expand administrative capability. All definitions accept that the aim of administrative reform is the improvement of the administrative system and enhancement of its capacity. Difficulties are encountered, however, when an attempt is made to distinguish between administrative reform defined as "new ideas", and a "conscious view", a "deliberate step", an "artificial inducement", "directed change", "specially designed efforts", "fundamental changes" and other such variants. There is an urgent need to re-examine the meaning, scope and limitations of administrative reform so that scholars and practitioners alike can share a common view of the concept and use it meaningfully in technical co-operation projects as well as in practical research work. Some scholars seek to distinguish administrative reform from administrative change. Others maintain that all administrative reforms imply change. It is therefore necessary to ascertain the interchangeability of administrative reform as a generic concept with other concepts such as administrative change, modernization and improvement.

Approaches to administrative reform

20. Two different meanings may be ascribed to the term "approaches" when it is used in the context of administrative reform. The first indicates the relationship between the reform agent and the target group or client organization and the second refers to the content of the reform itself. There are three possible types of relationship between the reform agent and the target of reform: authoritarian, participative and mixed. Similarly, the content of the reform may be categorized in four ways: ideological, socio-psychological, technical and institutional. The ideological approach seeks to socialize administrators into the norms of public service and the values and goals of the political leadership. This approach has been extensively applied in the United Republic of Tanzania, where a national ideology has been well articulated and widely accepted, and where a well-developed private sector is largely absent and there is therefore no temptation for civil servants to divert their energies away from public duties. The second approach is socio-psychological and concentrates on the motivational aspect of administrative work. Here, the stress is on the design of appropriate incentives—ranging from remuneration to the development of sense of pride in achievements in order to increase output. The third is the systems or procedural approach, which involves the use of techniques such as the programmes and performance budgeting system (PPBS) and management by objectives (MBO). The fourth is the institutional approach, which involves solutions such as the decentralization of responsibility to local authorities or public enterprises or the creation of new institutions such as an ombudsman. Countries may, in fact, adopt a mixture of these approaches in their administrative reforms.

21. It should be noted that a pure type of either approach is becoming rare. In earlier times, the pace of change was slower, society less organized and administrative systems and technology less complex. Diagnosis and prescription were easier and reform measures comparatively simpler. Contemporary public administration, however, has become qualitatively and quantitatively different. Governments are attempting more ambitious activities. The approaches used for administrative reform, therefore, have to be more eclectic in content. This requires guidance as to how approaches can be selected and blended.

Substantive aspects of administrative reform

22. The content of administrative reform varies considerably in scope, focus and level among developing countries. Administrative reform activities are very much a function of the socio-cultural environment, the complexity and sophistication of the administrative system and the priorities of government developed by the political authorities. Administrative reform activities may have as narrow a focus as the introduction of a new financial procedure in a specific ministry

or a monitoring unit in the ministry of finance. They may also be so broad as to include a whole new budgetary system (e.g., performance budgeting) for the entire machinery of government or a major reorganization that involves several ministries and agencies. Again, administrative reform may cover institutions and procedures related to central functions such as personnel, finance, supply and planning, or they may be limited to selected institutions or the procedures of one specific agency or sector of government.

23. Over the past few decades, the following areas of concern have been associated with administrative reform: the reorganization of structures and functions, personnel administration, budgetary systems and financial management, improvement of procedures and methods (management development services), decentralization and local government, supply management, regional planning and integrated rural development and institutions for public accountability (e.g., ombudsman). Newly emerging problem areas that require administrative reform include parastatals, mixed enterprises, management of agricultural development, administration of urban areas, politicization of recruitment and personnel management, management of access to public services, management of international economic and fiscal relations, corruption and salaries.

PROCESS AND DYNAMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Stages of administrative reform

24. There is universal agreement that administrative reform is a continuous process. Analytically, five separate stages are distinguishable: conceptualization, initiation, formulation, implementation and evaluation. Not all developing countries have been able to provide the institutions and resources necessary to pursue such a systematic approach. Major constraints are the costs and practicability.

Interrelationships between the stages of administrative reform

25. Many countries have given particular emphasis to the conceptualization, initiation and formulation stages of the process of administrative reform—hence the voluminous reports of innumerable commissions or committees, most of which have yet to be implemented. There are also countries where major changes and innovations in the administrative system have been introduced without elaborate planning activity. There are innumerable examples of administrative efforts motivated by partisan, personal and other interests. Several countries have established a central agency that is responsible for the initiation, formulation, and implementation of administrative reforms, yet these agencies have not always been capable of undertaking these roles; instead, high-powered commissions or committees have been utilized. Reasons for this include a loss

of momentum and support for administrative reform, a lack of adequate resources, the absence of concrete studies and proposals and overemphasis on planning as distinct from implementation.

26. Recent trends in technical co-operation activities initiated by the United Nations show a de-emphasis on attacking specific administrative problems in favour of assisting in the creation of reform institutions and capacities. Many earlier administrative reform efforts were considered ineffective because of a lack of adequate reform institutions and expertise.

STRATEGIES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Development and orientation of administrative reform

27. The administrative reform strategies adopted by any particular country are intimately tied up with the level of administrative development and orientation of its civil service. There exists considerable variation among developing countries, for example, between India and Vanuatu, with respect to their age, complexity and the capacity of each to achieve goals set by the political system.... Furthermore, an administrative system that is new and less organized and effective may be more amenable to fundamental change. The second factor important in defining the issues selected for administrative change is the basic orientation of the administrative system in terms of its behaviour, its willingness to intervene on behalf of social development and its reactive social stance.

Comprehensive, as opposed to partial, reform

28. A major consideration in planning strategies for reform is the realization that the more comprehensive and deep-rooted the problems are, the more difficult it will be to bring about effective change. The reverse is equally true, but the dilemma is that most administrative reform literature suggests that partial reforms do not provide meaningful change, which, it is argued,

requires overall and comprehensive reform. On the other hand, experience suggests that comprehensive reform is immensely difficult to bring about. An alternative possibility is that of adopting an incremental or gradual approach and pursuing it in a systematic way, sector by sector.

Timing

29. An important strategic consideration in planning any administrative reform is that of timing. The more widespread and fundamental are the changes sought from a reform, the more the appropriateness of timing should be examined. Generally, a relatively crisis-free society does not provide the conditions for basic structural change even though serious shortcomings in the administrative system may be apparent. Movements such as the achievement of independence and defeat in war and civil war provide both expectations of and support for reform. Apart from rare historical moments such as these, the timing of reform should coincide with peaks of demand and support from the public and other interest groups. The history of administrative reform is replete with situations where measures were initiated at the most opportune moment but the time taken to prepare the studies was so long that the momentum was lost and the reform efforts ended with volumes of studies stored in archives.

Interaction of input and output aspects in the context of timing

30. Since the time available for administrative reform is always limited, the more time that can be allocated to the formulation and implementation of specific administrative reform measures, the more probable it is that administrative reform will be effective. The advance preparation or availability of management studies and reform proposals can be an asset. In addition, the administrative reform activities initiated by one régime are often overtaken by political changes. However, this does not mean that they cannot be reconsidered by a subsequent régime.

III. PLANNING FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

INTRODUCTION

31. As will have been apparent from the previous chapter, reform programmes take many different forms and use various modalities, depending on the country's heritage and its political, economic and social structures and environments. The impact of these programmes has tended to vary in so far as some of the strategies and measures adopted have been inadequately planned at the stages of conceptualization and formulation. Other common failures have been overlooking the need to integrate administrative reform with socio-economic planning, a weakness of institutional support and inadequate backing from within the administration and from among the general public.

32. In line with the objectives of the present project to analyse, improve and evolve guidelines for the enhancement of capabilities for the planning of administrative reform, examined below is the establishment of administrative reform goals and strategies in terms of the various critical phases of the planning and implementation cycle, that is:

- (a) The review of organizational goals;
- (b) Management audit and problem identification and diagnosis;
- (c) The establishment of operational objectives and the orientation of the reform programme;
- (d) The preparation and review of recommendations;
- (e) The choice and approval of the strategy to be used;
- (f) The development of the implementation strategy;
- (g) Implementation;
- (h) Monitoring, feedback and evaluation.

33. Thus, rather than being concentrated on the process of administrative reform *per se*, the project is focused on experiences in the development of capabilities for reform programming, within the sequence of phases of an orderly process of reform. The purpose of the first section below, therefore, is to describe the available modes of planning administrative reform, as manifested by the experiences of various countries in the establishment of enhanced institutional capabilities for the effective planning and implementation of reform strategies.

34. The quality of the operational goals and objectives established and the strategic choices will be greatly determined by the effective interaction of various elements of national policy analysis and policy-making processes and internal administrative and organiza-

tional planning and development. Comments are often made on the isolation of reform agencies from many of these elements as well as from the socio-economic environment and the general public.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM GOALS AND STRATEGIES

35. The planning of initiatives for reform—ranging from problem identification, to the establishment of goals, objectives and programme orientation, to the choice of strategy—may be based on one or several of various sources:

- (a) National plan documents;
- (b) Sectoral plans and reports on development programmes of specific ministries;
- (c) Influential research and training institutes and governmental organization and methods (O and M) units;
- (d) Political changes (e.g., military coups and the establishment of one-party States);
- (e) External or international influences (e.g., the managerial or technocratic revolution, the private sector, technical co-operation for development and other international agencies).

Economic planning process

36. One of the most common sources of planning for reform has been the national economic planning process itself. Thus, in many countries, the administrative reform agency is linked to the ministry in charge of economic planning. This is particularly so in Latin American and some African countries (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras and Sierra Leone). Countries on all continents now recognize the importance of a more effective linkage between administrative reform and economic planning at all levels.⁵ In terms of techniques, the latter also has much more to offer than the former.

37. In Bolivia, for example, the Commission of Administrative Reform was established in 1970 as part of the Subsecretariat of Administrative Reform, Ministry of Planning, and was charged with working out a legal framework and machinery for certain ministerial, decentralized and corporate development functions. In 1971, the Commission was made independent and

⁵See, for example, "Réunion sous-régionale CEA/CAFRAD sur la réforme administrative et l'amélioration des structures gouvernementales en Afrique francophone", Abidjan, 9-13 November 1981 (CEA/PAM/S/RA/STG/3/81).

assigned the tasks of studying, appraising and formulating a civil service code and of preparing an inventory of methods. With United Nations technical assistance, a National Plan of Administrative Reform for the period 1973-1977 was prepared which covered sectoral aspects of the administrative system, regionalization, regional and local government and special projects.

38. In Brazil, more recent administrative reform proposals have taken place within the context of the National Plan. Thus, the Brazilian National Plan for 1975-1979 emphasized the need to reinforce the structure of ministries by the creation of permanent units of planning, budgeting and administrative improvement, staffed by appropriately trained personnel. It also called for the harmonization of the budget systems of the states and the improvement of the financial management of government-controlled banks so as to achieve greater harmonization of their activities with those of the central ministries.

39. At the same time, reform proposals in Brazil were not confined to the administrative requirements of economic and financial planning. Thus, the Plan for 1975-1979 also called for the improved co-ordination of line agencies; the introduction of a personnel classification system, based on functional activities, as a means of checking the growth of public personnel expenditures; planned specialized training for senior and technical officers in central and subnational administration and public enterprises by borrowing from the pool of management and central techniques used in the private sector and mixed enterprises; and the establishment of a civil service ministry or similar Cabinet-level institution to co-ordinate all management services in government and provide control, direction and leadership. In fact, Brazil has a relatively long and broad experience of administrative reform which began in 1934 when a system of merit was introduced. Some aspects of this experience are further discussed below.

40. The third example of reform linked to economic planning is Ecuador. In the National Development Plan for 1980-1984, a section is devoted to the subject. Against the background of a proliferating but unco-ordinated public sector, measures are proposed for the reform of public enterprise and the planning system; the simplification of procedures and increased productivity; the enhancement of ethical standards; an increased decision-making capacity, especially sectorally and regionally; decentralization and deconcentration; the modernization of methods; the harmonization of levels of remuneration between private and public sectors in order to improve recruitment into the latter; and the strengthening of provincial and municipal organs.

41. Likewise, in Honduras, the Administrative Reform Unit set up in 1973 and located in the Executive Secretariat of the Higher Council for Economic Planning Improvement in Public Administration was seen as crucial to the effective execution of the National Development Plans for 1974-1979 and 1979-1983. The major reform needs identified were the improvement of governmental organization, especially through a clearer

definition of functions; the simplification and speeding up of procedures; and public personnel development by means of the introduction of personnel management and career systems.

42. In Costa Rica, the economic planning system introduced in 1974 played a decisive role in the identification of the areas of necessary administrative reform, especially with regard to structural aspects, such as duplication and rivalry amongst government functions and a lack of co-ordination and dispersal—including a dysfunctional degree of decentralization. The General Civil Service Act of 1978 included a programme of administrative reform which was placed under the political leadership of the Presidency and the technical direction of the Office of National Planning and Economic Policy.

43. In the National Development Plan for 1974-1979 of Sierra Leone, one chapter was devoted to deficiencies in the structure and functioning of public administration, and was focused on the institutional framework, the sectoral ministries and corporations, personnel administration and O and M. In China, administrative reform activity is undertaken by the Economic Planning Commission.

Public administration research and training institutions

44. The second major source of planning for reform is the influential public administration research and training institutions, particularly in countries with well-developed professionalism in the public service and strong O and M organizations. The former are particularly important where the broad strategy of reform emphasizes behavioural change or where enhanced knowledge, skills and attitudes are vital prerequisites of structural reform.

45. An example of this pattern is the National Institute of Public Administration in Argentina which was designated as the administrative and technical secretariat to the Permanent Commission for Administrative Rationalization when the latter was created in 1976. The programme of administrative reform adopted in 1976 included the following activities: research into human resources, structures, processes, techniques and the informational requirements of modern methods; the recommendation of organizational and systemic improvements (procedures and standards); and the promotion of a civil service career system by the development of standards and procedures of recruitment, training, motivation and selection.

46. In Peru, a 1973 Decree created the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) as the focal agency in the process of reform of public administration, through which national plans would be articulated. In this manner, INAP was to formulate national policy on the reform of public administration, prescribe standards, give assistance and make recommendations for the guidance and activation of public administration.

47. Similarly, in Brazil, another country where civil service professionalism has long developed through a tradition of training and a public service department, reforms have had a broad character, beginning with a classification of posts in 1960. In 1963, three reform agencies were created: the Office of Administrative Reform, the Central Commission of Federal Administrative Reform and the Co-ordinating Office of Administrative Reform. These agencies carried out the reforms of 1967 which were largely concerned with the decentralization and rationalization of procedures as well as the elaboration of reform goals and the training of reform agents. These latter aspects are discussed further below.

48. Experience shows that a role for autonomous research and teaching institutes can be particularly beneficial. One alternative strategy for administrative reform worth considering is the use of autonomous public administration research and teaching institutions, especially in relation to the conceptualization, initiation and evaluation stages of reform. These institutions have advantages in terms of greater scope for the review of issues and problems which, by virtue of their innovative character, may be less open to debate within the public service.

49. At the same time, there are a number of factors that currently constrict a fuller role for public administration research and training institutes in the reform process.

50. In Latin America, the experience with training institutes has been less than encouraging. One of the major causes has been negative attitudes on the part of officials towards training and improvement owing to the lack of incentives offered by imperfect career systems. Only Costa Rica, for example, has an effective merit system.

51. In Africa, a similar constraint is faced in Liberia, where there is insufficient political support for training and the national institute lacks a clear mandate in terms of a systemic national policy framework for human resources development. Although Liberia is somewhat unique in this respect, other African countries, such as Uganda, have experienced difficulties in attracting officials (particularly influential senior ones) to training courses. Two exceptions are first, in the courses run by regional institutes in public administration and second, in countries such as Ghana and Zambia where the Head of State has personally encouraged training courses for top officials and even ministers. These efforts apart, there is clearly a need for a more systematic linkage between government reform efforts and public administration training and research functions. This has been recognized by a number of francophone countries.⁶

52. In Asia and the Pacific, similar problems have been reported in some of the smaller newly-independent countries in terms of the inadequacy of facilities,

particularly for the development of O and M skills. Some of the larger and longer-established public services, on the other hand, increasingly regard training as a costly, time-consuming and at times irrelevant exercise.

53. In Western Asia, a number of countries are establishing training institutes against a background of debate over their location and course content. Few have so far mounted courses for senior officials.

Reform agencies and O and M organizations

54. An alternative source of planning for reform is the O and M organization in the civil service, where management improvement objectives are broadly defined and aimed at overall changes in the administrative system.

55. Three constraints are common: a local scarcity of specialized cadres with O and M skills, as in some African and Western Asian countries where O and M services have been recently started; a lack of the conditions necessary for effective O and M work, as in many Latin American countries where career systems, and therefore the need for job classification, are absent; and the limited functional responsibilities of O and M units, as reported for example in francophone African countries where many aspects of administrative reform, such as structural change, lie with other competences.

56. In Asia and the Pacific, several countries have used O and M as an instrument of reform, with varying effects. In Afghanistan in 1980, the Departments of Planning, Administration and Inspection were transformed into the Department of Guidance of Local Administrative Organs in the Prime Ministry, along with the former Department of Administrative Reforms, in an effort to strengthen, *inter alia*, support for the improvement of management systems. Nepal has operated an Administrative Management Department since 1968 in the Prime Minister's Office, after more than ten years of experimenting with O and M. It covers personnel management, training and administrative reform. The Republic of Korea has likewise found advantageous the creation of a permanent agency in this area. Thus, the Administrative Reform Commission was succeeded by the Bureau of Administrative Management in the Ministry of Government Administration which was endowed with greater political support and less isolated. Fiji provides the example of one of the small, recently independent States where the Organization and Establishments Division of the Public Service Commission has been limited in its capacity to spearhead reform because of local manpower shortages.

57. In Western Asia, where in several countries there has recently been an expansion of the role of the public sector, O and M services and public administration research and training institutes have been established. In Iraq, the National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development (NCCMD) was estab-

* Ibid.

lished in 1972 to undertake administrative development planning and, in its turn, set up O and M units in all ministries and related organizations as well as organization and production (O and P) units in all State enterprises and similar public undertakings. In Jordan, an early event in the evolution of administrative reform was the establishment in 1970 of the O and M Division of the Budget Department. In Kuwait, which has recently experienced increased government revenues and service provision, the 1977 administrative reforms have combined a formerly weak Central Personnel Bureau with the new Ministry of Legal and Administrative Affairs.

58. In Africa, most anglophone countries have operated O and M services for some years which in some cases have played a central role in administrative reform. In the Sudan, the O and M Unit, set up in 1952 in the Establishments Branch of the Ministry of Finance, was expanded in 1971 to form the nucleus of the Administrative Reform Unit of the Ministry of Public Services. It has the responsibility for manpower planning, management development, training, methods, procedures, techniques, regulations and efficiency. In Uganda, the Ministry of Public Services and Cabinet Affairs has similarly emerged from the Central Establishments Division and is currently faced with administrative aspects of national reconstruction. In the United Republic of Tanzania, the Central Management Division of the Ministry of Manpower Development has, apart from training, been limited to clerical procedures. Major structural reforms have been undertaken by other means, especially Presidential commissions. In West Africa, in Ghana and Nigeria, long-established O and M units and establishments departments have played a central role in the implementation of recent reform commission recommendations. In Liberia, on the other hand, the Civil Service Agency has been limited in its operations owing to the absence of a merit system. In the francophone countries, O and M units have undertaken reform activities, as in Senegal with the central bureau in the General Secretariat of the Presidency. Generally, however, O and M has been constrained because of shortages of specialized manpower.

59. In the Caribbean, Barbados in 1971 established a central O and M office as a result of the Government's effort to reform its administrative machinery in order to cope with the rapid growth of the public service coupled with the increased complexity of public administration generated by the social and economic development needs of a modern State. It was therefore felt that a great part of the remedy lay in a systematic overhaul of job methods, the institution of a planned reorganization of the entire administrative machinery and the development of management skills through intensive training of supervisors and managers.

Changes in the political system

60. The fourth major source of planning for administrative reform has been the changes taking place at the

level of the political system. One of these has been military rule, where the incoming rulers have seen administrative reform as part of the programme of national reconstruction as, for example, in Chile, Peru, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Indonesia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea.

61. The Chilean Decree No. 212 of December 1973, for example, states that national reconstruction is incomplete without an efficient, dynamic and honest administration. The rationalization of organization, structures and methods is necessary to achieve greater productivity. The basic measure to achieve this was the creation of the National Commission on Administrative Reform (CONRA), directly responsible to the Military Junta, which would study and recommend general structural changes in the ministries, public services, subnational and municipal organs, together with the corresponding administrative legislation and regulations. The Commission is comprised of members drawn equally from the Armed Forces and experts in public administration. Civil service representation is limited to one member from the Ministry of the Interior. By 1980, the following objectives of reform had been proposed and officially adopted:

- (a) The complete debureaucratization of government administration;
- (b) The reorganization and improvement of the system of personnel administration;
- (c) Regionalization;
- (d) The revision and consolidation of the general reorganization of ministries, services and public bodies;
- (e) The formation of a system of Presidential assistance;
- (f) The formulation of a Civil Service Code.

62. In Peru, where administrative reform has at times taken on a socio-political character by stressing participation, politicization and a change of attitude on the part of the civil service as well as structural transformation of the administration by the redistribution of functions, these trends have been linked to the political initiatives of the military administration after 1968. In 1973, the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) was created and entrusted with the tasks of administrative reform.

63. In West Africa, periods of military rule in Ghana and Nigeria saw the establishment of major public service review commissions. In Ghana, the first military administration (1966-1969) set up the Mills Odoi Commission to examine ways of eliminating waste and imposing efficiency on the civil service and to identify structural changes geared to the promotion of rapid social and economic change. The Commission recommended a decrease in the number of ministries from 31 to 17 and secretariats from 23 to 8, the decentralization of functions to newly-created regional and district authorities, and the creation of a single, unified service for all functional arms of government, the teaching service and local government.

64. The advent of a second military administration in 1972, the National Redemption Council, led to a further Commission (Okoh) being appointed, this time with an apparent difference. Announcing the appointment of the Commission, the Head of State noted that previous commissions had tended to lump together salary reviews with an appraisal of structural and procedural effectiveness, with over-emphasis on the former, and that they had also tended to stress economy and efficiency rather than to suggest new measures designed to achieve productivity and output in terms of national development goals.

65. Under Decree No. NRCD. 264 of July 1974, the terms of reference of the Okoh Commission were:

(a) To investigate the organization and structure of the Civil Service and its methods of operation and to make recommendations for any reforms that were needed;

(b) To enquire into any other matters which appear to the Commission to be reasonably related to (a) above;

(c) To report its findings to the National Redemption Council by making such recommendations as it thought fit, including particular recommendations with special regard to the need to transform the Civil Service into a dynamic instrument of social change and economic development.

66. In interpreting these terms of reference, the Okoh Commission explicitly echoed the thinking of the recently published Nigerian Udoji Report: that the civil service should be totally committed to the development objectives set by the Government for the country; that these include rapid social change and economic development and not just maintenance and control; and that this requires less emphasis on rules and regulations and more pragmatism, originality, inventiveness, innovation, management, flexible attitudes and greater expertise in planning, policy preparation, decision-making and management.

67. The findings and recommendations of the report fall into four major areas of concern: first, the civil service organization—especially the co-ordination of functional elements of the civil service in order to ensure effective communication and decision-making; second, the civil service structure—that is—the allocation of responsibilities; third, working procedures in major areas of management, including finance and personnel; and fourth, the external relations of the civil service, both with the political leadership and the public.

68. In Nigeria, one of the principal undertakings of national reconstruction for the post-civil war oil-boom period was the 1974 Public Service Review Commission, a task which had been started earlier by the creation of a twelve-state Federation in 1966 and completed by its expansion to 19 in 1976. The terms of reference of the Commission were:

"The Commission shall, having regard to the need to secure adequate development and optimal utilization

of manpower and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Public Services in meeting the challenge of a development-oriented society:

"(a) Examine the organization, structure and management of the Public Services and recommend reforms where desirable;

"(b) Investigate and evaluate the methods of recruitment and conditions of employment and staff development programmes of the Public Services and recommend such changes as may be necessary;

"(c) Examine all legislation relating to pensions as well as the various superannuation schemes in the Public Services and in the private sector and suggest such changes as may be appropriate with a view to facilitating mobility within the Public Services, and also between those services on the one hand and the private sector on the other, while at the same time providing for the retention in the Public Services of qualified and efficient personnel;

"(d) Undertake, with the aid of appropriate grading teams, the regrading of all posts in the Public Services, establish scales of salaries corresponding to such grades and, as a result of a job evaluation of such posts, recommend salary scales to be applicable to each post in the services;

"(e) Enquire into...and make recommendations on any other matters which in the opinion of the Commission appear to be relevant to the foregoing and therefore ought, in the public interest, to be inquired into."

In its enquiries and recommendations, the Commission covered not only the central civil service departments but also the local authorities, police, judiciary, public enterprises, universities and teaching service.

69. The findings and recommendations made by the Commission in their main report fell into three major categories which are discussed below in order of their specificity and the priority allocated to them in the implementation of the subsequent Government White Paper.

70. In its main report, the Udoji Commission saw the central problem in these terms:

"The civil service of a development-oriented society must itself be change-oriented if it is to meet the present and future demands upon it. Any change must include the introduction of modern methods of managing complex organizations like government and the injection of new blood and the removal of obsolescence".

The injection of new blood was indeed a salient theme throughout the Commission's report. Many of the measures recommended, including the standardization of conditions of service, were aimed at facilitating mobility in personnel sectors, particularly between public and private sectors. The report continued:

"In view of the expanded and complicated nature of the present demands on the service, every effort should be made to bring into the service, especially at

higher levels, suitably qualified and experienced candidates from outside the service."

71. Second, the report proposed a package of modern techniques and procedures which, together with the improved pay and conditions of service and mobility of manpower between sectors, may improve and enhance civil service decision-making and productivity. They include management by objectives (MBO), project management and the programme and performance budgeting system (PPBS). Unfortunately, the presentation of these in the report is rather academic and no real attempt is made to show how they could be made operational under Nigerian conditions. What might be noted here, particularly in relation to further discussions below, is that the attempt to introduce techniques of this kind does indicate a desire among certain sections in the civil service to develop a more efficient and technocratic type of public administration.

72. The third and most interesting—if vaguest and least heeded—aspect of the public service review was its attempt to focus attention on a rather neglected dimension of public administration in the developing countries—its relationship with interest groups and the general public. This, in classic parlance, is the problem of impartiality and accountability and, in the Nigerian context, the whole question of an appropriate administrative style.

73. The retention of manpower in the public sector has been of concern in several African countries, where losses have also been experienced in other countries, as well as in a number of Western Asian and Asian countries.

74. A further example of administrative reform initiated by an incoming military régime is Mali where, in 1969, the Military Committee for National Liberation established a National Commission for Administrative Reform (CNRA).

One-party systems¹

75. In other cases, the advent of a one-party State system, particularly where it is inclined towards intervention in social and economic development, has also been a catalyst of administrative reform. For example, in the United Republic of Tanzania, the following changes flowed from that event: a modification of rules governing civil service neutrality in order to allow the participation of civil servants in party politics (as a means of enhancing civil service identification with party policy); an enlargement of the scope of the public sector in order to facilitate the implementation of State ownership policy vis-à-vis large-scale private enterprise; an injection of political education into civil service training; a reduction and freezing of conditions of service, in line with the national income redistribution policy; and an increased emphasis on civil service accountability to the public and on public participation in the planning process.

76. Conversely, another catalyst of reform has

been that of governmental change following long periods of one-party rule (e.g., Malaysia and Sri Lanka).

77. One area where some of the most dramatic changes in governmental machinery have taken place is at the local level, particularly in the rural sector where the colonial period had bequeathed a proliferation of loosely co-ordinated or unco-ordinated bureaucratic and technical agencies. Elements of the inherited administrative machinery have been restructured and new patterns of relations with the central administration have been created. Most of these have involved various forms of centralization and decentralization (depending on the circumstances), aimed at improving the effectiveness and capacity of local administration by the redistribution of powers and resources among levels of government. The justification of changes of these kinds has been an increasing policy commitment to rural development or to bringing government closer to the people, thus requiring an improvement in patterns of provision and access to government-controlled goods and services for hitherto neglected groups. In other cases such as Nigeria, however, less attention has been paid to the patterns of rural stratification in administrative units and the emphasis has been on the spatial aspects of access and distribution by means of the creation of new subnational units of administration.

78. The increasing importance of administrative reform initiatives which emanate at the level of the political system or at a specific ministerial, programme or sectoral level (i.e., without any linkage to reform commissions) deserves special attention. How is this kind of initiative to be accounted for? Should it be considered as administrative reform?

External sources of planning for reform

79. A final source of planning for reform has been an external one. The 1975 Nigerian Public Service Review Commission, in its heavy use of consultants, was obviously influenced by European and North American management technology. The Ghanaian review was more phlegmatic about the full-scale replication of such models. China is currently debating the relevance of foreign management technology. In Nigeria, it was not until 1981 that the President announced the adoption of one of the modern management techniques recommended in the Udoji Report—a programme and performance budgeting system—and requested the assistance of the United Nations in its installation. Management styles in the local private sector, particularly of the large transnational corporations, have also been influential in countries such as Nigeria and Kenya. Mali, for example, has provided formal consultative machinery not only for private corporate interests, but also for professionals, labour and local communities.

80. In Latin America, where the relevance of external models is being increasingly questioned, an interesting alternative is emerging in regional and technical co-

operation among developing countries. An example would be the meeting of United Nations project managers in Latin America, held at Buenos Aires in 1978. Many of the projects were related to administrative reform and more have emerged since, especially through the Central American Institute of Public Administration (ICAPI). Elements of this scenario are also emerging in Africa through the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) which has projects on administrative reform and a network of African consultants and the Economic Commission for Africa.

TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE PLANNING FOR REFORM

Focus, scope and content

81. Four conditions that are frequently identified as being critical to the focus, scope and content of administrative reform are (*a*) the clarity and specificity of objectives, (*b*) its comprehensive character, (*c*) its integration with socio-economic planning and (*d*) its professional character. Several administrative reform activities did not achieve success, according to various studies, because their objectives were too broad or confused, their focus was not comprehensive enough to bring about the desired change, they had not been sufficiently related to the needs and phases of socio-economic planning or the reform proposals and programmes were too general to be effective in complex administrative situations.

82. As is apparent from the examples given, in cases where administrative reform has been promoted through O and M services, goals have tended to be very specific and directed towards particular areas and sectors, thereby reflecting the operational character of O and M. Thus, O and M agencies in Asia and Africa especially have been charged with the study and improvement of aspects of civil service work and organization such as job methods, classification, personnel management, training and manpower development. The results have been correspondingly tangible, if somewhat restricted in areas of concern. Many, for example, have been concerned with remedying obvious lacunae in the civil service organization, such as a civil service code, central co-ordinative mechanisms, a merit system, a system of classification, etc. The extent to which O and M functions can provide adequate and comprehensive solutions to the needs of administrative reform is considered in a subsequent section of the present study.

83. At the other extreme, reforms promoted by public administration training and research institutes, such as in Argentina and Peru, have tended to assume a more comprehensive or global character. However, this has often been because much of the task of defining particular reform goals, strategies and measures has been left to the relatively autonomous research activity

of institutes and, sometimes, *ad hoc* reform commissions. Working under the general rubric of promoting standards, effectiveness, efficiency, dynamism, etc., the results have at times consisted of academically interesting diagnoses but little in terms of measures that have been or can be implemented.

84. Where administrative reform has arisen in the context of economic planning, the gap between reform measures and the needs of socio-economic development has been narrower, depending on the extent to which economic planning has taken social benefit into account. Furthermore, because in these cases reform has been concerned with the administrative requirements of implementing development plans, it has been focused on the needs of specific programmes and projects. Thus, in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Mali, it has been directed towards areas such as sectoral administration, regionalization and local administration or, in the case of Brazil, towards improved budgeting and finance management.

85. The final category of reforms with respect to the nature of goal establishment is where the latter have been politically articulated or externally induced. On the other hand, the advent of a military régime has sometimes given rise to a reform programme linked to the tasks of national reconstruction, usually abstractly expressed in terms such as "reorganization", "debureaucratization", "elimination of waste", enhanced "ethics", "accountability" and "dynamism", and which requires, if at all possible, implementation by a permanent *ad hoc* reform commission. In addition, reforms flowing from the creation of one-party States have been mixed as regards the character of their goals. Some have been very specific, aimed at providing the appropriate constitutional changes to reconcile public administration with one-party rule. Others have been programme-oriented and aimed, for example, at a decentralized, regional administration that would facilitate agrarian reform or the Green Revolution. Others have been more political and directed towards cultural and value changes on the part of public servants. Externally-induced reform aspirations can combine several weaknesses. While taking their cue from the increasing professionalism of metropolitan public services (or alternatively the technocratic managerial styles of locally-based transnational corporations), policy measures tend to be replicative in nature and are rarely adopted for application to local conditions (e.g., MBO and PPBS).

86. While it is realized that positive improvements in focus, scope and content are likely to enhance the effectiveness of administrative reform activities, it is necessary to note that a complete or total improvement of all four critical conditions at the same time is not necessarily practicable or even desirable. For example, not all reform efforts can have their objectives too clearly specified since in some cases they will alienate too many strong groups to allow the effective continuation of reform efforts. Similarly, the comprehensive

character of any administrative reform is relative and no administrative reform effort can be comprehensive enough to encompass all the relevant variables and components. Furthermore, comprehensiveness has its own limitations in terms of implementation. It is generally seen that the more comprehensive an administrative reform effort is, the more it generates hostility from various groups and the more delay and resistance it faces in acceptance and implementation. The integration of administrative reform with socio-economic planning is very useful but there are occasions when needs for administrative reform are generated by the adverse and anticipated consequences of economic planning or the need for maintaining order and promoting stability. It is relevant to note that all administrative reform impulses or needs cannot always be integrated with socio-economic planning.

87. Many administrative reform activities are still dominated by generalists and the result is that they are not relevant and meaningful in the complex administrative situations into which they are introduced. It is necessary that more professional input be made in the initiation, formulation and implementation of administrative reform activities. It is equally necessary to note that most administrative reform efforts will require certain mediation or a conciliation of interests; this will require certain generalist skills in administrative reform efforts. What is needed is a mixture of both professional and generalist competences, the type of mixture depending on the nature and focus of specific administrative reform proposals.

Continuity, systematization and comprehensiveness

88. The second general issue which arises in relation to the planning of administrative reforms is that of continuity, systematization and comprehensiveness. As pointed out in chapter I above, any effective strategy of reform must be based on a recognition of the continuing needs of reorganization and change in the public services, thus emphasizing particularly the evaluation or feedback stage of any systematic reform process.

89. At the same time, considerable costs and difficulties are involved in adopting this approach. Certainly, to be effective, each of the five stages of the administrative reform process may require different types of institutions, expertise, support bases and intra-relationships. It is also no doubt known that actual formulation and implementation of reforms has to be completed within a given time when sufficient political will, administrative support and adequate resources are available. The lesson to be learned is to examine how well the dynamics of administrative reform, especially the significance of each of the five stages and their interaction, have been understood in the administrative reform experiences in many developing countries.

90. Finally, several efforts have been made to distinguish between major and minor administrative

reforms. In chapter II it was argued that there is a need to examine whether such distinctions are meaningful or whether alternative ways of categorizing the scope and intensity of specific administrative reform efforts should be explored. However, there is clearly some difference between large-scale administrative reform and small partial changes and it may be necessary to determine whether there is any relationship between the two. Thus, for example, it may be important to examine the relationship between first, inertia or the continuous absence of even small changes, second, periodic adjustments, and third, major overhauls. An option for the first or even the second may eventually, in extreme cases, leave no alternative but to embark on the third. On the other hand, careful pursuit of the second option may indeed delay or obviate any attempt at a major overhaul.

PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Interaction of input and output aspects in the context of timing

91. Planning for implementation is perhaps the most critical aspect of creating the capacity for administrative reform. Thus, one of the shortcomings of many reform efforts has been the imbalance between the planning of reform (the design of input) and the monitoring and control of output (the impact of reform measures). In a sense the two are, of course, related. Policy objectives and corresponding reform measures may require constant revision where feedback suggests inappropriate or unrealistic designs.

92. As pointed out in chapter II, the strategy for implementation requires consideration of the timing factor. The time constraint may explain the kinds of choices that countries are increasingly making about the areas for selection in embarking on reform efforts. Faced with all-pervading questions in nearly every sector and level of the public services, a not infrequent response is to opt for a minor reform, concentrating for example on an area-based programme such as integrated rural development or the establishment of a new institution such as an ombudsman.

Creation of capacity for implementation

93. Creating the capacity for administrative reform entails several elements at the level of planning for implementation:

- (a) The effective formulation of reform measures;
- (b) The design of the latter in terms of relevance and specificity;
- (c) The leadership and tactics for implementation;
- (d) Corresponding staff to operate and man new or reformed structures and procedures, support (political, administrative and social) and other non-human resources;
- (e) Related training for implementation.

94. Underlying each of these elements is the question of agency, which arises at several points. First, an agency for monitoring and managing feedback will be necessary to enable policy-designers to check the realism of objectives and to measure and revise them if necessary. This will require arrangements for basic data collection, a subject to be treated extensively in the following chapter. A second requirement may be additional mechanisms, such as meetings with officials, to enable target or client ministries or governmental organizations to discuss and agree on concrete programmes for implementation. Follow-up meetings may also be necessary if any effective system for ensuring control and compliance is to be established.

95. Two examples can be provided of choices of agency to supervise this crucial area. The first of these is the establishment of permanent co-ordinating reform units in each ministry. The second is where *ad hoc* reform commission experts remain to oversee the implementation of their recommendations and to provide overall leadership and guidance.

96. In addition to the effective formulation of reform objectives and arrangements for the collection of appropriate data, there is growing recognition on the part of both analysts and practitioners of the importance of incorporating client group interests into reform design at various levels. Thus, the policy objectives of a given reform, rather than making general statements about institutional goals such as "efficiency", "productivity", etc., should endeavor to indicate the specific output or allocations of a given reform. Who, for example, are the ultimate intended beneficiaries of a rural decentralization programme? Are they the large-scale commercial farmers as recipients of a planned increase in the allocation of agricultural credit and inputs? Or are they the collectives of small-scale peasant farmers as beneficiaries of a programme for redistributing the means of production? Policy objectives defined in terms of output will also be easier to evaluate by providing ready-made impact indicators.

97. Likewise, design at the level of manning will require the supply of procedures to regulate the behaviour of local staff in operating a reformed administrative structure. Taking again the example of decentralization, often generally and sometimes vaguely aimed at enhancing popular participation and a redistribution of power between the levels of government and its clientele, it will be necessary to provide appropriate procedures to the staff of decentralized administrative structures in order to ensure that, in the allocation of resources, they take into account or actively encourage popular initiatives emanating at the level of production or the community. Otherwise, the familiar process of goal displacement is likely to occur and decentralization will result in a reconcentration of decision-making power in the hands of local officials, to the detriment of community and local governmental institutions.

98. This touches upon the fifth element of design for

implementation—the training of staff for leadership and teamwork and their acceptance and support of reform measures. It may even be necessary for appropriate sanctions to be built into programme design. This could be achieved, for example, by linking the administrative performance of key programme implementors to their prospects within the public service career system; for example, promotion incentives for effective organizers of community participation. This approach has been effectively undertaken in a number of human settlements projects.

TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

99. In conclusion, two factors have been increasingly identified as critical to effective planning for implementation. The first of these is support. Three kinds of supports are usually identified: political, administrative and popular.

100. Political support is considered indispensable for any administrative reform activity. Usually meant by political support is leadership and commitment on the part of the chief executive. However, care must be taken to ensure that political support relates to the achievement of national administrative goals and does not degenerate into partisan support for the achievement of partisan goals. Many administrative reform efforts, particularly those dealing with a decentralized administration or development activity, receive strong political or other support from the leading faction in the political leadership, but they are implemented in such a way as to benefit specific groups, individuals or a political party at the cost of overall society. Hence, it is necessary to develop criteria to distinguish appropriate political support from partisan support and the effects that it has on the intended beneficiaries of the reform.

101. While recognizing the crucial nature of political support for administrative reform activity, the limitations on the latter imposed by frequent political changes should also be noted. Political instability has been a recurrent phenomenon in many developing and even some developed countries. Irrespective of the desirability and crucial nature of political support, it is clear that many countries will continue to experience political instability from time to time and to seek alternative sources of support for administrative reform. One source of support is that of senior civil servants who should be encouraged to take a more active leadership role in the planning and implementation of administrative reform. The experience of some countries shows that senior civil servants can, during long periods of political instability, assume such a role. This role can possibly be more effectively performed if it is related to the career system.

102. A dilemma is faced with respect to administrative support from bureaucracy or other groups within the administration, since changes affect some or most

key members of the administrative system. Many examples are available to show how unsuccessful were the administrative reform efforts relating to change in the basic structures of civil services and how strong and effective the resistance from the administrative system or its key components can be towards any proposed change that adversely affects their interests. Yet, over the period of years, efforts to overcome this resistance have been successful and provide useful guidance in estimating the nature and magnitude of the resistance, the possible opportunities to cultivate and develop support from the administrative system and the strategies and policies to be used for neutralizing some bureaucratic resistance to proposed changes.

103. It is useful to argue for the presence of popular support for administrative reform but, speaking realistically, very few developing countries have felt the need and opportunity to develop it. Public administration is still a closed subject in many developing countries and popular perceptions of it tend to be limited to general feelings about its unresponsiveness, size and costliness. Socially-innovative public sector programmes may even cause popular resentment and resistance in some cases. Many developing countries

are, however, experimenting with various approaches and programmes, such as community development, participatory decision-making, decentralization, clientele organizations and ombudsmen, in order to popularize participation in the administrative process. These approaches and modalities need to be encouraged and strengthened so that administrative reform has wider popular support and meaning. Some programmes for popularizing public administration that are especially relevant to administrative reform are the effective involvement of local leaders in a decentralized administration, participatory management of public organizations and increased institutional public administration teaching and research. Efforts to popularize public administration will greatly enhance the probability of effective planning and implementation of reform.

104. The second factor increasingly identified as critical to effective planning for implementation is the improved synchronization of the input and output aspects of the administrative reform process, as underscored by recent trends and pointed out in chapter I above.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES

105. Fundamental to the enhancement of capabilities for administrative reform is the creation of an agency and the corresponding institutional arrangements. This is not just a matter of establishing organizational structures with the available organization and development techniques; it also involves fulfilling behavioural requirements, such as providing leadership, commitment, team spirit, co-ordinative capacity and innovative attitudes. Broadly speaking, there are three basic types of organizational choice in the establishment of a reform agency, each of which entails a number of issues. Ultimately, these choices involve political will and have to be made at the highest level, taking account of the various elements in the power structure. The challenge may be to ensure that the supervising minister selected either has the necessary time or is able to delegate a working committee or secretariat of professionals, technicians and administrators.

106. The first organizational choice is that of a reform organization or commission to carry out a specific reform programme. Special statutory bodies are often resorted to primarily to ensure objectivity and impartiality with respect to the formulation of administrative reform. The experience of such reform agencies increasingly shows that at the head of any national system for administrative reform it may be necessary to have some kind of deliberative body to finalize and make recommendations at government policy-making levels. No matter how good the in-house research may have been, all efforts may be in vain if the resultant recommendations are not presented in a way that is likely to appeal to the political decision-makers. It may also be necessary to establish some kind of specialized division of labour in the executive units of reform bodies. In Chile, for example, CONARA is headed by a Co-ordinating Committee under the President of the Commission (and has ministerial status) and comprises five military members, six professionals and a representative of the Ministry of the Interior. Below that is the Consultative Committee, which comprises representatives of ministries and public services, universities and relevant social and technical interests. Finally, CONARA is mandated to establish working sub-committees to carry out research and analysis and to formulate proposals. The number, organization, composition and functions of the sub-committees are left to the Co-ordinating Committee, under the general supervision of the Consultative Committee.

107. In Asian countries, the need has also been

recognized to develop some degree of specialization in reform commissions along the lines, for example, of panels based on programmes or sectors. Typically, each panel is authorized to secure information for the concerned ministry or agency in government, to invite witnesses and discussants to scheduled hearings and to conduct in-depth analyses of the functions and operations of the ministry and agencies related to a particular function or programme. The chairman of the reform agency is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the various panels. Each individual panel has its own chairman, consultants, experts and technical staff.

108. Examples of reform commissions in Asia include the 1968 Commission on Reorganization of the Philippines, which included representatives drawn from the legislature as well as the executive and private sectors; the All-India Administrative Reform Commission, which included six members of the Union Parliament; and, in western Asia, the 1959 Commission in Lebanon, comprising 20 ministers and, working through sub-committees, the Royal Commission in Jordan.

109. In Africa, the 1974-1975 Nigerian Public Service Review was carried out by a Presidentialy appointed Commission and supported by a Public Service Review Unit in the Federal Ministry of Establishments, the latter being the agency responsible for liaison with appropriate bodies of the Federal and state Governments, parastatals, universities, police, judiciary and educational services. Canadian consultancy services assisted the Unit. A panel of six, comprising eminent private citizens and professionals, was set up to receive and consider complaints arising from the Commission's recommended grading system. It was subsequently announced that proposals were under consideration for the establishment of a management reform implementation agency, with more staff and equipment, to replace the Unit. The panel urged that any such agency should be made the effective clearing-house for any proposals for change and called for stronger co-ordination of the various entities involved—the National Council on Establishments, the Central Establishments Committee of the Federal Ministry of Establishments, and the state governments.

110. In Ghana, the 1974-1976 Okoh Commission comprising seven commissioners, drawn from the private sector, the military and the civil service, and supported by a secretariat of 28 staff—five senior civil servants (Principal/Assistant Secretary level), three management analysts, one accountant, one executive officer and 18 supportive staff. The recommendations have yet to be acted on, largely owing to rapidly chang-

ing political circumstances since their publication; in the mean time, in 1979, a Permanent Salary Review Commission was set up, with its secretariat in the Ministry of Establishments.

111. While it may not be feasible to discern any global or ideal type of organization, a number of ingredients for successful planning, co-ordination and implementation of reform are fairly evident. The first is leadership and co-ordination, which may be provided by appointing as the head of the deliberative body a person of ministerial status or the head of the civil service; second, the representation of key civil service ministries and management research and national training institutes; and, third, an effectively staffed administrative reform unit or secretariat.

112. An alternative approach is that taken in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, where reform has been synonymous with decentralization and the establishment of one-party State systems, and characterized by Presidential and party political initiatives, with no formal reform agency involvement. Thus the Tanzanian decentralization in 1972 took its cue from the post-Arusha Declaration emphasis on participatory rural development, under party supervision. Design of the reform proposals took place by means of a series of Presidentially-encouraged or -supervised studies and, finally, a management consultants' report. Likewise, in Zambia, a Presidential initiative followed by a series of studies, some by the national Institute of Public Administration, led to similar results, although some ambiguity apparently exists as to whether popular participation or increased party control over local administration has been enhanced.

113. In the francophone African countries, Mali is unique in having a National Commission for Administrative Reform (CNRA). Under the Presidency of the Ministry of Labour and the Public Service, to which it acts only in an advisory capacity, the Commission functions by means of sub-committees and working groups specializing in management and training, public finance, regional and local administration, the organization and management of public services and enterprises and informatics. In Senegal, administrative reform is carried out under the Presidency, while in the Ivory Coast it is handled by the Ministry of the Public Service. A disadvantage of the latter location is that some components of reform, such as structural changes, lie within the competence of other branches of the machinery of government.

114. Several other countries have made a similar choice of location. In the Republic of Korea, for example, administrative reform activities have been undertaken continuously since 1948 by the Administrative Management Bureau of the Ministry of Government Administration. In Liberia, a key institution is the Civil Service Agency. Hitherto, the Agency has concentrated on examinations and has not yet been able to carry out the task of promoting a merit system, a *sine qua non* of administrative reform.

115. Where no special reform commission is set up, an alternative approach often adopted is that of establishing some mechanism for co-ordinating the relevant skills in various branches and related agencies of government, as in Colombia, between the Civil Service Department, the O and M Secretariat of the Public Service and the Escuela Superior de Administración Pública; in Honduras, between the Directorate General of the Civil Service and the Ministry of Works and Public Credit; and in Ecuador, between the Establishments Departments and the Inspectorate-General of the Civil Service.

116. Co-ordinating mechanisms may vary. In Ecuador a Co-ordination Team for Administrative Development was formed with United Nations assistance under the Secretariat General of Public Administration; in Honduras a Commission for Public Administration was established in the Executive Secretariat of the Higher Council for Economic Planning; in Barbados there is a Civil Service Department at Cabinet level; in Costa Rica a Division of Administrative Reform was set up with United Nations assistance in the National Economic Policy Planning Office of the Presidency; and in Afghanistan a Department of Administrative Reform was established in the Prime Minister's Office. Mexico, in contrast, has adopted a more dispersed approach in the location of its administrative reform capabilities and has established collaborating units in all organs of government: 61 internal reform committees, 63 O and M units, 53 units of data collection and 52 human resource units.

117. Co-ordinative mechanisms are not always supported by any special or separate executive agency. In Thailand, for example, administrative reform is the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office, while in Kuwait and Indonesia it is that of the Ministers of State for Legal and Administrative Affairs and for Administrative Reform, respectively.

LOCATIONAL TRENDS

118. Against the background of these broad types of organizational choice, certain trends are discernible with respect to the best location of the various types of reform agency. Generally, a tendency is apparent in favour of more permanent and less isolated bodies that are linked to the executive or policy-making organs of government as well as to related functional concerns, such as finance, economic planning, establishments and O and M. Reform committees, sometimes set up by incoming régimes and staffed by civil servants (as in Sri Lanka), have usually given way to more permanent organs because of the need for more adequate manpower. In the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, reform programmes that started as short-term exercises were first extended and eventually made permanent. In Uganda, recent tasks of national reconstruction occasioned a review of the public service by a series of *ad hoc* committees, and a permanent administrative

review commission is now proposed. At the same time, there is constraint on the development of O and M as a nucleus for reform in some western Asian and some Pacific countries because of limited manpower. Where this has not been the case, administrative reform departments have emerged from O and M and establishments organs (e.g., the Sudan). In other cases, O and M and reform departments have been combined (as in India and in Jamaica's Department of the Public Services). One reason has been a desire for broader reform agency concerns and a move beyond improvisation (e.g., India). In Asia, the location of reform functions in the finance ministry has generally not been found to be effective—in the Philippines, for example, owing to the other onerous functions of that Ministry. In Latin America, the location of reform functions in finance (or planning) ministries has sometimes obscured them from the public visibility often important for their effectiveness.

119. Reforms initiated by the chief executive, although automatically backed by the highest policy-making authority, may suffer from the low implementation capacity that can exist with the same office, divorced as it is from the executive ministries. Sectorally based initiatives have had the best record of implementation since their design, execution and evaluation are in the same hands. Reflecting growing Presidential executive power, the Philippines converted its Reform Commission to a Presidential Commission in 1968, while in the Republic of Korea, administrative reforms were placed in the Office of the Presidency and subsequently the Prime Ministry.

120. The need for more permanent reform agencies located in the civil service has also been emphasized by *ad hoc* commissions and by autonomous public administration research and training institutions. The Nigerian Udoji Commission, for example, recommended the establishment of an implementation agency with a strong link to establishments. This also reflects the trend towards increased specialization on the part of reform agencies, with special statutory bodies concentrating on structural and institutional reforms and behavioural reforms remaining with establishments and personnel agencies. For example, the functions of the office of organization and methods in Senegal reflect the inclusion of structural aspects in the national reform strategy that go beyond the normal competence of O and M units.

121. The third organizational choice, as exemplified in Argentina, has been to delegate the substantive activities of the National System of Administrative Reform (SNRA) to the National Institute of Public Administration as secretariat. The latter has mounted a team of 50 instructors in methods and a team of 10 experts in the preparation of case materials.

122. Some of the broad advantages of involving public administration research and training institutes were discussed in the previous chapter.

123. The final organizational choice, which man-

ifests itself in the Asian experience in particular, is that of establishing a committee or department of administrative reform within the machinery of government. Such committees have been set up, for example, in Bangladesh (the Administrative and Service Reorganization Committee, on the occasion of the 1973-1978 Five-Year Plan and the 1976 Pay and Salaries Commission), Pakistan (the 1958 Administrative Reform Committee), Sri Lanka (the 1965 Committee on Administrative Reform) and Malaysia (the Commission on Government Reorganization). Administrative reform departments have been set up in Afghanistan (and subsequently abolished in 1980), the Sudan (1971), India (1964) and Jamaica (1973).

LINKAGES

124. Aside from these specific organizational choices and the merits and demerits of each, a number of questions relating to the framework of the political system and the machinery of government also arise.

Political support

125. In the interface between the reform agency, political leadership and policy-making and co-ordinative functions (cabinet, supreme party or military organs), political support is universally recognized as necessary in order to facilitate the formulation, adoption and implementation of reform and also to ensure adequate financial resources for its operation.

126. The head of the reform organization must have the confidence of the dominant political party or groups and have direct access to the highest decision-makers. Legislative backing will also be necessary, including adequately authoritative terms of reference vis-à-vis other government agencies affected by the planned reforms.

127. Consultative mechanisms or formal representation may also be necessary on the part of politicians, such as elected members of parliament, as well as professional associations and client governmental organizations. In the former case, mechanisms to enforce compliance may be advantageous. The leadership of a reform committee, commission or board is particularly important. Whether recruited from inside or outside government and administration, the chairman will require the ability to lead the deliberations as well as effectively and persuasively to present recommendations to the political authorities. The chairman's status within the machinery of government vis-à-vis other government organs will also be important.

128. Regarding the proximity to the political leadership, particularly where the President or Prime Minister assumes personal supervision (an arrangement sometimes seen as advantageous in terms of maximizing political support and minimizing possible isolation), it is also well to bear in mind the limitations of political support imposed by frequent changes of régime and the need, under such circumstances, for senior civil ser-

vants to provide a more lasting reformist consciousness.

Linkage with public administration research and training institutions

129. As indicated in the previous chapter, public administration research and training institutions have an important role to play in the planning and administration of administrative reform. Their main assets are relative objectivity, technical expertise and autonomy. Objectivity and expertise are the main reasons why there is a need to establish linkages with the academic institutions. Participation may be in the form of consultancy or secondment of some faculty and staff as technical analysts to the reform organization. Another alternative is to commission the academic institutions to formulate reform proposals that are subject to the review and approval of the reform organization. In this approach, the decision-makers can get as many options and as wide a perspective as possible. The independence of an academic institution is a virtue in itself because the reform is not perceived to reflect only the interests of a single group or the members of the bureaucracy.

Linkage with the agencies affected

130. As suggested earlier, in connection with any systematic planning of the implementation of reform there is universal agreement on the need to establish better co-ordinative and participative linkages with the agencies affected by the reform in order to have access to the information needed to plan, provide a feedback mechanism and ensure implementation of the reform. Linkage with the affected agency will give the reform organization an idea of the situation, the problems and issues and the possible reaction of the agency and public service unions to the reform proposal. It will also facilitate implementation in the sense that the approved reform will ultimately be implemented by the affected agency. Mutual understanding of and commitment to the purpose, components and measures of the reform plan will be enhanced by establishing such a linkage with the agencies. In fact, the agency itself will initiate the reform by internal self-appraisal, the conduct of a management improvement study and the sponsorship of training programmes. It is important that the agency be represented in the reform organization, whether in the task force of the specific study panel or the programme of the same agency. The element of surprise is not a contributory factor to the successful implementation of the reform plan. Resistance to change is minimized when the agency participates in the reform process and is forewarned of the consequences as well as the benefits.

131. With a clear and open linkage to the agency effected, it is possible to balance and reconcile the opposing interests to reform. The members of the agency can also develop a constructive dialogue with key political leaders before the reform plan is approved. In

extreme cases, when the staff are adversely affected they can resort to the mediation procedures of the central personnel agency, the bargaining power of the labour union or associations of civil service personnel and the adjudicatory function of the courts. The most recent case that can be cited pertains to the reforms in the Philippine judiciary. The reform strategy called for the abolition of judicial positions, excluding those in the high court. The judges affected have sought a court injunction in order to stop the reorganization of the court system. The judges maintain that their positions are protected by permanent tenure under the constitutional mandate of an independent judiciary.

Linkage with the budget office and planning ministry

132. Linkage with the agency responsible for the preparation of the budget is necessary in order to synchronize changes in the allocation of funds and also to ensure that adequate financial support is provided to implement the approved reform. Regarding the planning ministry, as pointed out in the previous section, with the exception of some Asian countries, there is growing recognition that as a consequence of the primacy of government administration in social and economic development, administrative reform would be better linked institutionally and procedurally to the national planning process. It is therefore necessary to consider administrative feasibility in the preparation of national plans. Likewise, the orientation of reforms should be in line with plan objectives. Planning techniques can be useful in the design and elaboration of reforms.

Linkage with the central personnel agency

133. A main purpose of linkage with the central personnel agencies (including establishments, management improvement services and inspectorates) is to prepare the agency for any disruptive effects on existing conditions of service and employment patterns. Another is to ensure that the personnel recruited to the public service are given the necessary training and orientation. The role of the central personnel agency becomes more critical if the scope of reform includes behavioural reform or changes in the attitudes and thinking of government personnel.

Linkage with the central auditing agency

134. The central auditing and accounting agency has a vital role to play in the reform process. The involvement of this agency would lead to the re-examination and change of financial control procedures that obstruct the expeditious implementation of development programmes. The same agency provides the audited financial data and reports that uncover problem areas in financial transactions, such as misuse of funds, equipment and other resources. The more creative auditing agencies are also moving towards a facilitative and supportive role in administrative reform. One apparent trend is the undertaking of an overall appraisal

of management performance in the bureaucracy instead of the conventional focus on a single issue, such as fiscal reform.

MANPOWER AND TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS

135. Within the framework of these broad organizational choices and their respective challenges, there are the particular institutional and organizational needs and requirements of administrative reform efforts and the corresponding issues and problems of each. Critical areas include job descriptions of reform agency personnel, training, planning the staff requirements, conditions of service, recruitment, specialized expertise and management. A key issue underlying most of these areas is that of the relationship of administrative reform capacity to the type and levels of the administrative system and its development. For example, the provision of effective job descriptions for reform personnel will depend on the quality of basic goal definition, as articulated at the highest levels of the political and administrative system. Likewise, training needs and the extent of dependence on the external provision of specialized expertise and management technology will depend on local manpower development and its availability to the public services. Even the choice of management technology will be a function of the scope of the public sector and the extent of its intervention in sophisticated services and productive activities. Finally, aspects such as recruitment and conditions of service of reform agency personnel will be affected by the competition for manpower between the public and private sectors, especially under conditions of rapid economic growth and social development. A dynamic private sector also has well-known influences on the public services in terms of the demonstrative effect of its management styles.

136. The perceived need for specialized expertise and management has obvious relationships with the type and levels of the administrative system and its development. Issues that have been raised concerning the importing of specialized expertise and management usually include (a) that of a heightened dependence on foreign expertise and technology; (b) the cost of the technology and its relevance for local conditions; (c) the neglect of possible alternatives; (d) the problem of the acceptance of the reports and recommendations of foreign experts.

137. Where the use of foreign experts and imported management technology can be justified, other matters still arise—such as the need to specify reform goals, where politically articulated, in terms that are comprehensible to non-citizens. Another related matter is the effectiveness of procedures for recruiting responsive foreign experts.

Job descriptions of reform agency personnel

138. To a large extent, the design of effective job descriptions for reform agency staff depends on the

existence of clearly defined goals or terms of reference for the reform agency itself. The Chilean legislation and administrative directives, for example, were quite explicit in enumerating the activities of CONARA. These included:

(a) The assessment of the legislative and regulatory infrastructure necessary for reform;

(b) The synthesis of previous experiences in Chile relevant to administrative reform;

(c) The analysis and preparation of structural modifications in all branches and at all levels of government;

(d) The review of projects in relation to the reform objectives;

(e) The study and proposal of measures for an effective decentralization programme.

A number of operational tasks were also included:

(a) The maintenance of technical guide-lines;

(b) The planning, co-ordination and launching of particular measures;

(c) The supervision of the installation of the measures;

(d) The submission to the Junta of the immediate basic decision to be taken for the implementation of the measures;

(e) The reporting of any impending measure to the Junta.

Methods of work, however, appear to have been left for elaboration by CONARA itself. On the other hand, since the terms of reference attached to a body like CONARA may be fixed, the task of elaborating methods of work is less problematic than in O and M units, where needs are constantly changing. In contrast, the job titles of CONARA personnel are fairly broadly defined as "professionals", "administrative officers" and various categories of support and managerial staff.

139. Other tasks of reform agency staff may include:

(a) The scrutiny of specific phases of departmental operations, including the study of functions, staffing patterns, work methods and procedures, and related documentation, including operational manuals and forms;

(b) The analysis and documentation of the flow of work, including the preparation of flow charts, development of procedures and design of forms;

(c) The preparation of or assistance in preparing operational manuals;

(d) The development and implementation of training programmes relevant to reform measures.

140. In addition to the above tasks which are largely related to general administrative work, a reform analyst may be required to specialize in one or more of the following functional areas, according to his aptitude: accounting, finance, budgeting, taxation, personnel administration, supply management etc. Staff members trained in any of these functional specializations and

given added training in management analysis techniques have proved in a number of cases to be effective analysts. Other areas of specialization include:

- (a) Filing systems and records management;
- (b) Space planning and utilization;
- (c) Office communications systems;
- (d) Property management and control;
- (e) Management information systems and related computer utilization.

Training

141. The strengthening of staff resources, management improvement skills and capabilities by means of training may be undertaken in a number of ways. The officials who are most likely to benefit from such training include those who can play general and leadership roles in the initiation and implementation of management improvement programmes. This may require a high level of pre-entry training, a few years of experience at a senior level in the public services and an aptitude for generating new ideas and for participating in the challenging process of change. A critical issue here is the source of recruitment of the officials and their posting on return. Experience in Latin America has shown that efforts to develop a general, central cadre of O and M specialists have not always been effective. Such staff often lack substantive knowledge of the line functions of particular ministries, departments and programmes and make a minimal impact at that level. The development of cadres in each organizational unit may be more effective, provided that the ministry or department concerned uses to the fullest extent staff recently trained for management improvement work. Even where centralized O and M agencies have surmounted the problems of attracting staff, their work at the ministerial level may be perceived as an intrusion or even a brake on productivity.

142. With regard to training objectives, content, time scale and location, a number of basic requirements have to be met. The aim of the management improvement training programmes in government is to develop a systematic analytical, critical and creative approach to the solution of administrative problems in the various ministries and departments. It is intended to increase the knowledge of participants, to make them aware of modern management thinking, the proper allocation of duties, the more effective utilization of resources, and to teach them how to improve the organizational structure, methods and procedures of work.

143. Course contents may include basic topics such as the principles of management; the background of modern management; motivation, group behaviour and leadership; the principles of systematic training; communication and basic organizational theory; the importance of human relations in management; an appreciation of work measurement; basic O and M techniques; and problems of implementation. Course programmes should balance theory with practical

know-how in using management improvement techniques.

144. The total programme may intersperse initial basic course work of the kind described above with a period of practical experience, followed by more advanced training, possibly overseas, in subjects such as management improvement, relevant aspects of accountancy, organization and development, electronic data processing, systems analysis, organization and research, project planning and co-ordination and supply management.

145. Countries such as the Sudan, whose Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform has undertaken this kind of training programme, have devoted up to 10 and 16 weeks for the basic and advanced components of training, respectively.

146. Another training aspect in administrative reform concerns the personnel in the government departments and agencies whose reforms are to be implemented. The 1967-1969 Brazilian reforms, for example, extended to the training of reform agents in the target ministries and public organizations—especially at the base or first rung of the administrative hierarchy, where it was felt that the greatest impact could be made. Some 25,000 were reported to have been involved in the programme.

Planning the staffing requirements

147. Planning the staffing requirements of reform agencies can only be realistically undertaken after areas and methods of work have been established. For example, much will depend on the nature and complexity of any new techniques and institutions that may be recommended for introduction and the extent of the research that is required prior to the identification of specific reform measures.

148. In the case of Chile, where the terms of reference and activities of CONARA were specified *ab initio*, the establishment of the following 90 posts was provided for:

- (a) 16 senior managers (grades 18-41);
- (b) 22 executive secretaries/administrative officers (grades 15-25);
- (c) 30 professionals (grades 4-15);
- (d) one administrative chief (grade 6);
- (e) one accountant (grade 15).

Conditions of service

149. Another important organizational requirement is that the conditions and terms of employment of the O and M staff should be such as to attract and retain staff of the right calibre. The creation of this relatively new cadre of public servants and the rapid development of their professional capabilities present a new challenge that requires an objective outlook and the modification of restrictive and conservative civil service personnel policies and regulations.

150. Where countries have set up a permanent reform organization, as in the case of Chile, the reform agency may be made an internal organ of the public service, with ministerial status attached to its head and its staff remunerated on the central civil service salary scales. Where reform has been entrusted to existing civil service agencies, such as O and M and management improvement services, there have been a few (rather isolated) cases of a separate and competitive career structure being created for management analysts. In a few other cases, services in O and M and similar management improvement activities have been recognized as a basis for management development and advancement in the public service. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the former Director of the central O and M department became the President of the Civil Service Bureau. Similarly, the heads of the bureaux of O and M offices in several other countries have similarly progressed, some becoming permanent secretaries, some directors-general and others heads of departments. Special *ad hoc* reform commissions and the use of consultants are treated separately below.

Recruitment

151. The basic knowledge and skills considered as minimum qualifications for management improvement and related work in government include:

- (a) A general knowledge of the organization of the Government and its administrative system;
- (b) The ability to identify and analyse administrative problems;
- (c) A knowledge of management analysis techniques and skills and their application;
- (d) The ability to formulate different solutions to the problems identified;
- (e) The ability to express oneself clearly and concisely, both orally and in writing.

152. In addition, a management systems analyst will be expected to be specialized in some of the following areas:

- (a) The application of general management theories, principles and techniques;
- (b) The principles of behavioural science and organizational development;
- (c) The techniques of organizational analysis and institution-building;
- (d) The application of modern (quantitative) management techniques;
- (e) Management information systems, including the use of computer technology.

153. A college degree in business administration, public administration, economics or political science, or an equivalent professional qualification, is a desirable minimum academic requirement. However, long practical experience at responsible levels in administrative work, together with a post-secondary or high-school education, is a reasonable substitute for an academic qualification. A person's training should enable

him or her to adequately appreciate the significance, role and problems of administration.

154. While the above-stated requirements may be generally applied, the actual degree of experience and specialization required depends on the level of responsibility and the scope of the work attached to any given position. The assignment of responsibilities to the different positions and the establishment of qualification requirements is a flexible exercise. For example, a senior management systems analyst can be expected to conduct studies limited only to the operations in one ministry, while it is possible for a management systems analyst who is highly specialized in one functional area to conduct studies that embrace the work in several ministries.

155. The recruitment of regular staff (as distinct from consultants) for permanent reform commissions or related government units, such as O and M units, is an important but difficult task in so far as it is not provided for by the existing recruitment agencies of the public service. To that end, in Saudi Arabia, recruitment teams visit the universities occasionally to explain the objectives and functions of O and M with a view to attracting new graduates to work for the central O and M agency. In Iraq, efforts are similarly made to recruit new graduates directly from the universities. In addition, potential candidates are looked for in the civil service. In some instances, the search is extended also to the private sector. A continuous recruitment effort is essential in view of the rapid turnover of staff that takes place and the steadily expanding administrative responsibilities of the Governments in developing countries.

156. Debate on the question of sources of recruitment continues, with some persons advocating staffing from internal resources and others advocating recruitment from external sources. The advocates for external recruitment claim that the recruits are likely to be more objective and imaginative since they have fewer prejudices than current staff as far as public administration systems are concerned. Thus, they argue that external recruits would make a more constructive contribution to the work of management improvement. On the other hand, the advocates for internal recruitment claim that current civil servants have the advantage of a better understanding of governmental operations and problems, which makes them more effective as management analysts.

157. No matter what may be the source of recruitment, what is needed is a carefully balanced recruitment and selection process. One good approach is a thorough review of employment applications followed by interviews and other forms of screening in order to evaluate the qualities of the candidates concerned in relation to the jobs to be filled. The high cost of making the wrong selection is often not recognized. The employment of unsuitable candidates, whether they are over- or under-qualified, can create frustrations for both the employing agency and the individual concerned.

158. The selection and development of trainers of management systems analysts is perhaps the most crucial aspect of recruitment because of the multiplier effect of their role. Initially, it may be necessary to depend on outside help to train the trainers—for example, by means of technical assistance from the United Nations and other international sources. Between 1968 and 1977, the United Nations provided nearly 200 fellowships to nationals of Member States to study and specialize in O and M. In addition, experts have been made available through the same programme to train, at the country level, local staff in O and M and other management techniques.

159. An increasingly important source of outside assistance within some regions has been technical co-operation among developing countries by means of the United Nations system.

SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE: THE USE OF CONSULTANTS

Identification of need

160. Where required, specialized expertise in advanced management technology may be obtained from various sources: for example, both foreign and local private consultants and national institutes of public administration. Reliance on consultants may be great in the case of *ad hoc* reform commissions, particularly where, as with the Nigerian Udoji Commission, there is an attraction for "modern" (i.e., imported) management techniques. This is not invariably the case, however, if one considers, for example, the Nigerian Okoh Commission's sceptical attitude towards automatically replicating what is practised in the centres of metropolitan modernity.

161. The assessment of the necessity for external assistance in carrying out administrative reforms has been extensively discussed in recent years by both international organizations and user Governments. In view of the high costs of using foreign consultants, it is now widely acknowledged that more careful attention often needs to be given to preliminary in-house research and diagnosis in order to determine the exact nature and scope of the problem and whether a foreign consultant is necessary to solve it. Sometimes time pressures on an incumbent administration may leave no alternative, or the issues involved may be politically charged and more easily tackled by a "neutral" outsider. At the same time, however, foreign experts may be seen as lacking in the necessary local knowledge and unadaptable to the particular environment. Their presence on reform committees may even pose problems. Another criticism frequently levelled is that their attachments are usually short-term in duration, leaving the problems of implementation to barely trained local counterparts.

Recruitment

162. Issues and problems in recruiting consultants have been given fairly extensive treatment in a number

of prior United Nations studies. These studies have emphasized the importance of an ability on the part of consultants to understand the cultural background and the economic and social environment and political framework, the ability to maintain an advisory role and to avoid slipping into a semi-operational decision-making role with respect to the activities under study, the importance of a clear project document, access to a geographical variety of consultants from which to choose, the effective screening of candidates, etc.

International technical assistance and co-operation

163. An increasingly important source of external assistance within some regions has been technical co-operation among developing countries by means of the United Nations system, a possibility that was alluded to in an earlier United Nations report⁷ and, more recently, regional co-operation among developing countries through regional institutes of public administration, such as the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) and the Latin American Centre for Development (CLAD).

164. In Ecuador, against the background of governmental efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, United Nations projects are strengthening key co-ordinative organs and assisting in the planning of objectives and activities of the elements concerned, for example, with human resources development and training. The provision of expertise has been concentrated on, first, the definition of objectives for the National Administrative Development Plan, and second, the supply of advisers and *ad hoc* consultants.

165. In Costa Rica, United Nations support for the Division of Administrative Reform in the Office of National Economic Policy Planning similarly provides an adviser and *ad hoc* consultants who are preparing five manuals on the inventory of human resources, specialized manpower forecasting, the compilation of a staff list and the standardization of the classification scheme. They are also assisting in informatics, training, sectoral and regional needs and the development of the public services.

166. In Honduras, United Nations project input in the programming of administrative reform is concerned with the career system, salaries policy and strategies for improving the capacity of the public sector. The approach being pursued is the training of several local technical counterparts and the pilot application and start-up of scheduled administrative reform measures.

167. Similarly, in Guatemala, United Nations project activity is not just restricted to the design of techniques and to training but is also concerned with the supervision of the installation of techniques, together with trainees, by means of pilot schemes. The projects

⁷*Handbook on the Improvement of Administrative Management in Public Administration* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.II.H.3), p. 53.

in Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala are co-ordinated through the Central American Institute of Public Administration (ICAP), located in Costa Rica.

168. In Argentina, the National System of Administrative Reform (SNRA), instituted in 1977, is being assisted by United Nations project activity located at the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP), which serves as the secretariat to SNRA. Output includes the formation of a team of 50 instructors and 10 experts in the preparation of case materials and co-operation in the analysis, evolution and co-ordination of the research plan of INAP. Project activity also covers the monitoring of implementation, supervision of investigators and devising a system of administrative indicators and an information system for the application of the results of the investigation.

169. A contrasting case in terms of self-reliance is that of the Brazilian 1967-1969 reforms, which were planned and executed by three national agencies with local technical assistance from the Getulio Vargas Foundation and financial assistance from the National Bank for Economic Development. The reforms were focused on the decentralization and rationalization of procedures. It is interesting to note that the Brazilian Government has recently taken a strong interest in participating in projects in public administration with other countries in the region by means of technical co-operation among developing countries.

TECHNOLOGY, FINANCE AND PHYSICAL INPUT

170. Administrative reform as innovation requires the mobilization and introduction of new technology,

resources and physical input. The type of technology may be as complex as a computer, or as simple as management by objectives, an organizational guide or an operations room. Installation of a communications system, such as a radio, telex machine or even a beeper, is another type of technology to speed up communications. A management information system is far more sophisticated and useful than simple records filing. The system provides easily accessible and organized data on the organization and its programmes. It is a fast and reliable source of the information required for decision-making. Another type of technology is the use of microfilm or microfiche for the reproduction, storage and retrieval of information. A word processor is another type of technology that speeds up paperwork and the typing of communications and documents. The reform agency should have this technology and equipment at its disposal. Finance is certainly essential to the acquisition of the technology and other physical input. Adequate office space in a central location is a physical requirement of the reform agency.

171. As the examples indicate, technology may be not only in the form of machine or hardware. Other types of technology that could be introduced are new management or personnel processes, such as programme budgeting, economic and policy analysis, organization and development and sensitivity training. It is maintained that the introduction of the technology and technical innovations may not always lead to the desired improvement in work output. A new building, a computer system or expensive office and laboratory equipment may be only a façade for the persistent inefficiency, lack of productivity, low morale or other management problems in the bureaucracy.

V. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING FOR PLANNING THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM STRATEGIES AND FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATING RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

172. The first informational requirement of any effective formulation of a strategy and policies for administrative reform is an appropriate data base, which may include the collection of data on items such as human resources (the size and composition of establishments and general manpower data); structures (organizational charts, functions etc); processes (decision-making, planning and resource allocation); and techniques.

173. Second, in monitoring and evaluating the results and impact of the policies implemented, appropriate techniques and methodologies are also needed to systematize and apply the information collected. This raises questions of the criteria of evaluation and the impact indicators.

174. The final requirement of data collection and processing for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of the impact of reform measures is to provide a suitable institutional and organizational framework and to ensure the effective handling and feedback of data at the various points.

175. Regarding machinery for handling data, choices and issues include those between permanent machinery as opposed to the delegation of monitoring and follow-up to ministry O and M units etc., and the case for the involvement of users, the public and policy-making levels.

DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING FOR PLANNING REFORM STRATEGIES

176. An information system is the core instrument of diagnosis for administrative reform. The design and establishment of any information system to serve as the base for planning, monitoring and evaluating the results and impact of reforms has to be considered at three levels:

- (a) The level of information required;
- (b) The area of information required;
- (c) The choice of indicators for inclusion in the data base.

Information and organizational level

177. At one level are the large-scale administrative reforms, usually promoted by technical units of the Presidency, planning boards or institutes of public administration. At another level are the sectoral reforms that are usually handled by the ministries that

have functional jurisdiction over the respective sector or by the sectoral units of the national reform organization. The needs of collecting, processing and using information vary at each of these institutional levels. Hence, there are enormous difficulties involved in large-scale administrative reforms because the information requirements are generally far larger than the possibilities of design and processing. Whatever the level, it is important to restrict the volume of the information collected to manageable proportions.

Area of information

178. In terms of specific areas of information, the following represent the range of problems of organizations, particularly the nature of problems detected (technology, culture and environment), the type of relations involved (hierarchical, functional and budgetary), or the perspective of the reform planner or implementer (executive, reform unit, consultancy firm or self-evaluating institution):

- (a) *Norms.* Goals, policies, programmes, procedures and sanctions;
- (b) *Resources.* Human, financial, material and technological;
- (c) *Structures.* Differentiation, functional specialization, interdependence, authority, co-ordination, information and communication, evaluation and control;
- (d) *Behaviour.* Identification, motivation, action-orientation, leadership and morality conflict;
- (e) *Productivity.* Efficiency, effectiveness, impact and consequences.

179. It is essential to ensure a balanced coverage in data collection between areas and sectors as well as levels and to maintain a cross-sectoral flow at all levels.

Indicators

180. Against this background, it is possible to categorize the available types of indicators of administrative performance and their potential uses.

181. In a generally ascending hierarchy of scale and impact, the following are distinguishable:

- (a) Input indicators, reflecting the volume of properties of the resources that are made available to the organization or programme;
- (b) Activity indicators, measuring what is actually done by the members of the organization; these activities may be auxiliary (e.g., the number of motor

vehicles maintained in operating condition) or more directly instrumental (e.g., the number of clients interviewed);

(c) Output or impact indicators representing what the organization produces and contributes to its external environment;

(d) Input-output or efficiency indicators, the cost per unit of output per unit of costs;

(e) Cost-effectiveness indicators, the effectiveness of output in performance terms per unit of input or cost;

(f) Societal impact indicators, of which there are two classes:

(i) Direct—what the organization's output accomplishes in its environment;

(ii) Indirect or second order—the effects of the programme of activities or the organization on such macro-societal values as equity, growth, security, participation, or on other values beyond the immediate output of the programme. This would also include clientele activation and response and may be described as outcome;

(g) Administrative capacity indicators, the ability of the organization to mobilize resources, convert them into services and achieve complementarities with its external environment.

DATA COLLECTION FOR PLANNING

182. Possible institutional bases for data collection include: O and M management services of government, economic planning agencies, statistical bureaux, reform commissions, and, as seen in chapter IV, international technical assistance. Possible bases also are consultants and associated public administration research and training institutions—especially in conjunction with reform agencies that do not have their own research capacity or management services in highly specialized areas.

Fact-finding

183. As indicated above in connexion with particular country approaches and experiences, one major method of data collection is by means of interviews. With regard to the analysts who undertake such work, particularly consultants or experts drawn from outside the country or public service, interviews and visits require planned arrangement.

184. In terms of coverage, interviews should be held not only with staff of the governmental body under review but also with its clientele. The view of the public, as beneficiaries of government services, is especially crucial to ascertain. Where analysts are recruited from overseas, their work in such an area would require a careful approach.

185. Flow-charts have at times been considered as particularly important in organizational analysis of the kind required for administrative reform. At the same

time, the informational needs of effective charting can be great. A prevalent shortcoming in this respect is to rely on formal procedural descriptions rather than to probe beyond these to determine actual behaviour and performance. The latter can only be attained by interviews and consultation of other sources, such as phone logs, minutes of relevant meetings and files. These can indicate the actual components of a process and those who are, in practice, responsible for them. When carried out in this way, investigation often shows a number of intervening steps that are not indicated in the formal procedures. Significantly, these are often the ones closely connected with levels of cost-effectiveness, accountability and productivity. Another aspect to which special attention should be paid, where possible, is the time taken between steps. The time elapsed may give indications of possible delays and other operating problems.

186. In carrying out a programme of data collection, practicability requires that utmost care be taken in deciding on the exact data required. This avoids the cumbersome task of having to conduct additional research in order to complete missing items. However, arrangements are sometimes provided for supplementary data collection. Also, the fact that information is absent in an organization is in itself an interesting symptom of malaise.

187. The balanced coverage of data is another requirement that is often difficult to achieve. Most of the data collected for organizational evaluation are rarely sufficiently voluminous to merit the application of quantitative techniques. Nevertheless, the need for balanced coverage applies equally to smaller quantities of data. It is seldom feasible, for example, to anticipate the extent to which flow-charts will be required in a given case. At the same time, it is necessary to try to balance the inclusion of examples of both positive and negative performances in a given sample. For instance, citing a single case of procrastination by a central personnel agency may be very confusing if, in the majority of cases, the major delays in personnel management do not take place in the personnel agency but in the departments of origin. Although it is possible to point out sampling biases when presenting findings, top policy-makers in government departments may be equally aware of the limited representative nature of the examples cited in the recommendations. Misperceptions may result and even redundant reforms may be authorized.

188. At least one other problem of data-gathering should be mentioned. For a variety of reasons, only one segment of a process is generally examined. To the extent permitted by the project's scope and funding, however, the totality of a process should be examined, from the planning phase through each phase of execution. The advantages of this practice are far greater than might be readily apparent.

189. For example, if a study were undertaken in response to a number of complaints that a five-person unit in a field office was lagging badly in its work of

processing applications from small farmers for assistance in the use of a new high-yield type of fertilizer, a limited study concentrated on the operation of the five people may well be useful in discovering opportunities for improvement. By means of such measures as performance standards, better work flow and simplified forms, the processing time in the unit might be decreased by 20 per cent, a result that would seem to justify the review. However, a far more comprehensive review of the total beginning-to-end process, covering whatever occurred in that operational cycle outside the five-person unit, as well as in it, may reveal additional information of great relevance. Perhaps the field office of which this unit is a small part has certain procedures that require the clearance of individual applications by other elements of the office. A study might prove this requirement to be as time-consuming as the processing in the operational unit but seldom resulting in a significant change in the acceptance or rejection of the applications. A study of the whole process might also reveal the fact that the basic headquarters policy of requiring a financial investigation of individual farmers could be waived in the event of proof of farm ownership by a signed lease, thus eliminating 30 per cent of the total processing time for most applications.

190. A comparison of the two studies would show that the limited study of the five-person unit saved 20 per cent of the processing time, but since only half of the processing occurred in that unit, only 10 per cent of the total processing time was saved. The comprehensive study of the whole process, on the other hand, saved not only this 10 per cent but another 10 per cent in the additional processing that takes place elsewhere in the field office and a further 30 per cent by changing the headquarters policy. Thus, the broad study saved 50 per cent in the time required to process applications rather than the 10 per cent gained from the limited study. A similar increase in savings may also result from a comprehensive study of the forms required from the farmers and of the staffing requirements and overall cost of the operation. The limited study at first glance may have appeared worthwhile (particularly since it would have saved 20 per cent of the processing time) but the results would have been invisible to the public. The 50 per cent savings from the comprehensive study would have been visible to the public, the major cut in red tape further welcomed by the farmers, and the reduction in workload of considerable help to the internal budget of the processing unit.

Approaches to analysis

191. For obvious reasons, analysts should be permitted to rely primarily on their own methodologies in the analysis of data and development of recommendations. Yet, frequently, certain approaches are so keyed to the objectives of the users that they will want to develop, with the analyst, ways to reflect them in the project. The following discussion is intended only to illustrate the type of approach to methodology that may warrant the involvement of the user.

Vantage point of the public

192. The principle vantage point from which the analyst approaches his work is extremely important. In the review of any operation, for example, a user may want to be sure that the activity is looked at just as closely from the vantage point of the outside recipient of services as from the standpoint of agency management. Among other things, this requires considerable first-hand contact with the recipients. Existing data regarding public attitudes can be useful, but they generally result from a poll or a series of interviews taken for other purposes. Therefore, the questions may not only have failed to elicit answers meaningful for the study, but they may have provided information that becomes quite misleading when it is transposed to a different field of inquiry. Therefore, during the negotiations, the user should ensure that there is time and effort specified in the final agreement that provides for adequate information-gathering from other governmental units, from the private sector or from any element of the public affected by the organization or the process under study. After all, it is the recipients of government services who constitute the rationale for the existence of the programme and the staff administering the programme. Further, there are times when the public perspective is better than that of persons in the bureaucracy.

193. To illustrate this point, we will return to hypothetical example of fertilizer for the farmer. It is assumed that an average of 10 people are involved in varying degrees in the processing of each application. It is also assumed that an average time of three working days is required by each of these 10 people to complete their share of the process, since the programme requires the gathering and review of a considerable amount of data and the use of discretionary judgement in the approval of applications. If the typical public servant involved in this activity were asked whether he or she thought the process was efficient or whether it was slow and non-responsive to the farmer's needs, this person would be most likely to answer largely within the context of his or her own share of the time sequence—that is, the time elapsing in moving the application from the in-box to the out-box—and probably would respond that the process was not perfect but was reasonably fast-moving, particularly since many applications were being processed simultaneously. The farmer might respond quite differently. His view would not be given from the perspective of the time elapsing from one person's in-box to that person's out-box, but from the perspective of the cumulative time that elapsed from the mailing of his application until the receipt of a decision—or 30 working days plus the time it takes to make two trips to deliver the application and obtain the subsequent response, roughly six weeks. The farmer's six-week perception contrasts sharply with the employee's three-day perception, but it is the more meaningful of the two; it illustrates why the public image of government bureaucracy is so frequently negative.

194. Similarly, the head of the field unit discussed

above is concerned with the total time it takes the personnel unit of the parent organization to enable him to have a new fertilizer expert on board from the day he first advised them of the need to fill the position. He is not much interested as to why the system is complex or what the complexities are. He wants results from the service units measured in terms that he can see, such as the time and cost to him and the quality of the goods or services he receives.

195. It is this broader perception that needs to be captured by the analyst if the study is to focus on worthwhile changes which are likely to have some visibility to those not immediately involved in the activity to be studied. Considerable time is spent in discussion of this point because it is important in a managerial sense and because it represents a philosophy of responding to public needs that is often stated but not really thought through. It also tends to be put forth as a self-evident statement of intent in management projects without being given enough follow-through. In part, it may be because as the work progresses the analyst does not sense that basic problems are very important to the user who may be preoccupied with smaller difficulties that have greater visibility. The user should weave concern for the activity's effectiveness from the standpoint of the recipient into the request for proposals and the discussions throughout the study.

Efficiency as opposed to effectiveness

196. The oral and written language of a Government's reform strategy will often place considerable emphasis on efficiency, such as the reduction of staffing requirements and the increase of productivity. In so doing, policy objectives may unwittingly slant the thrust of the study in a direction that is quite different from that intended unless the phraseology is balanced by other references that emphasize the quality of service and other elements of performance that are better characterized as programme effectiveness than programme efficiency.

197. Referring back to the illustration of fertilizer assistance, without too much exaggeration one could conceive of a drastic streamlining of the application processing in which applications were simply turned down if they were not completed correctly or if they were not accompanied by the proper financial data. There are no explanations given to the farmer other than the enigmatic "insufficient financial information" and no personal discussions with the applicant in order to counsel him on how to prepare the application. This would mean savings in time and agency workload, perhaps a further 25 per cent. Employee productivity would also increase.

198. On the other hand, this more efficient approach may also result in 25 to 50 per cent of the qualified applicants in greatest need of the fertilizer assistance failing to receive the benefits offered by the programme. This might well be the very opposite of the set of values the user would want to see applied. If the user places great value on reaching farmers who need

assistance but who are not accustomed to filling out forms, the tone and language of the user should reflect this emphasis in both the oral and written communications.

Techniques for systematizing and applying information

199. Based on the Latin American experience, the following are the most frequently used collection, processing and retrieval techniques in relation to the kinds of areas of information mentioned above:

- (a) An inventory or census of personnel and human resources;
- (b) A profile of intergovernmental relations (organizational charts, structures and functions);
- (c) Attitude surveys;
- (d) Reports on activities;
- (e) An analysis of budgetary executions;
- (f) Special studies, such as those of the salary and compensation system, decision-making, intersectoral mobility and turnover of personnel and organization of the parastatal sector.

200. Other modern information systems, such as the program evaluation and review technique (PERT), MBO, social indicators (SI) and PPBS, have been less favourably assessed as instruments for analysing data pertinent to administrative reform. For example, PPBS requires information beyond most human capacities to collect and analyse, even with the assistance of automatic data processing.

Recommendations

201. Reform programmes usually call for the analyst to provide a preliminary or draft report to the user prior to the conclusion of the project and the submission of the final report. This report must be reviewed promptly and carefully. It is the last stage at which misunderstandings regarding the expected final product can be worked out. The report should include a digest of the data gathered, an analysis of these data, the alternative courses of action considered and at least the preliminary conclusions and recommendations.

202. Occasionally reform policy-makers may be chagrined—and considerably surprised—to find, upon reading the draft, that the analyst is going to produce a report that has somehow strayed from the principal objectives and has attempted to solve the wrong problem. Because it is generally far too late at this stage to refocus the whole project, one can readily see the importance of the earlier suggestions for ensuring that the analyst has an understanding of the user's environment, needs and objectives, for making a clear statement of the project's scope and for providing for continuous communication during the study. If these steps are taken, it is almost impossible to reach the draft report stage with major differences between the policy-maker's and analyst's perceptions of the nature of the report.

203. It well may be, however, that even though the subject area of the report is on target, the substance of the draft recommendations is very different from what the Government expected, and perhaps far more controversial. A competent analyst, given time to understand the political environment of the user, will be sensitive to that environment and will strive to develop the findings and recommendations in a way that will minimize the controversy resulting from the report but will stop short of a compromising professional judgement regarding important actions that must be taken to achieve the Government's goals. Further, there are occasions on which some particularly sensitive matters, such as conclusions regarding individual employees, are best handled orally.

204. In any event, the draft report provides the Government with an opportunity to advise the analyst of problems created by the proposed recommendations of which he may not have been aware, thus providing him with an opportunity to adjust the report in ways that will not require him to compromise his professional integrity and yet will considerably ease the problems for the Government which result from the final report.

205. The preliminary report should be circulated for the verification of the factual data and for reactions to the alternatives and recommendations. These reactions can be most helpful to the analyst in refining the final set of recommendations, provided the analyst's modifications are based on his best professional judgement and are not an attempt to tell the Government what it wants to hear. The circulation of the draft report also provides another means of giving government personnel a sense of involvement in the project. In some circumstances, the sensitivity of the recommendations may limit the circulation of the draft recommendations but the factual portion of the report should be circulated for comment if at all possible. How widely it is circulated will vary according to circumstances.

206. Most important, the draft report affords the opportunity to the analyst to sharpen his thinking and to correct misconceptions. This requires a full and timely response on the part of those to whom the report is given for reaction. The draft report provides the Government with the information it needs to begin analysing the recommendations in advance of their formal submission, thus saving time and permitting more meaningful discussions with the consultant when the final report is received. The preliminary report also permits advance planning for the implementation of the recommendations most likely to be approved.

Final report

207. Considerable advance thought needs to be given to how people learn about the contents of the final report. If it is not to be published or circulated, what is the rationale for keeping it confidential and how is this to be explained to employees and the public? If it is not to be treated confidentially, is it to be published, or merely circulated to those most affected by the report?

208. Not infrequently, an operation already under heavy criticism can profit by having it stated that in view of this concern the organization has taken the initiative of examining the problem and is aggressively determining the true nature of the problem in order to take corrective action. In this situation, therefore, there is particular value in government departments having worked closely enough with the reform agency analyst, especially at the preliminary report stage, to enable the Government to announce one or two of the planned corrective measures at the time that the report is released. Clearly, many of the measures will require far more analysis and implementation planning than will exist when the report is released, and in some circumstances the user may want to see the reaction to the recommendations before determining a number of the measures. The decision concerning the release or circulation of the final report has to be tailored to individual circumstances.

IMPLEMENTATION: MONITORING AND EVALUATING RESULTS

209. Implementation rarely takes place as quickly or as easily as desired. Frequently, it never occurs. Somehow, there are always unexpected problems and unforeseen delays, yet most of these difficulties can be handled without substantial consequences if the implementation is carefully planned, with the time-tables thought through, the responsibilities clearly assigned and a clear designation of leadership for overall implementation. Such an action plan will need to provide for necessary controls on the costs, staffing and any contracting that might be required, particularly if the project is large. Whatever role the reform agency is to play during this phase needs to be clearly understood by all, particularly where it involves the monitoring and evaluation of feedback and results.

210. Obviously this systematic and logical approach makes sense only to the extent that the Government has made clear decisions regarding what steps are to take place as a result of the reform agencies' work. Unused management studies collecting dust on the bookshelf represent some of the modern lore of public administration and are often pointed to by critics of outside management consultants.

211. Generally, the Government should make decisions on the recommendations of the study with all deliberate speed, since the longer the report has been issued without the resultant course of action being set, the greater the uncertainty and the apprehension on the part of employees, the more unsettling rumors will circulate and the more opposition will be generated. Also, the longer the delay, the more difficult it is to regain managerial attention and the organizational resources needed to mount effective implementation. It is by means of involvement in the process of translating the general wording of recommendations into the precise wording of action documents that true understand-

ing and teamwork develop. It is in this way that ideas are tested and illuminating questions and comments are stimulated.

212. Within the limits of practicability, the more understanding that is developed, the more government personnel will come to feel that the programme is partly theirs and something that they had a share in shaping. This sense of sharing in the new programme is also greatly increased by the process mentioned earlier of involving user personnel during the course of the study, particularly if the consultant is foreign. In addition to substantially increasing supervisor and employee support, this approach makes for far smoother implementation. Each proposed step is tested against the experience of pragmatic practitioners who tend to have a healthy skepticism; of course, care has to be taken that this is not permitted to develop into unintentional dilution or change in the direction of the recommended programme.

Reform agency involvement in implementation

213. Criticism is commonly directed towards *ad hoc* reform commissions that are disbanded as soon as the report is turned in. The Government then must struggle to understand the report and either move forward with a misconceived jumble of ideas or give up in great frustration, determined never to rely again on such a review. Increasing attention has been given to the role that should be played by the reform agency

during implementation. Minimally, it is essential that at least one member of the reform agency who has the perspective of the whole project should remain for a substantial portion of the implementation. This additional work needs to have been provided for institutionally. Ideally, reform agencies should establish a permanent machinery both to direct and supervise implementation and to provide technical advice. Alternatively, this could be provided by decentralized O and M units in each ministry, particularly if they have worked closely with the reform agency. Reform agency experts can review in depth the information gathered by their analysts and explain the logic that led to the conclusions drawn and to the recommendations. The representative of the reform agency is in an excellent position to advise as to how literally to interpret the wording in the recommendations and where flexibility in carrying them out is desirable. He knows the interrelationship of the various recommendations and how their cohesiveness can be lost in their modification or only partial implementation. Frequently, he will provide a technical capability which is directly focused on the essence of the report and is not possessed by the user. He may also have useful impressions of the government staffing weaknesses that will limit the capacity of the user to carry out the report recommendations.

214. The foregoing points are only a sample of the many ways in which the continual monitoring role of a reform agency during implementation can be of great help and, indeed, be virtually indispensable.

VI. CREATING AND ENHANCING CAPABILITIES: CONSTRAINTS AND CRITICAL FACTORS

215. The focus of the present monograph has been the modalities and problems of enhancing capabilities for administrative reform. Capabilities have been defined in this context as the combination of organization, skills, resources, leadership and supports required for specific administrative reform projects and programmes. The previous chapters, which dealt with various aspects of administrative reform capabilities, identified the constraints and difficulties inherent in developing new capabilities, the criteria for assessing existing capabilities and guide-lines for enhancing administrative reform capacities. The present chapter highlights and further elaborates some of the key constraints and critical variables.

THE SALIENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

216. Administrative capacities are developed to cope with the State's basic production and service functions which in turn reflect the needs and interests of social and economic groups. The establishment, enhancement or reduction of capacities in the administrative system also depends on the political priorities and challenges that face the State at one particular time. It has been observed that, for various reasons, the need to establish or enhance capabilities for administrative reform does not always receive high priority among national decision-makers. A review of the literature evaluating the development plans of many developing countries will indicate the inadequacy of the attention often given to the administrative requirements of development plans and their implementation at the early stages. The tendency to entrust the existing administrative system with expanded activities, without making any major changes, is common in many newly independent countries. This tendency partly reflects the inherent limitations of a system in detecting its own weaknesses as well as a lack of appreciation by senior officials of the complexities of planning and implementing development activities.

217. It is also necessary to note that the pressure groups for reform within the administrative system are usually less vocal than those for other goals. The latter are often well organized, articulate and persistent. Producer and user demands for a better water supply, higher prices for farm products and better transport facilities are highly visible, command wide interest and public support and have political influence. It is difficult to find any commensurate internal pressures for admin-

istrative reform in developing countries. In addition, these countries are faced with constant challenges and crises and their administrative systems are under heavy pressure to get things done. Administrative reform is a time-consuming exercise and its benefits may not be immediately visible. Even the senior policy-makers who realize the need for substantial administrative reform may find that the necessary time and support for such activities is unavailable in view of the competing day-to-day demands on public administration.

218. Another constraint on the development of administrative reform capacities is the confusion in many administrative systems between reform, management development and management services. This has affected the handling of problems in such areas as:

- (a) The systematization of the entire structure of the public service;
- (b) The establishment of viable and effective organizations;
- (c) The allocation of adequate financial and human resources;
- (d) Training and staff development;
- (e) The co-ordination of governmental operations.

Over the years, the approach taken by most governments has been to use *ad hoc* commissions, committees, working parties and other special bodies to study and propose solutions to the problems. On realizing the ineffectiveness of such an *ad hoc* approach, many governments have subsequently created central institutions (e.g., organization and management agencies) charged with the exclusive responsibility for management improvement. In some cases, the O and M agencies have recently been expanded into administrative management departments.

219. The performance of these agencies in improving the organization and management of various public administration and finance systems has been mixed. The objectives and the nature of management services varies from country to country. In several countries, O and M units started with limited functions, such as the analysis of organization, procedures and methods of work, which were expanded over the years to include other activities, such as personnel management, training and administrative reform. The agencies dealing with these broadened activities were usually reconstituted as administrative management departments or administrative reform departments. However, confusion between administrative reform and management

services still persists in many countries and some clarification as to the respective roles of each is necessary in the development of the necessary capacity for administrative reform.

THE ORGANIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ITS LOCATION

220. The selection of an appropriate organization and its location in the machinery of government is very crucial. In some countries, the reform agency has been established as an independent ministry, while in others it has been organized as a unit in the personnel or finance ministry or in the secretariat of the President or Prime Minister. The reform agency may be headed in some cases by the President, the Prime Minister or one particular minister. The important considerations in selecting the type of organization for administrative reform and its location are flexibility, organizational strength, the jurisdiction that the agency will command, the kind of constraints it will have and the extent of attention it is likely to receive from the political head of the institution in which it is located. Usually, the location of the reform agency in the Office of the President or Prime Minister is preferred. If the President or Prime Minister cannot spare the necessary time and leadership for the reform activities, the full power and authority of his Office will not be brought to bear. In such cases, the location of the reform agency in a central service ministry whose political head can spare more time may be preferable.

PERSONNEL OF THE REFORM AGENCY

221. Many reform agencies have not been effective because they lack the right type of personnel. Reform agencies require personnel with experience and specialized skills in various broad categories of governmental activities such as regulation, protection, extraction, social services, public utilities and development. The personnel of the administrative reform agency must have the capacity to grasp and analyse complex administrative problems and issues and to develop appropriate solutions while keeping an eye on feasibility and possible sources of resistance at the implementation stage. Hence, the reform agency needs not only competent professional staff but its senior leaders should have a sound grasp of, and a sensibility to, the various institutional and social forces that operate in the administrative system and its environment.

SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE ISSUES AND FOCUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

222. The development of the capacity for administrative reform has to be achieved in the context of the particular problems and inadequacies in the administrative system. The selection of the problems or issues to be tackled is crucial as it will determine the extent and

quality of capacity. Several aspects of the interrelationship between the agenda of and the capacity for reform can be identified.

223. The issues and problems identified for administrative reform tend to be multi-dimensional in that many impinge on political and economic as well as administrative matters. Where administrative reform efforts are preoccupied with issues that are essentially non-administrative in nature, it is sometimes a way of handling problematic political and economic questions. Nevertheless, for administrative reform efforts to be effective, it is necessary to select issues and problems for reform that are essentially administrative as well as manageable in terms of their scope and objectives.

224. This aspect requires further elaboration as it is vitally related to the establishment and strengthening of the capacity for reform. The development of capacity should be a gradual process. Effective and credible capacity can only be developed by careful planning, formulation and implementation of relevant administrative reforms over a period of years. There are advantages and disadvantages in attempting large-scale areal or sectoral reforms. When large-scale reform efforts are impeded at the levels of formulation and implementation, it does more harm than good to the process of developing capabilities for reform. On the other hand, the successful formulation and implementation of administrative reform measures for a specific programme by a particular ministry may possibly earn credibility and legitimacy for the reform agency or unit as well as its personnel.

INTERRELATIONSHIP OF REFORM ISSUES WITH SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES AND STAGES OF REFORM

225. Once the focal issues and problems of administrative reform efforts have been identified, it is necessary to examine their various dimensions in order to determine which components of capacity need to be emphasized, and at what stages, to carry out a successful reform. It is unlikely that all of the components of capacity for reform (i.e., organization, skill, resources, leadership and support) will be available in sufficient quantities in any country. It is equally unlikely that all these components may be needed in equal proportions for a given reform effort. The identification of the components of capacity and the stages of reform that need to be emphasized can be partially determined from an initial assessment of the reform issues and problems. Questions that should be raised about these problems and issues in the initial assessment should include, *inter alia*, the following:

(a) Have the problem or issue and its dimensions been clearly identified and agreed to by key groups? If the issue or problem is complex and all of its various facets have not yet been identified and agreed to, action needs to be taken to achieve this objective (e.g., the organization and skills components need to be emphasized);

(b) Is there sufficient concern and support for doing something about these issues or problems on the part of key groups? If there is not sufficient concern and support, reform efforts should include activities to promote them (e.g., the support and leadership components may be emphasized);

(c) The questions raised in (a) and (b) with respect to problems or issues can also be raised with respect to solutions. There may be cases where solutions for specific reform problems are clearly identified but sufficient resources are not available for their implementation. In this case, the reform efforts may emphasize increased and continuing support for the solutions that have already been devised rather than embark on additional ones;

(d) Again, there may be cases where solutions have not yet been clearly identified or, if identified, the extent to which they have support in the system is unknown. Efforts may be necessary to identify solutions and to explore which are more practicable for implementation.

INTERACTION WITH AGENCIES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

226. Strong political support is necessary for administrative reform efforts to be successful. However, political support alone cannot offset any significant deficiency in the capacity to undertake reforms. The kinds of skills needed in a reform agency have been discussed in the preceding sections. The personnel and leadership in the reform agency should have something more than the technical capacity to do the job well. They must have the right attitude and disposition to serve and assist other government agencies and programmes in their improvement. It is also necessary that the reform agency have the capacity to analyse, inter-

pret and communicate administrative issues and problems in a simple way that is comprehensible and meaningful to various relevant groups in the society. The ability to assist and collaborate with other agencies in the administrative system and the capacity to communicate complex administrative issues and problems is necessary in the process of developing an effective and sustained capacity for administrative reform.

227. Mention has been made in several sections above of the potential of external teaching and research agencies in the field of public administration in developing the capacity for reform in the administrative system. As society becomes more and more complex, the activities of government agencies and institutions become more specialized. Hence, the planning and implementation of any major programme depends on the collaboration and co-ordination of several agencies. In the field of administrative reform, it is necessary to realize the difficulty in developing the optimal capacity for all kinds and levels of reform in the administrative system. It will be useful to encourage public administration research and training institutions to explore how they can, along with management and administrative counselling agencies, participate in the development of overall capacity for administrative reform. The divisions that currently exist in many developing countries between practice on the one hand, and teaching and research on the other, are not productive for the overall improvement of the administrative system. The sooner these divisions are reduced by meaningful interaction, the better it will be for the enhanced understanding, appreciation and effectiveness of the administrative system. One way of encouraging this interaction is to develop external research, teaching and consulting agencies in the field of public administration and to increase their involvement in the process of administrative reform.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS SINCE 1947

- With special reference to reforms in the eighties

On Independence, India inherited an administrative system fashioned by the colonial British Government to suit their needs. Independent India had an inevitable desire to shift the emphasis of administration to subserve the requirements of a welfare state. This necessarily involved a major reorganisation. Accordingly, a committee known as the Secretariat Reorganisation Committee headed by Girija Shankar Bajpai was set up by the Government of India in 1947 to inquire into the question of personnel shortages, better utilisation of the available manpower and improvement of methods of work in the Central Secretariat.

This was followed by a comprehensive review of the working of the machinery of the Central Government in general undertaken towards the end of 1949 by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (Report on Reorganisation of the Machinery of Government, 1949). In July 1951 A.D. Gorwala, an eminent planner, was asked to assess how far the existing administrative machinery and methods were adequate to meet the requirements of planned development (Report on Public Administration, 1951). Two subsequent reports which had a significant impact on the thinking on administrative reforms were Paul H. Appleby's first report (Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey, 1953) which dealt with changes in basic principles and concepts including administrative reorganisation and practices and his second report (Re-examination of India's Administrative System, with special reference to Administration of Government's Industrial and

Commercial Enterprises, 1956), which contained several suggestions for streamlining organisation, work procedures, recruitment, training and relations between the administration and the Comptroller and Auditor General.

The Appleby report of 1953 had emphasised the need for the establishment of a central office charged with the responsibility of giving both extensive and intensive leadership in respect of structures, management and procedures. One of the outcomes of the report was that an O&M Division was set up in 1954 in the Cabinet Secretariat, supported by O&M units in the various ministries. This Division concentrated on improving the working of the Central Secretariat. The thrust was by and large directed towards effecting improvement in paper management through manualisation and a system of inspections. Among its more important achievements was the bringing out of a manual of office procedure for all Ministries. However, its ambit of activity remained limited.

Setting up of Department of Administrative Reforms

In 1963, a mid-term appraisal of the Third Plan showed that although significant progress had been made in a number of directions, the pace of economic growth was slow. It became apparent that administrative deficiencies had something to do with the shortfall in achievement. Central ministries and State Governments were, therefore, called upon to raise the level of administrative efficiency and strengthen the implementation of development programmes. It was in this background that the machinery for administrative reforms came to be reviewed. The

first outcome of this review was the setting up of a Department of Administrative Reforms within the Ministry of Home Affairs in March, 1964. The O&M Division was transferred to its charge from the Cabinet Secretariat. The intention was that the Department would be the Government's standing machinery for administrative reforms. It was expected to raise the level of the reform process from mere O&M operations to something more likely to yield positive results.

Administrative Reforms Commission

As piecemeal efforts aimed at reforms proved inadequate to meet the new challenges thrown up by developmental activities, it was felt necessary to explore the basic and significant sectors to adopt a coordinated approach to the administrative requirements. Accordingly, the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) was set up in January, 1966. The terms of reference of ARC were perhaps the widest ever entrusted to any commission and covered the entire gamut of public administration at the centre as well as in the states. The ARC was asked to give consideration to the need for ensuring the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in public services, for making public administration a fit instrument for carrying out the social and economic goals of development and also for making administration responsive to the people. Before winding up of the Commission in 1970, it had submitted 20 reports containing 537 recommendations. These recommendations initiated a series of changes, big and small, in all important sectors of administration. Equally important, these stimulated further thinking on a variety of administrative problems and that has naturally led to newer and

more radical reforms.

Reforms during Seventies

The decade of 1970-80 witnessed enormous changes in the administrative structure, systems and procedures, partly as a result of implementation of ARC's recommendations and partly due to the efforts of the Central reforms agency. Some of the more important reforms effected during this period on the recommendations of the ARC were:

- a central personnel agency, viz., the Department of Personnel, was set up;
- the role of the Department of Administrative Reforms was redefined and its structure streamlined;
- new systems of secretariat working including the desk officer system, were introduced;
- performance budgeting was adopted by all developmental ministries; and
- a new principle in delegating financial and administrative powers was adopted, viz., that the powers to be delegated should be the maximum possible rather than the minimum necessary.

Role and functions of Reforms Agency

Based on the recommendations of ARC, the following functions came to be assigned to the Department of Administrative Reforms:

- i) Advising the Central Government on policy matters concerning administrative reforms;

- ii) Providing management consultancy services to the organisations of the Central Government, State Governments, public sector and local bodies and promoting modern management practices in these organisations;
- iii) Promotion and development of the management services efforts in ministries/departments; and
- iv) Imparting management education and disseminating information on administrative practices and modern management techniques.

Management studies occupied an important place in the scheme of administrative reforms. A number of reform measures were introduced as a result of the studies carried out by the Department of Administrative Reforms. Specific areas of management covered in the study reports included:

- organisational structure and relationship
- methods and procedures
- financial administration
- information systems
- records management
- use of modern office machines and equipment
- citizen satisfaction
- employee satisfaction

These have brought about substantial improvement in the working of the offices and helped to increase the level of citizen and employee satisfaction. Some of the measures introduced as a result of the studies were:

- Integration of internal and associate finance in

Ministries into a single Integrated Financial Adviser;

- Departmentalisation of accounts;
- Payment of pension through nationalised banks;
Discontinuation of pay-slips for officers by the Accountant General and drawal of pay and allowances of gazetted officers in the establishment bill form by the head of office as for other non-gazetted staff;
- Last pay drawn to be allowed as leave salary for all categories of employees;
- collection of road tax through post offices;
- Payment of government dues in cash across the departmental counters;
- Collection of electricity/water charges by Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking and New Delhi Municipal Committee through branches of nationalised banks;
- Evolving a revised schedule of retention periods for records common to all ministries; and
- Introduction of the functional filing system which is based on a logical grouping of functions, activities and operations.

Another important reform that was effected was setting up of a Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms at the State level.

REFORMS IN THE EIGHTIES

In the 1980s, particularly since 1985, substantial reforms have been brought about in the administrative system. A ful-fledged Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions was set up in March, 1985 with three departments, viz., Department of Personnel and Training, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances and Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare. A major highlight of this arrangement was that the Ministry was placed under the overall charge of the Prime Minister assisted by a Minister of State. Secondly, the subject of public grievances was added to Administrative Reforms. This alignment was effected under the rationale that it would provide a closer and integrated view of the inadequacies of the administrative system that give rise of grievances, on the one hand, and how the administrative machinery could be made adaptive to the changing requirements, on the other. Thirdly, a separate department was created to handle the subject of pension and pensioners' welfare.

Greater emphasis was placed on the creation of a new work culture where performance and result orientation was given the highest priority. The importance of this approach was reflected notably in the Prime Minister's address to the nation on January 5, 1985 when he announced a package of measures to make administration a fit instrument for social and economic transformation. These measures included;

- decentralisation of decision making process;
- enforcement of accountability;

- simplification of rules and procedures;
- prompt and courteous service to the citizens;
- setting up of effective machinery for redress of public grievances.

Some of the major activities/achievements in the sphere of administrative reforms in the recent past are briefly given below:-

(i) Twenty-Point Programme

Following Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation on January 5, 1985 a series of steps were initiated to bring about greater efficiency and effectiveness in the functioning of Government and to make administration much more responsive, accountable and result-oriented. The will towards sustained action in the above direction was further reiterated in the form of Point-20 of Twenty Point Programme-1986 which delineated the basic ingredients of the strategy to bring forth more responsive administration, namely simplification of procedures, delegation of authority, enforcement of accountability and more effective redress of public grievances. It has been enjoined upon all ministries to ensure that the administrative ingredients are integrated into all their activities including their day-to-day functioning as also implementation of the specific programmes undertaken by them. They have also been asked to prepare Action Plans for implementation of Point No. 20.

(ii) Enforcement of Accountability

The Economic Administration Reforms Commission(EARC) which examined the concept of accountability in all its aspects in their report on 'Accountability' (1983) advocated the need for

moving towards accountability in the positive sense, i.e., to give greater emphasis on performance and achievement of results rather than mere adherence to rules and procedures. The Commission felt that if accountability in its positive sense were to be introduced in Government, certain complementarities in terms of organisational and individual requisites were also required to be brought in, viz., defining goals and objectives of the organisation, evolving a scheme of delegation of powers within the organisation, providing for a mechanism to appraise the performance in terms of achievement with an inbuilt system for reward and punishment, streamlining the process of inter-departmental consultations, evolving an appropriate system for monitoring of performance with deviation correction mechanism, etc. Following the Government's decision to implement various recommendations of the EARC, certain concrete steps were taken to bring about accountability in Government viz., introduction of Action Plan in the Ministries/Departments, fixation of levels for disposal of cases, delegation of powers, streamlining of the procedure for inter-ministrial consultation, etc.

(a) Annual Action Plan

To bring about accountable management in Government, the concept of Management by Objectives(MBO) was introduced in the form of Annual Action Plan in Government Departments. The Annual Action Plan is intended to reflect the manner and time-frame of action in respect of the activities and functions to be performed during the course of the year. A succinct document listing both the tasks to

be performed and the time-frame for each of the tasks is prepared. Once a programme is formulated by a Ministry/Department, it is formally adopted so that the programme gets recognised as something positively to be done rather than merely taking the form of a set of pious intentions. Again, once a programme of action gets recognised, specific tasks are allocated to individuals and units and in this manner it becomes possible to fix responsibilities specifically, both of organisations and individuals. The action points in respect of the activities are indicated in the Action Plan along with critical milestones to be achieved in a particular month. The Action Plan would also mention the key activities/functions.

All the ministries/departments are preparing Annual Action Plan in the form of a calendar of activities identifying tasks and objectives which are broken down into targets, and also individual officers having primary or supervisory responsibility for the tasks, with dates for the completion of the tasks.

Monitoring of the achievement of targets is done every month at the level of the Secretary/Minister of the individual Ministries and the Ministry of Programme Implementation. The progress of achievement of the items indicated as key activities is reviewed by the Prime Minister's Office on a quarterly basis.

b) Fixation of levels of disposal

The levels of examination and consideration in government were legion - in a typical Government Department

the cases were passing through as many as six to eight levels before it eventually reached the Minister. The multiplicity of levels and examination of cases at each level has tended to diffuse responsibility and affect the quality as well as speed of disposal. To circumvent this problem and to further enforce accountability the ministries/departments have been asked to issue orders fixing final levels of disposal of cases of different categories and the channels of their submission. They are also required to review their orders once a year. Fifty-one ministries/departments and their subordinate formations have fixed the levels of disposal and channels for submission of cases.

c) Delegation of powers

Attempts have been made to match responsibility for performance of tasks with authority. With such delegation of authority and responsibility, individuals at all levels know, in specific terms, the responsibility entrusted to them and the authority they possess to discharge that responsibility. The dictum followed is that delegation should be the maximum possible rather than the minimum necessary. The result has been salutary. There has been greater delegation of powers:

- by the Ministry of Finance and other nodal Ministries to administrative ministries;
- by administrative ministries to other lower formations and

- **Intra-departmental delegation of powers.**

Indeed, this work is of a continual nature and pressure is being kept on Ministries to delegate more powers, where necessary.

d) **Inter-ministerial consultation**

Inter-ministerial consultation used to take a long time in being completed, resulting in considerable delay in decision-making. In order to avoid such delays and to achieve speedy and effective decision-making, it has been decided that the following procedure may be evolved in cases requiring inter-ministerial consultation:

Where consultation with or concurrence of other Departments has been prescribed for taking a decision or for submission of a case to the Cabinet or its Committees, a time bound procedure should be adopted i.e., the sponsoring ministry may indicate to the ministries being consulted to forward their views within a stipulated and reasonable time period failing which, it will be presumed that other ministries have no comments to make unless an intention to the contrary has been indicated by the latter.

In cases requiring consultation with other ministries/departments, the machinery of Inter-departmental Committees should be made use of. These Committees should function collectively and the individual members should not normally reserve the position of their respective Ministry or Department. Where, however, individual consultations can serve the purpose it should not be substituted by a Committee discussion.

Cases involving difference of opinion between the Ministry substantially concerned with the subject matter and other Ministries should be referred for a decision to a Committee of Secretaries under the Cabinet Secretary as Chairman within the stipulated time-frame from the date of receipt of an advice or comments from the Ministries consulted.

As far as possible, technical, specialist or appraising agencies should lay down broad guidelines for implementation by other Ministries so as to avoid being involved in giving a case by case clearance.

It would be the responsibility of the administrative Secretary to ensure timely decision after consulting the Departments and organisations concerned wherever necessary either individually or jointly.

e) Performance appraisal

The system of reporting on the performance of IAS officers and also those of other services has been streamlined to make the performance appraisal a tool for human resource development also. The Annual Confidential Report has been revised and so designed as to provide an objective appraisal in the form of a joint exercise between the officer reported upon and the reporting officer who would evaluate the performance of the officer during the prescribed period, in terms of the achievement against the pre-set quantitative performance targets, wherever quantification is feasible.

iii) Organisational Review

Another major step taken in the sphere of administrative reforms in the recent past has been a comprehensive review of administrative organisation, policies and procedures with the object of achieving decentralisation in the decision-making process, enforcement of accountability, simplification of rules and procedures, prompt and courteous service to the citizens, etc.

The progress made in the review is being closely monitored through reports and meetings taken by the Minister of State for Personnel with the Secretaries of the respective Ministries. Fifty-one Ministries/Departments have been reviewed by the Minister from August 1985 to November 1989. Thirty-six of the Ministries/Departments covered in these meetings have been reviewed twice. These meetings have been found useful in many ways.

(iv) Management Studies

Management studies have continued to receive greater attention. However, while selecting areas for study, emphasis is given to those at the cutting edge level of administration where citizens come in frequent contact with administration or areas which involve complex procedures and generate excessive paperwork. Till the end of December, 1989, the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances had completed about 469 studies.

An illustrative list of important steps taken in the recent past as a result of the studies/reviews as well as action

initiated on their own by the Ministries/Departments to bring about reforms in administration, including procedural simplification, decentralisation/delegation and decontrol/deregulation is given at Appendix-1.

(v) Redress of Public Grievances

Redress of public grievances has occupied a prominent place in the agenda of Government's activities. The objective of the efforts has been not only to provide speedy and effective redress of grievances, but also to smoothen the relationship between citizens and the Government. The strategy adopted in the sphere of public grievances has four important aspects - one to set up or strengthen the grievance machinery in various organisations and to evaluate its effectiveness; second, to concentrate more on identification of systemic deficiencies that give rise to complaints rather than on individual complaints; third, to enlist the cooperation and support of voluntary agencies to supplement the governmental effort in the sphere of public grievances; fourth, to utilise the media for transmission of information on various innovative measures taken by the Government and for creating awareness among the people about their rights and privileges and the services, including grievance redress arrangements available for them.

Redress arrangements at the Centre

As part of this strategy, the Ministries/Departments were requested to take steps to systematise grievance redress

arrangements by ensuring, among others, that a senior officer was designated as Director of Grievances and the system was closely monitored at different levels. Agencies like the railways, hospitals, banks etc. were required to make special arrangements to settle complaints on the spot, as far as possible, because of the time angle involved. Important steps taken in this direction by some of the Ministries/Departments are:

- Public grievances booths have been set up in 45 important railway stations to provide on-the-spot redress on complaints of reservations, refunds, etc;
- A "single window" system has been introduced in the Department of Telecommunications to handle complaints;
- A Grievance Redress Committee has been set up by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to deal with grievances relating to medical care facilities in all hospitals under the Directorate General of Health Services. These hospitals have also nominated Grievance Redress Officers to provide on-the-spot redress to people's problems;
- A Centralised Customer Service Centre Scheme in the nationalised banks for expeditious redress of public grievances has been introduced;
- The Joint Secretary/Protector General of Emigration and Deputy Emigration Officer hold public hearing for two hours every Monday, Wednesday and Friday to hear emigration matters;
- The Delhi Development Authority has devised a public

hearing system to make the grievance redress machinery more efficient and public oriented:

Every Wednesday is observed as a meetingless day. Three hours (10 a.m. to 1.00 p.m.), on this day, are set apart for redress of grievances, when all officers of the level of Deputy Secretary and above are available in their offices for receiving grievances in person.

(a) Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies

To supplement the governmental effort in the sphere of public grievances, voluntary agencies are being involved. Groups of voluntary agencies have been identified and matched with the concerned Departments. A Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies(SCOVA) has been set up in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Department of Women and Child Development, Department of Youth Affairs & Sports,Department of Electronics and Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare. The Committees have representatives of voluntary organisations on their panels, who bring the individual grievances from the public before the Committee, help educate the public and advise the Government on simplification, alteration and streamlining of the existing procedures.

(b) Shikayat Adalat

With a view to bringing, face to face, the aggrieved

with the department concerned for on-the-spot redress of public grievances, the concept of Shikayat Adalat (Grievances Court) has been introduced as an innovative scheme. The scheme has been tried out in the Department of Telecommunications and the Delhi Development Authority and has evoked good response.

(c) Directorate of Public Grievances

A Directorate of Public Grievances headed by an officer of the rank of Secretary to the Government of India was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat on April 1, 1988. The Directorate is vested with the authority to call for the relevant files from the concerned departments to see whether a grievance had been handled in a fair, objective and just manner and whether a 'speaking' decision had been communicated to the complainant within a reasonable time. The Directorate would take up complaints selectively after verifying itself about the bona fides of the complainant and keeping in view the gravity of the grievance.

The jurisdiction of the Directorate is limited to the Ministries/Departments of Railways, Surface Transport, Civil Aviation, Urban Development, Posts, Telecommunications and Banking Division, National Saving Schemes and the Insurance Division of the Department of Economic Affairs.

(vii) Personnel Management

A number of measures of far-reaching consequences have been taken to effect improvement in the sphere of personnel management. Some of the major steps relate to salaries and fringe benefits, pensionary benefits, setting up of a Civil Services Board, Anti-corruption Act, setting up of Central Administrative Tribunal, and training of civil servants. These are briefly discussed below:

a) Salaries and Fringe Benefits

On the recommendations of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, which was set up in 1983 to examine the structure of emoluments and conditions of service, post retirement benefits as well as other allowances and benefits available to the employees, a number of reforms have been effected. The major reforms are -

- Introduction of elongated scales of pay with efficiency bars, to eliminate the problem of stagnation;
- Rationalisation of pay scales and the consequent reduction in the number of scales from 153 to 36; and
- Evolving a formula for drawal of Dearness Allowance as compensation for price increase above the stipulated 12 monthly index average, on half-yearly basis.

b) Pensionary Benefits

The setting up of a separate Department of Pension

and Pensioners' Welfare in 1985 indicates the Government's perception of pension as an instrument to instill confidence in civil servants that they would not be in penury when the bread winner retire from service or dies. It has also been recognised that the pension structure is as important as the pay structure to attract the best talent in the government service.

Consequent on the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission several changes in the pension structure have been brought about. Some of the important changes are given below:

- The guaranteed minimum pension/family pension has been raised to Rs. 375/- p.m. and the maximum pension fixed at Rs. 4,500/-.
- Pension is to be computed at 50% of basic pay only.
- Retirement gratuity has been increased to Rs. one lakh.
- Death Gratuity for employees dying in harness has been introduced at the following rates:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Rates</u>
(i) Less than 1 year	2 times of pay)same)as
(ii) 1 year to less than 5 years	6 times of pay)existing)grades.
(iii) 5 years to less than 20 years	12 times of pay)
(iv) For service of 20 years or more	Half a month's pay for each completed six monthly period of service subject to a maximum of 33 times of pay and monetary limit of Rs. one lakh.

There will not be upper limit on reckonable pay.

Family pension rates have improved, the maximum being Rs. 1250/- p.m.

Those who retired prior to 1.1.86 were given additional relief and a rationalised pension structure was introduced for them.

Dearness relief to pensioners is to be paid in the manner as Dearness Allowance to serving employees. Pensioners drawing pension upto Rs. 1750/- p.m. are to be allowed 100% neutralisation against price rise; those in receipt of pension between Rs. 1751/- to Rs. 3000/- 75%, and those in receipt of pension above Rs. 3000/- 65%.

Other measures:

Apart from the benefits flowing from Pay Commission's recommendations, certain concessions to the pensioners were also extended by the Government. In addition, certain procedural simplifications/innovations have been introduced. The important of these are given below:

- Following the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Government's proposal, the Family Pension Scheme, 1964, was extended retrospectively from 22.9.77 to the families of the deceased employees who had either opted out of the Scheme or were not covered by it.

Similarly, based on the Government's proposal to restore commuted value of pension after 15 years -after retirement or on attaining the age of 70 years in another writ petition the Supreme Court decided to allow restoration w.e.f. 1.4.1985 on completion of 15 years after retirement. Orders to implement the decision were issued.

The Heads of Offices have been made accountable for issuing pension/gratuity payment order on the date of retirement and provisional pension/gratuity order if any delay is anticipated.

Pensioners can now file their nominations at any time convenient to them for their nominees to claim life-time pension arrears.

The format of the Pension Payment Order (PPO) has been revised to incorporate detailed service particulars required for the calculation of pension/family pension. Family pension entitlement is also simultaneously entered in the PPO while sanctioning pension.

Families of Government employees who suddenly disappear or whose whereabouts become unknown to be paid on receipt of the prescribed report, salary due, leave encashment and GPF in the first instance and after a lapse of one year other benefits like Family Pension/DCRG, as against the existing practice of payment of such dues after a lapse of 7 years.

Ready reckoning are issued wherever revision of pension or DA is involved.

Pension Adalats

Pension Adalats (Courts) - an innovative scheme - to bring the pensioner and the administration together to seek on-the-spot redress of grievances was initially tried on the Railways. As the experiment was found to be rewarding the Pension Adalats are now being held in the Department of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Defence.

(b) SCOVA on Pension

To provide an input with a view to making decision centres more responsive to public needs a Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) consisting of representatives of active organisations of pensioners has been set up for the Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare. The SCOVA acts as a forum for exchange of views on various policy initiatives of the Department and as a direct source of feedback on the implementation of programmes.

(c) Civil Services Board

A Civil Services Board was constituted in April 1987 for making selections to the posts at the level of Deputy Secretary, Director and Joint Secretary under the senior staffing scheme at the Centre. Besides the Cabinet Secretary (Ex-officio Chairman), the Board consists of Secretary (Personnel) - (Ex-officio member), one Secretary to the Government of India and Secretary of the Administrative Ministry/Department as members. The Establishment Officer is the Member-Secretary of the Board.

The Board examines the offer list and prepares a panel of three names for each post having regard to the job description, suitability of the candidates' cadre profile in the Ministry/Department, representation of women, representation for the various organised services, equitable opportunities for officers on the offer list and other relevant factors.

The names recommended by the Board are arranged in order of preference and after approval of the Minister of State (Personnel), these are submitted to the Minister of the administrative ministry concerned and thereafter to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.

The constitution of the Civil Services Board and the procedure adopted are aimed at streamlining the process of placements at senior levels under the senior staffing scheme.

d) Anti Corruption Measures

A three-pronged strategy, i.e. preventive, surveillance and detection, and deterrent punitive action, has been adopted to fight the malaise of corruption. An Action Plan on anti-corruption measures has also been formulated along with a calendar of vigilance action on a time-bound basis. The Action Plan includes identification of corruption-prone areas, simplification of rules and procedures, strengthening departmental vigilance machinery, expeditious finalisation of vigilance cases, regular review of the cases of the Government employees who attain the age of 50/55 years or who will be completing 30 years of service with a view to weeding out the corrupt and inefficient elements, and a close watch on the officers of doubtful integrity.

Prevention of Corruption Act

The existing anti-corruption laws and the procedures and mechanisms for detecting the corrupt practices and

punishing the corrupt among public servants have been strengthened with the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Bill, 1988. The Act brings at one place the various provisions relating to prevention of corruption to make the law more stringent. Some of the salient features of the Act are: widening the scope of the definition of the term "Public Servant"; empowering the Central Government also to appoint Special Judges and investing these judges with civil powers and functions exercisable by a District Judge for attachment of property; incorporating the offences under section 161 to 165-A of Indian Penal Code and enhancing the penalties provided for these offences; providing for day to day trial of cases; providing that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for prosecution would be final if it had not already been challenged and the trial had commenced.

e) Central Administrative Tribunal

The civil servants, both in the Union Government and the State Governments, used to move the courts of law including the High Courts and the Supreme Courts of India in respect of their grievances relating to service matters. In view of the fact that the High Courts and the Supreme Court in the country are heavily over-burdened with a large number of cases, the civil servants had to wait for a long time for redress of their grievances. Much of the time of the courts was also spent in discovering facts of the case as the service conditions of Government employees are governed by numerous executive instructions.

A provision was introduced in the Constitution of India to enable the Parliament to pass legislation for creating Administrative Tribunals for the Central Government employees as well as State Government employees which would assume authority, powers and jurisdiction exercised by the courts in the country in service matters. Pursuant to this the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was passed by both the Houses of Parliament.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was established on November 1, 1985. This Tribunal has 15 Benches in different parts of the country. The Central Government employees can take their grievances only to the Administrative Tribunal and all cases pending in the High Courts and the lower courts in the country in respect of service matters of Central Government employees stand transferred to the Tribunal.

In the Tribunal every case is heard by a Bench consisting of one judicial member and one administrative member. The judicial member is drawn from the judiciary or the bar and the administrative member is drawn from the civil services. Complete independence of the Central Administrative Tribunal from the Executive has been ensured. The cases which are filed in the Central Administrative Tribunal are being disposed of expeditiously. The rules of procedures of the Tribunal have also been very much simplified.

Till January 31, 1990 various Benches of the CAT received 24,670 cases from the High Courts and lower courts on transfer. During this period as many as 58,794 cases were also instituted afresh in various Benches of the Tribunal. Of the above two categories 51,894 cases were disposed of by the Tribunal.

(f) Training

One of the major items in the agenda for civil service reforms is training. The objective of training is not only to sharpen the professional skills of the participants, but also to bring about attitudinal changes among them. A comprehensive training strategy was evolved in the middle of the eighties which sought to make the training compulsory and to cover all the civil servants at all levels. Keeping this objective in view, a number of programmes were started for different categories of officers.

A major step in this direction was introduction of compulsory training programmes for IAS officers. A one-week mandatory refresher course, with a vertical mix of participants has been started for all IAS officers to be undergone by them every year. In addition, a three-stage training programme of 4 weeks' duration for IAS officers has been developed to ensure regular imparting of training depending upon the work requirements at specific intervals. These programmes are structured to meet the needs of officers at various levels viz., 6-9 years' service, 10-16 years and 17-20 years in regard to : Programme Implementation, Management Concepts and Decision Making

Techniques, and Policy Planning and Analysis, respectively.

Greater emphasis is given to training in development administration as civil servants are increasingly being entrusted with the task of planning and implementation of programmes in agricultural, industrial and other related fields. Training in project formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation is imparted to them wherever appropriate.

Broadly divided into Plan and Non-Plan programmes, the training programmes seek to cater to different categories of officers in the Central Ministries/Departments, State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings and the nationalised banks.

An idea of the quantum leap in the training activities can be had from the table below indicating the number of training programmes conducted and the officers trained during the period 1985-86 to 1988-89 under different categories :

Year	<u>Non Plan</u>		<u>Plan</u>		<u>IAS</u>	
	No. of Programmes.	No. of Officers trained	No. of Programmes	No. of Officers trained	No. of Programmes	No. of Officers trained
1985-86	44	1157	151	3179	148	3480
1986-87	33	1008	133	3439	135	3446
1987-88	38	998	159	4193	134	3900
1988-89	28	745	229	5080	121	3084

The Cadre authorities have been asked to formulate

training plans for officials of organised Group 'A' Services in consultation with the Training Division of the Department of Personnel and Training and implement them so as to cover every officer by a refresher course relevant to his stage of career by March 1990. For non-group 'A' officials, the Ministries/ Departments have been requested to organise the programmes themselves on account of the large number involved.

Recently, a new thrust was given to management education by launching an intensive 15-month National Management Programme specially designed for a mix of young officers from Government (All-India and Central Services Group 'A') as well as executives of public and private sector organisations. Started from July 1, 1988 at the Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, the programme seeks to promote a joint developmental approach through management education. The programme is supported by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions and is held with the academic cooperation of all the Indian Institutes of Management and Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur.

To attract best talents in the sphere of training, trainers in the central training institutions are given a monetary incentive equivalent to 30% of their gross emoluments.

(VIII) Efficiency drive in Office Management

The importance attached by Government to the strict

compliance of the provisions of the Manual of Office Procedure as part of the drive towards imparting a sense of urgency and dynamism in administration is being continually impressed upon the ministries/departments. It has been reiterated that activities like review of periodical reports and returns, compilation/consolidation of orders/instructions, review of rules, regulations and manuals, inspection of sections and records management are important as they constitute an integral part of the control mechanism to ensure proper and orderly working of the offices. There has also been greater emphasis on reduction in paperwork and monitoring of weekly and monthly arrears reports.

A Plan Scheme for modernisation of government offices has also been formulated which aims at improvement in work environment through: functional layouts; creation of open offices to facilitate better supervision; redress of public grievances and better service to the public; more efficient management of data through reduction in paperwork by using modern aids; and cost effective and space effective records management. The scheme provides for setting up a model office. Accordingly, a Section or a Unit within the office would be taken up for development into a model unit. This unit, in turn, would be a model for others to emulate. An outlay of Rs.25 lakhs was sanctioned under this scheme during the year 1987-88 which was disbursed among 17 ministries/departments for the purchase of modern aids, e.g. photo-copiers, electronic typewriters, shredders, etc. The budget provision was enhanced to Rs.1 crore during the year 1988-89. The scheme has been well received.

IX) Work Improvement Teams

Another innovative measure designed to achieve higher productivity in public organisations was introduction of Work Improvement Teams(WITs). Adapted from the Japanese experience of Quality Control Circle, the WIT is essentially a small group of employees in the same work area or doing similar type of work, who voluntarily meet regularly for about an hour every week to identify, analyse and resolve work-related problems. Through participation at the grass-root level, the scheme seeks to generate higher employee morale, improved productivity and reduction in cost.

The scheme formulated by the Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances envisages a few sequential steps for implementation of WIT programme in Government organisations. First, a small group of members of a unit will identify an operational problem. Then, they will remit it to a Steering Committee for consideration. The Committee to be constituted in each Ministry/Public Sector Undertakings will consist of a few selected employees and be headed by the Secretary/Chief Executive to provide overall leadership for implementation of the programme. Each team will be given a distinct identity in the organisation and its work and contribution will be periodically monitored by the Steering Committee. The scheme also provides for appropriate training for the team leaders in various training institutions.

The scheme has been introduced in select organisations having large interface with the public, viz., Railways, Posts,

Telecommunications, Delhi Development Authority, Health, Labour, Banking, Insurance and Public Enterprises.

X) Adopting new work habits

Officers and staff have been addressed to promote a new work culture by:

- giving more importance to results rather than procedures;
- looking at requests from the members of the public from the users' point of view and not solely from the point of view of what might be administratively convenient; and
- showing more sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of the people.

Conclusions

The above review of the scenario has shown that a number of steps have been taken to bring about reforms in different areas of administration. Different approaches and methodologies have been adopted to achieve the objective. Much of the efforts have been directed to improvements in the system of functioning of public institutions at the cutting edge level of administration. There has been greater emphasis on the simplification and demystification of rules and procedures, on speedy redress of public grievances, changing the attitude and behaviour of the functionaries along with upgradation of their professional skills. No doubt, all these efforts have had their impact, both tangible and intangible, short-term and long-term and in terms of systemic improvements and citizen satisfaction.

However, Administrative Reforms is a continuing process

- the process of unfreezing the established pattern, changing and moving ahead, and refreezing the new pattern. The whole process requires consistent efforts to review the system, identify the inadequacies, locate newer areas and utilise newer methods for reform. The efforts are continuing.